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ABSTRACT 
The increasing reliance on information technology to support business 
processes has emphasised the need for information security mechanisms.  
This, however, has resulted in an ever-increasing workload in terms of 
security administration.  Security administration encompasses the activity of 
ensuring the correct enforcement of access control within an organisation.  
Access rights and their allocation are dictated by the security policies within 
an organisation.  As such, security administration can be seen as a policy-
based approach.   
Policy-based approaches promise to lighten the workload of security 
administrators.  Separation of duties is one of the principles cited as a criterion 
when setting up these policy-based mechanisms.  Different types of 
separation of duty policies exist.  They can be categorised into policies that 
can be enforced at administration time, viz. static separation of duty 
requirements and policies that can be enforced only at execution time, viz. 
dynamic separation of duty requirements.   
This dissertation deals with the specification of both static separation of duty 
requirements and dynamic separation of duty requirements in role-based 
workflow environments.  It proposes a model for the specification of 
separation of duty requirements, the expressions of which are based on set 
theory.  The model focuses, furthermore, on the enforcement of static 
separation of duty.  The enforcement of static separation of duty requirements 
is modelled in terms of invariant conditions.  The invariant conditions specify 
restrictions upon the elements allowed in the sets representing access control 
requirements.   
The sets are themselves expressed as database tables within a relational 
database management system.  Algorithms that stipulate how to verify the 
additions or deletions of elements within these sets can then be performed 
within the database management system.  A prototype was developed in 
order to demonstrate the concepts of this model.  This prototype helps 
demonstrate how the proposed model could function and flaunts its 
effectiveness.   
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Chapter 1.  
Introduction 
Businesses are beginning to realise that in order to remain competitive they 
need to manage their information more intelligently (Mohanty, 1998). Many 
methods exist which a business can make use of to accomplish this task.  
Such methods include knowledge management, total quality management 
and business process re-engineering (BPR).   
BPR projects involve streamlining the current business processes in order to 
improve the efficiency of the business (Motwani, Kumar & Jiang, 1998).  Often 
the implementation of information systems and technology is used to bring 
about the improvement of the business processes.   
It is generally noted that the use of information systems and technology can 
enable better information management.  One such information system is 
known as a workflow management system.  A workflow management system 
is often seen as a suitable solution for BPR projects as it separates the 
business logic and the information technology support it requires 
(Hollingsworth, 1995).   
Workflow is a growing area of business technology concerned with the 
automation of processes that involve various participants.  Workflow 
automates the procedures where documents, data, or tasks are passed 
between participants according to defined rules to achieve, or contribute to, an 
overall business goal.  Workflow can thus be seen as the computerised 
facilitation or automation of a business process, in whole or in part 
(Hollingsworth, 1995).   
Workflow software coordinates workflow processes, which are comprised of a 
series of tasks that must be performed.  These tasks form the basis of a 
business process.  The workflow software will follow the defined process and 
will execute these tasks in the correct order as and when the conditions 
stipulate it.  This will normally result in items of work that must be completed 
by the users that are part of the workflow environment.   
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These work items are created as the workflow progresses along the defined 
process.  For example, a purchase order for a low value item may not require 
special approval, while orders for a high value item will require approval from 
the departmental manager.  Due to the nature of the information being passed 
through the organisation, information security is an important issue within the 
workflow environment.  The prevention of fraud and other detrimental 
activities within the workflow environment needs to be ensured.   
As such, the workflow management coalition (WfMC) has recognised that 
information security is an important issue within workflow environments and 
has begun working on security specifications (WfMC, 1998).  But rather than 
specify exactly how the security is to be implemented, the WfMC has left the 
decision and the implementation of security services to the software 
manufacturers.   
Security services form a vital part of any information system within a business.  
Information in a business must be protected, and for this reason workflow 
management systems do implement security mechanisms (Bertino & Ferrari, 
1999).  Unfortunately, information security administration is a very complex 
and time-consuming activity.  The complex nature of the administration of 
information security is eased through the introduction of role based access 
controls (Bertino & Ferrari, 1999).   
The complex nature of information security administration could be alleviated 
more if the relationship between the workflow environment and the role-based 
environment was better understood.  This understanding would result in a 
greater understanding of how and where security can be enforced.   
In order to understand exactly what this research covers, an overview of the 
research domain is in order.   
1.1  The Research Domain 
The research reported on, in this dissertation, primarily addresses access 
control administration.  In order to understand what access control is, it is 
necessary to review information security services.   
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Information security involves five generic services (ISO 7498–2, 1989).  These 
services are: Authentication; Integrity; Non-repudiation; Access Control and 
Confidentiality.   
An authentication service ensures that the person trying to gain access is 
properly identified and is in possession of the required access rights.   
The integrity service ensures that the information being accessed is not 
corrupted in any way.  Corruption may occur through the tampering of data.   
A non-repudiation service ensures that the information received is from the 
correct source.  This enables the receiving party to know without a doubt that 
the data came from the sending party and not a third party.   
The access control service ensures that data is disseminated to persons who 
have valid access rights and not to those persons who do not have the correct 
access rights.   
The confidentiality service ensures that the information remains secure.   
Complex security features can be created by the careful combination of the 
basic security services.  This project, however, will focus primarily on the 
access control service and its synergy with the integrity service.   
Access control has to do with the control of access to resources.  The 
demands required from access control mechanisms have quickly grown to not 
only include the specification of "who has access", but also the "type of 
access" that is allowed.  In the workflow environment, this can be extended to 
“who has what type of access to which information, under which 
circumstances” (Cholewka, Botha & Eloff, 2000).   
In order to ease the administration of access rights to resources, the notion of 
user groupings has been defined.  This type of access control is referred to as 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein & Youman, 
1996).   
1.1.1  Role-Based Access Control 
In essence RBAC associates permissions with roles, and users with roles.  
Users, therefore, receive permissions based on the roles with which they are 
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associated.  Roles typically represent the various job functions in an 
organisation and users are therefore assigned roles based on their 
responsibilities and qualifications.  Users can be re-assigned from one role to 
another with ease.  Roles can be granted new permissions as new 
applications and systems are incorporated, and permissions can be revoked 
from roles as needed (Sandhu, 1998).  Rules, which are known as 
constraints, can be established to govern the relationships between roles.   
Constraints are sometimes considered the principle motivation for RBAC.  
One common constraint is that of mutually disjointed roles, such as accounts 
payable manager and purchasing manager.  If the same individual is allowed 
to be a member of both these roles, the possibility of committing fraud is 
enhanced.  This forms the basis for a well-known and time-honoured principle 
known as Separation of Duty (SoD) (Ahn & Sandhu, 1999).   
1.1.2  Separation of Duty 
SoD is a fundamental security principle frequently exercised even in the 
paper-based world.  The general idea is to ensure that no single person can 
be responsible for the completion of a business process (Simon & Zurko, 
1997).  Several types of SoD can be identified (Simon & Zurko, 1997) (Gligor, 
Gavrila & Ferraiolo, 1998).   
These types of SoD can be grouped according to time of enforcement.  SoD 
requirements that can be evaluated already at design time are known as static 
separation of duties.  Requirements that can only be evaluated during the 
execution of workflow processes are known as dynamic separation of duties.   
The specification of SoD constraints for either static or dynamic SoD can be 
accomplished within the access control administration environment.  The 
enforcement of static SoD constraints can only be done within the access 
control administration environment.  Dynamic SoD constraints are enforced 
during execution of the workflow processes.  This is an important distinction 
for this research as it impacts on what can be accomplished within the access 
control administration environment.   
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1.1.3  Access Control Administration 
As already mentioned, access control administration is a very complex 
problem.  Although this administration problem is eased through the use of 
roles and permission groupings, the users of the administration systems can 
still make mistakes.   
An access control administration environment that can prevent user errors 
would increase security and maintain ease of use.  This is possible by 
controlling the complex relationships between the various entities in the 
workflow environment.   
The entities involved would include those found within RBAC as well as those 
identified within the workflow environment.  The linking of the workflow 
environment with RBAC only serves to increase the complexity of the access 
control administration environment.  Information security concepts, in 
particular access control, will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.   
Now that the research domain has been established the research questions 
are examined.   
1.2  Research Questions 
The creation of a model for an advanced access control administration 
environment is envisaged.  This model will require a number of problems to be 
researched.  These problems are specified in the form of questions.   
1.2.1 How can RBAC concepts be applied in the workflow environment?   
RBAC environments formulate access control requirements in terms of Roles, 
Users and Permissions.  Additional elements may need to be included into 
these formulations due to the fact that the propagation of work will have an 
effect on access control.  The workflow environment will also dictate how the 
RBAC environment makes use of these elements.   
1.2.2 How is the specification of SoD requirements influenced by the 
inclusion of the workflow entities?   
With the inclusion of the additional workflow information into the RBAC 
environment, it will be necessary to examine the specification of SoD 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 6
principles.  Specifically, what the impact upon the constraints between the 
different entities will be and what rules will govern how they inter-relate.   
1.2.3 Can a single administration paradigm successfully formulate the 
range of separation of duty requirements?   
The term single administration paradigm describes a shift towards an access 
control administration model that combines what used to be separate access 
control tasks into one logical entity.  The single administration paradigm will 
involve the specification of access control requirements and will ensure the 
enforcement of these requirements.  Other approaches could separate these 
tasks into two distinctly different administration entities.  The single 
administration paradigm would allow for a consistent and easy to use 
approach to access control administration.   
The answers to these questions all contribute towards the accomplishment of 
the primary research objectives.   
1.3  Research Objectives 
The objective of this research project is to propose a model that can be used 
to support the specification and enforcement of static SoD constraints in the 
workflow environment.  The model should, furthermore, provide a single 
administration paradigm.   
The proposed model will, furthermore, address the specification of dynamic 
SoD constraints employing the same administration paradigm.  The proposed 
model does not, however, address the enforcement of dynamic SoD 
constraints, since this would be the responsibility of run-time components 
within the workflow environment.   
1.4  Methodology 
The research commenced with a literature study. The first part of the literature 
study developed an understanding of the workflow environment and 
technology currently applied.  Thereafter, a study of access control, 
specifically focusing on the access control requirements of the workflow 
environment, followed.   
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This study of access control requirements resulted in a detailed study of the 
RBAC mechanisms that are frequently used in workflow environments.  The 
focus of the literature study then shifted to examine SoD requirements.   
A model that embodies a single administration paradigm was proposed for the 
specification of SoD requirements.  The model has been extended to include 
the enforcement of static SoD requirements.  The research will furthermore 
demonstrate the proposed model through the development of a security 
administration prototype. 
The next section discusses how the results of this research have been 
incorporated into the dissertation.   
1.5  Layout of Dissertation 
The layout of the dissertation is depicted in Figure 1.1.  The structure of the 
chapters is described below.   
Introduction1.
Workflow
Technology
2. Information Security3.
Access Control
RBAC
Separation of Duty4.
Dynamic SoD
Static SoD
SoDA: The Concept and Model5.
SoDA: The Administration
Paradigm
6. SoDA: The
Enforcement Strategy
7.
SoDA: The Prototype8.
Conclusion9.
 
Figure 1.1 Layout of Dissertation 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The problem statement, the objective of the dissertation and the research 
methodology are introduced here.   
Chapter 2. Workflow Technology 
A clarification of the terminology used in workflow environments is followed by 
a state of the art overview.  A discussion of the concepts of workflow and a 
description of the WfMC's reference model is included.   
Chapter 3. Information Security 
An introduction to information security services is followed by a discussion of 
access control in broad terms.  Focus then shifts to role-based access control 
(RBAC).  It is shown how RBAC eases security administration through a 
policy-based approach.   
Chapter 4. Separation of Duty 
Separation of duty as a security policy is introduced.  It is shown that the 
workflow environment provides an appropriate context for specifying SoD 
policies.  This chapter introduces the difference between static and dynamic 
SoD.   
Chapter 5. SoDA: The Concept and Model 
The conceptual framework of the model is followed by a definition of the 
scope of the model.   
Chapter 6. SoDA: The Administration Paradigm 
An introduction to the entities that are involved is followed by descriptions and 
explanations of the relationships between these entities.  It then describes the 
conflict paradigm that has been adopted.  Thereafter, the conflict concept is 
incorporated as part of the model.   
Chapter 7. SoDA: The Enforcement Strategy 
This chapter introduces algorithms for maintaining integrity in the model.   
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Chapter 8. SoDA: The Prototype 
A discussion of the design of the prototype is followed by an explanation of 
the implementation issues.  The detailed workings of the prototype are shown.  
The lessons learnt and the shortcomings of the prototype conclude this 
chapter.   
Chapter 9. Conclusion 
A summary of the findings of this research is followed by a discussion of 
possible future research.   
The workflow environment forms the basis of the access control 
administration model and, as such, the next chapter will discuss the workflow 
environment.  In addition to describing the workflow environment, an example 
workflow process will be introduced in this chapter and will be referred to 
throughout this dissertation.   
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Chapter 2.  
The Workflow Environment 
Interest in workflow technology has been increasing as is evident with the 
plethora of workflow systems available.  Companies such as Oracle, SAP, 
Microsoft and Adobe have all adopted some workflow functionality into their 
products.  Workflow systems are also currently being used to facilitate other 
areas of business such as customer relationship management (Stadler, 2000).  
Many companies have adopted workflow systems as a means of 
implementing business process reengineering (BPR) projects (Teng, Jeong & 
Grover, 1998).  Workflow technology is often used as the solution for BPR 
projects as it separates the business logic and the IT infrastructure 
(Hollingsworth, 1995).   
It is necessary to examine the workflow environment in order to gain answers 
to the research questions that were formulated in the previous chapter.  The 
knowledge gained about the workflow environment will enable role-based 
access control to be applied to the workflow environment.   
In order to gather this knowledge of the workflow environment, a study of the 
Workflow Management Coalition’s (WfMC) generic workflow product 
reference model will be carried out.  This model identifies the characteristics, 
terminology, and components of the generic workflow system (Hollingsworth, 
1995).  Any developments in workflow technology can be based upon this 
generic model.  As such, a look at the architecture of a workflow system is in 
order.   
2.1  Architecture of a Workflow System 
The workflow reference model proposed by the WfMC is an effort to 
standardise workflow management products.  The reference model describes 
the concepts of workflow management, the reference architecture, and the 
interfaces between the various workflow components (Hollingsworth, 1995).   
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Many existing or future workflow systems may differ in implementation but 
they encompass some form of the architectural components described in the 
workflow reference model.  These similarities enable the model to be used as 
a foundation for the study of existing and future workflow environments. 
Administration and Monitoring Tools
Process
Definition
Tool
Workflow
Client
Applications
Invoked
Applications
Workflow
Enactment
Workflow
Engines
Build-time Run-time
 
Figure 2.1 The workflow reference model and components 
The process definition tool defines a process into a computer processable 
form.  This defined process is known as a process definition.  The process 
definition holds all necessary instructions to enable the workflow enactment 
software to correctly execute it.  Information such as the starting and 
completion conditions and user tasks to be undertaken is included within the 
definition.  In the workflow example, described in section 2.2, the process 
definition would be the tasks and the rules to transform between the tasks.   
The workflow enactment service interprets the process description.  Based on 
the process definition it will begin processes and sequence activities.  The 
workflow enactment software will also add work items to the user work lists 
and invoke application tools as necessary.   
A workflow engine is the part of the workflow enactment service that places 
items onto worklists when user interactions are needed.  The worklist handler, 
which is part of the workflow client applications, will handle these items.   
The worklist handler manages the interaction between users and the workflow 
enactment service.  The worklist handler progresses the work requiring user 
attention.  It uses the worklist to interact with the workflow enactment 
software.  The WfMC uses the term workflow client application in preference 
to "worklist handler" to reflect its larger potential usage (Hollingsworth, 1995).   
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The workflow environment may invoke applications to handle various tasks 
that do not require user interaction.  The workflow environment would need 
sufficient logic built in to be able to communicate with the invoked application.   
The final area of standardisation is a common interface for administration and 
monitoring functions.  This will allow a single administration and monitoring 
tool from one vendor to be used, with multiple workflow environments from 
other vendors.  These administration and monitoring tools must take into 
account the temporal nature of the workflow environment.   
For the purposes of this research we distinguish events based upon the time 
that they occur.  Events can be either build-time or run-time.   
Build-time events are typically the process definition and the access control 
definition.  This dissertation uses the term “build-time function” to refer to 
these events.  These events are distinct from the run-time events that include 
the creation of process instances and the enforcement of access control.   
2.1.1  Build-Time Functions 
One aim of the build-time functions is to produce a computerised definition of 
a business process.  This is accomplished by translating a business process 
from the real world into a computer processable definition.  Various business 
analysis, modelling and system definition techniques may be used to produce 
the process definition.  The process definition can be displayed in various 
means such as graphically or textually and is also called a process model, 
process template, or process metadata.  A system administrator or the 
process owner may be responsible for the creation of the process definition.   
A process definition comprises of various tasks1 that have associated human 
or computer operations.  Tasks are the building blocks of business processes 
and a user would perform each task.  An example of a task that a user would 
perform is the ‘Approve Order’ task described in the workflow example in 
section 2.2.  A computer-controlled task could possibly be the ‘Check Stock’ 
                                            
1 The term ‘activity steps’, which is used by the WfMC, is synonymous with the term ‘tasks’, 
which is more widely used within this text (Workflow Management Coalition. 1996). 
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task.  The scenario depicts this task as being controlled by a user, however it 
could be controlled by a computer application if the stock system was 
automated.  Tasks can be limited to certain sets of users ensuring a level of 
access control.  Access control specification is another of the build-time 
functions and is a major area of focus for this research.   
The constraints that ensure access control can also be used to govern the 
progression between tasks within a workflow process.  These constraints 
govern when and if a task should be performed.  In the workflow example in 
section 2.2, the ‘Approve Order’ task only gets performed if the order is above 
a certain value.  This is an example of a constraint governing the progression 
of the process.   
The process definition is subject to standardisation while the means of 
creating the definition can vary greatly between workflow products.  This 
standardisation is necessary to allow for the interchange of data between 
other build-time and run-time components.   
2.1.2  Run-Time Functions 
The process definition is interpreted by software that will create and control 
instances of the process.  This software will schedule the activities and will 
invoke the different human or IT applications as needed.  The users who 
interact with the workflow environment are the organisation employees and 
other people who may form a part of the workflow processes.  The run-time 
control functions link the modelled process to the real-world process.   
In order to understand how a real world process functions within a workflow 
management system, an example workflow process will be discussed.   
2.2  Example Workflow 
The example workflow process definition, which will be used to explain the 
workflow concepts in more detail, is depicted in figure 2.2.  It describes an 
internal order procedure within an organisation.  It is made up of activities that 
can be performed by members of certain roles such as Employee or Manager 
roles.  Roles are discussed in depth in chapter 3 but for now a role can be 
seen as a direct mapping to an organisational structure.  For example, an 
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employee may place a purchase order, whilst only a departmental manager 
may approve the order.   
The internal order process needs to be converted into a process definition for 
use by the workflow environment.   
2.2.1  Defining the Process 
The definition of the process will involve analysing all the tasks and conditions 
for every step of the process.  The process definition will also define 
conditions that must be met during the performance of a task.  These 
conditions are often expressed as entry and exit conditions for a task 
(Hollingsworth, 1995).  For example, a purchase order for a low value item 
(i.e.. value <= 100) may not require special approval, whilst other orders with 
higher values would require approval from the departmental manager. 
Note that a task definition may very well be a complete workflow.  The "Order 
stock" task in Figure 2.2 may, for example, require its own process definition 
(WfMC, 1998).   
Approved
Rejected
Value > 100 Stock available
Value
<=
100
Out of
stock
Complete order form
Role: Employee
T1
Check stock
Role: Stock controller
T2
Approve order
Role: Manager
T3
Issue stock
Role: Stock controller
T4
Write rejection memo
Role: Manager
T6
Order stock
Role: Stock controller
T5
 
Figure 2.2 The “internal order” process 
At any stage within the workflow environment, multiple instances of this 
workflow process may be in operation.  Each instance of this workflow 
process will need to be interpreted by the workflow enactment service.   
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2.2.2  Interpreting the Definition 
Each workflow process instance could be at a different point in execution as 
shown in figure 2.3.  The route taken by the workflow process depends upon 
that particular instance’s operational data.  An instance of a task is created 
upon demand as the tasks are encountered during the processing of the 
workflow.  In this case, whether the item requested is above a certain value or 
whether it is in stock, different tasks will be instantiated.  In figure 2.3, process 
instance 1 depicts a task (t11) that is waiting for a manager to approve it while 
in instance 2 the order has been approved (t23) and is busy being checked by 
the stock controller (t22).   
 Defining the Process 
t 1 
t 5 t 6 
t 4 t 3 
t 2 
Interpreting the Definition 
Process Definition 
Build-time Run-time 
t 11 
t 13 
t 31 
t 35 
t 34 
t 32 
t 
23 
t 21 t 22 
Process Instance 1 
Process Instance 2 
Process Instance 3 
 
Figure 2.3 Example process instances 
Process instance 3, however, was of a low value (<=100) and did not need 
approval from the manager.  This means that task t3 was not instantiated and 
thus the process bypassed the manager.  Task t2 was instantiated instead and 
so the stock controller is checking the order (t32).  But the item was not in 
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stock and so the stock controller had to order the item (t35) before being able 
to issue the stock (t34).   
These tasks generally involve placing work items onto the user’s worklists.  
Only a user that is associated to the correct role will receive the relevant work 
items.   
2.2.3  Interacting with the User 
The users in the example system, as shown in figure 2.4, are as follows: 
· Users A and B are associated with the Manager role. 
· User C is associated with the Stock Controller role. 
 Interpreting the Definition 
Run-time 
t 11 
t 13 
t 31 
t 35 
t 34 
t 32 
t 23 
t 21 t 22 
Process Instance 1 
Process Instance 2 
Process Instance 3 
Interacting with the User 
t 13 
t 13 
t 22 
User A 
Manager 
User B 
Manager 
User C 
Stock Controller 
 
Figure 2.4 Task instances and user interaction 
At various points during the execution of the workflow process instances, 
worklist items will appear on different users’ worklists.  These worklist items 
will only appear in certain users’ worklists, which are determined by the 
relationships between the users and the roles, and the task and the roles.  
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The worklist items of a task may only be assigned to users who are 
associated with the same role that the task is associated with.   
An example is depicted in figure 2.4.  Since a worklist item based on task 
instance for task t13 appears on two worklists, user A’s and user B’s, both are 
managers.  As soon as one of them completes the worklist item, it will 
disappear from both of their lists.  Task instance t22 appears on user C’s 
worklist as a worklist item, as user C is a stock controller within the 
organisation.   
Task instance t23 of process instance 2 only appears on user B’s worklist 
unlike task instance t13, which appears on both user A and B’s worklists.  This 
is due to the fact that user A, as a member of the employee role, placed the 
order.  That is, user A submitted the order form that instantiated process 
instance 2.  A constraint is in place that prevents a user from approving self 
placed orders in order to reduce the possibility of fraud.  This technique of 
restricting access rights is known as separation of duty and is discussed 
further in chapter 4.   
This type of constraint closely follows the organisational security policies and 
would have to be programmed into the process definition through an 
administration tool.  An organisation’s access control policy needs to maintain 
the integrity between system objects and real world objects.  This means that 
the organisation’s workflow systems should only allow actions that would be 
allowed to occur in the real world.  This can only happen when the business 
constraints that form the organisational policies are mirrored within the 
workflow access control decisions.   
2.3  Conclusion 
This chapter has defined the workflow environment and has introduced the 
core components of the workflow environment.  These components include 
the build-time and run-time components as well as the concept of the task.  
An example workflow definition was used to illustrate how the workflow 
environment functions, as well as to demonstrate some access control 
principles.  This workflow example will be referred to when describing 
information security.   
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The WfMC has identified that information security and the area of security 
administration are important for workflow systems (WfMC, 1998).  An 
important part of information security is access control and the accompanying 
administration for the access control requirements.   
While some information security services may be handled by the underlying 
operating system, there are still areas of information security within the 
workflow system that need specialised information security services.  These 
information security services, and especially access control services, will be 
reviewed and discussed in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 3.  
Information Security 
Information security has been recognised as an important aspect of a 
workflow environment from an organisation’s perspective.  More importantly it 
should be noted that even though various types of security services exist, it 
was ascertained that access to the data and the integrity of the data are 
paramount.  In order to correctly implement these two information security 
services, a proper understanding of all the information security services is 
needed.   
Another reason for examining the information security services is the 
introduction of open systems such as the Internet.  An organisation’s critical 
data is being distributed through these open systems and as such a higher 
degree of security is required.   
A lapse of security that causes some of this information to become freely 
accessible could be very detrimental to the day-to-day activities of the 
business.  In order to properly protect an organisation’s information, various 
security services need to be implemented and used by the organisation.  
Doing so will prevent many possible offences. Offences could include 
(Stallings, 1995):  
· Modification: An unauthorised user gains access to valuable data and 
modifies that data. This constitutes an attack on integrity. An example of 
this could be the alteration of the contents of a purchase order through the 
worklist item in the workflow’s worklist handler.   
· Fabrication: An unauthorised party adds fake objects to the system. This 
constitutes an attack on authenticity. An example of this would be 
transmitting fabricated worklist items in order to gain from manipulating the 
workflow system. 
· Interception: An unauthorised party gains access to an asset of the 
system. This constitutes an attack on confidentiality. An example would be 
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the monitoring of messages on the network.  In so doing, values that would 
trigger certain checks could be altered in order to bypass those checks.   
Five different security services are generally recognised.  These security 
services are generally known as: authentication; confidentiality; non-
repudiation; integrity; and access control (ISO 7498–2, 1989).  These security 
services have evolved from within the real world and are also very relevant 
within the information technology realm.   
3.1  Information Security Services 
Through the correct use of various security services, a secure information 
environment can exist (Stallings, 1995).  It is important to understand what 
each service tries to accomplish and how they can work together.   
Authentication services ensure the users are who they claim to be.  The 
correct identification of a user is important for maintaining accountability and 
access control.  There are three discernable methods of authentication, which 
include: passwords; physical tokens; and biometric techniques (Sandhu & 
Samarati, 1996).   
Passwords are normally utilised within the login process in software products.  
They are not a very secure method unless they are chosen carefully and 
changed very often.  Passwords, besides being susceptible to guessing or 
automated dictionary attacks, are also susceptible to discovery through the 
use of network sniffers.  The use of passwords alone does not ensure a 
secure environment.   
Physical tokens, such as smart cards, are a better approach.  Users now need 
to physically have a valid access token to gain control.  This coupled with 
needing a password makes for better security. An example of a security token 
would be a bank’s ATM card.  However, tokens can be stolen or forged and 
as such are not as secure as they could be.   
Biometric techniques offer another approach to the security token method.  
Instead of making a user keep a token such as a smart card, biometric 
techniques allow the user themselves to be the key.  A variety of 
characteristics including fingerprints, retinas, voice patterns, and hand 
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geometry, are able to be measured and to uniquely identify a person.  
Biometric security methods are also not failsafe and as such should also be 
used in combination with other authentication methods.   
Confidentiality services maintain the non-disclosure of information from 
unauthorised users.  It also maintains the confidentiality of information that is 
transferred between parties.  To keep information confidential it can either be 
kept hidden or it can be encrypted.  Various encryption schemes exist 
including symmetrical key and public/private key systems, using a variety of 
enciphering mechanisms.   
There are two levels of data confidentiality (Michener, 1999). Firstly, keep 
unauthorised users unaware of the existence of the data.  This can be 
accomplished by proper access control to the data.  As such, it is limited to 
the computer systems and applications that store the data.  Secondly, keep 
unauthorised users unaware of the semantic content of the data.  This can be 
accomplished through the encryption of the data by utilising various 
encryption techniques.   
Non-repudiation services prevent denial of service to properly authenticated 
and authorised users (Zhou & Lam, 1999).  Non-repudiation is normally 
achieved through the use of digital signatures (Zhou & Lam, 1999).  These 
digital signatures are made up of a public/private key encrypted addition to the 
information being transmitted.  If the sender’s public key deciphers the 
encrypted signature, then it is proof that the message was from the sender.  
For example, if a recipient of a message returns a proof of delivery with a 
digital signature, then non-repudiation is provided.  Due to the nature of public 
and private key encryption, only the recipient’s private key could have created 
the digital signature. And this digital signature provides non-forgeable 
evidence of the delivery of the message.  Symmetric encryption cannot 
guarantee non-repudiation since the sender and the receiver share the key.  
This enables either party to create a fake digital signature.   
Integrity services are responsible for the sound state of the information.  
Integrity of information is dependant upon the timely, accurate, complete and 
consistent nature of the information.  Integrity services provide for the basic 
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protection against corruption during storage or transfer through the effective 
use of various mechanisms such as a checksum.  These mechanisms are 
typically already in place in data storage devices and communication 
protocols.  Cryptographic methods provide for strong data integrity through the 
use of a calculated message hash of the data.  If the data gets corrupted 
enroute then it will be identified as such when the message hash is decrypted.  
As the data is not encrypted it does not provide for confidentiality.   
Integrity issues can be separated into three different aspects (Leymann & 
Roller, 1999): (1) operational integrity deals with concurrent access to data, 
(2) physical integrity implies protection from loss of data and (3) semantic 
integrity requires that the data complies with the appropriate business rules.  
Operational integrity can be maintained through concurrency controls as part 
of the integrity service.  Physical integrity can be achieved by the use of 
checksums, provided by the integrity service, and cryptographic techniques 
provided by the confidentiality service.  Semantic integrity relies heavily on the 
access control service, as it will require that data can only be changed 
according to certain business rules.   
Access control services ensure that a user only has access to the 
information and resources for which the user has rights.  It is important to 
ensure that users have access to the information that will allow them to do 
their work.  It may also be important to restrict users from access to resources 
and information that they do not need.  An organisation should be able to 
specify who can access information and how and when it can be accessed, 
including under which conditions (Sandhu et al., 1996).  Access control is 
seen as an indispensable part of any information sharing system (Shen & 
Dewan, 1992).   
This research focuses upon access control more than any of the other 
security services.  An in-depth look at this particular information security 
service will be followed by an analysis of role based access control.   
3.2  Access Control 
Once authentication services are in place it becomes possible to implement 
access control services.  There are several forms of access control, including 
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discretionary access control, lattice-based access control and role-based 
access control (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994).   
Discretionary Access Controls (DAC) revolves around the concept of the data 
having an owner.  The owner determines who will have access to this data.  
Access to a copy of the data can be obtained as DAC allows data to be 
copied without restriction from object to object.   
Lattice-based access controls (Sandhu, 1993) are also known as mandatory 
access controls (MAC).  This type of access control is based on rules for 
deciding whether a user may access requested data.  The rules only allow the 
transfer of information in one direction in a lattice of security labels.  Labels 
would include low, medium and high security and users would be assigned to 
a label.  The confidentiality requirements of the military brought about MAC, 
but it has uses in many other applications.   
In the workflow environment, access needs to be granted when a user needs 
it and should be revoked once the user has completed the work.  In the 
workflow example shown in figure 2.2, the stock controller should only be able 
to issue stock when an order comes through.  The rights needed to issue 
stock should only be granted when the internal order process has reached the 
task that requires it.  Neither MAC nor DAC support this functionality.   
If the workflow system made use of MAC for its access control requirements 
then a user would gain access to objects that they should not gain.  This is 
due to the global nature of the access that is granted.   
If the workflow system made use of DAC for its access control requirements 
the security administration of the system would become very complex.  This is 
due to the fact that each object within the system could be owned by a unique 
user and as such would involve the complex administration of access rights 
(Osborn, Sandhu & Munawer, 2000).  Administration of the access rights to 
the individual users is also a complex exercise.   
Extensions to access control models such as role based access control have 
been introduced in order to add these types of functions (Nyanchama & 
Osborn, 1999).  Access rights are assigned directly to the user with DAC, 
while with MAC there is less control over the particular access rights that are 
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assigned to a particular user.  Role-based access control mechanisms deal 
with these issues by assigning the access rights to roles.  A user will gain 
these access rights when he is assigned membership to the roles (Sandhu et 
al., 1996).  This greatly simplifies information security administration.   
RBAC can effectively enforce both MAC and DAC (Sandhu & Munawer, 1998) 
and is policy neutral.  The policy that an RBAC based system enforces is a 
direct result of the RBAC components and their interactions (Sandhu et al., 
1996).  The RBAC model affords an administrator the opportunity to express 
an access control policy in terms of the way that the organisation is viewed.   
The RBAC model makes use of roles, which are used to logically group 
permissions together so that they reflect the organisation’s view or the 
application’s view.  Roles are basically a semantic construct around which a 
variety of different concepts and models can be formulated.   
Since this dissertation will be utilising RBAC, a more in-depth look at RBAC is 
in order.   
3.3  Role Based Access Control 
RBAC greatly simplifies the permission to user information security 
administration.  This simplification is achieved by only needing to administer 
the user to role assignments instead of needing to assign all required 
permissions to every user.  Users get assigned to the roles with those 
permissions they need to do their work.   
This can be seen in a DBMS such as Oracle where roles can be created with 
all the access rights and permissions necessary for a particular user group 
(Oracle, 1999).  Any user that comes into the organisation as part of the group 
will be assigned to that role and will immediately have access to all required 
data.   
RBAC also supports the following security principles: least privilege and 
separation of duties.  It supports least privilege by only allowing the 
permissions required to perform a job to be assigned to a role.  It ensures 
separation of duty by ensuring that mutually exclusive roles complete a 
sensitive task.  The application of these principles cannot be enforced by 
Chapter 3. Information Security 
 25 
RBAC.  These principles rely upon the correct use by the security 
administrator.   
It is possible to predefine the role-permission relationships in order to simplify 
the assignment of users to predefined roles.  The role-permission 
assignments tend to change slower than the user-role assignments (Sandhu 
et al., 1996).  It is also seen to be desirable to allow administrators to be able 
to administer the user-role assignments but not the permission-role 
assignments.  This is due to the fact that assigning users to roles is less 
technical than assigning permissions to roles.   
It is important to differentiate between the concept of groups and roles.  
Groups are typically seen as groupings of users while roles are seen as 
groupings of permissions (Sandhu et al., 1996).  It can also be seen that a 
role brings together groups of users and groups of permissions, and 
consequently acts as an intermediary.   
In this dissertation the existing and well-accepted RBAC96 model (Sandhu et 
al., 1996) is used.  Choosing an independently developed existing model for 
this exercise gives us an element of objectivity in assessing the power of the 
proposed administration paradigm.  An overview of the RBAC96 model must 
therefore be given.   
In order to better understand the RBAC model, the different concepts that 
form this model will now be described.   
3.4  The RBAC96 Model 
Sandhu et al (1996) describes four different conceptual RBAC models.  The 
first is RBAC0, which is the base model that specifies the minimum set of 
requirements for any system that implements RBAC fully.  The second is 
RBAC1, which adds the concept of role hierarchies that allow roles to inherit 
permissions from other roles.  The third is RBAC2, which adds the concept of 
the constraint.  These constraints impose restrictions upon the configuration of 
various components within RBAC.  The final model is RBAC3, which includes 
RBAC1, RBAC2 and RBAC0.  This family of models is better known as 
RBAC96.   
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3.4.1  The RBAC96 Entities 
The RBAC96 model consists of 4 main entities: users, roles, permissions and 
sessions.  These entities and their relationships with one another can be seen 
in figure 3.1.   
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U 
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Figure 3.1 Role-based access control model (Sandhu, 1996) 
The user denotes a human being but can also denote any automated process.  
To keep the model simple though, it will be assumed that it is a human being.  
Users are part of a set called U as shown in figure 3.1.   
A role is generally a job function or title within an organisation.  A user that is 
assigned to a particular role would generally be working within the job function 
that the role denotes.  Roles are part of a set called R as shown in figure 3.1.   
A permission is a privilege to access an object or objects in the organisation in 
a certain way.  A permission is always positive and will allow the user to 
access the referenced object in the way defined by the permission.  The 
objects that are referred to could be either data objects or resource objects.  
The concept of the permission can vary from being very coarse grained to 
being very fine grained.  The particular nature of a permission depends upon 
the system being implemented.  Permissions are part of a set called P as 
shown in figure 3.1.   
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A session is a mapping of a user to one or more roles.  This means that a 
session is unique to a particular user.  The user also receives the union of all 
the permissions of the role.  This means that a user that belongs to a few 
sessions could be associated with many roles.  Each role may, in turn, 
associate many permissions to the user and as such care must be taken to 
ensure that the user doesn’t get the ability to commit fraud.  Sessions are part 
of a set called S as shown in figure 3.1.   
Users may have multiple sessions open simultaneously and users have 
control over which roles they activate.  A user can belong to a powerful role 
but may leave it deactivated until required.   
As can be seen in figure 3.1, user assignments and permission assignments 
are both many to many relations with roles.  This is denoted by the double-
headed arrows on both ends of the joining line.  This means that roles can 
have many users and a user can be assigned to many roles, and that 
permissions can be assigned to many roles and many roles can have the 
same permission.   
3.4.2  Role Hierarchies 
Role hierarchies are a natural way of structuring roles so that they match the 
internal structure of an organisation.  This dissertation refers to role 
hierarchies as role networks.   
 Manager 
Stock Clerk Senior Clerk 
Employee 
 
Figure 3.2 Role hierarchy example 
Roles within the hierarchy inherit the permissions from lower roles.  This 
would mean that the Stock Clerk role in figure 3.2 would have all of the 
Employee role’s permissions as well as its own.  The Manager role would 
have the Stock Clerk, Senior Clerk and the Employee role’s permissions.   
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Sandhu et al (1996) have defined the entities and their relationships through a 
mathematical model. Users (U) are associated with roles (R) through the user-
assignment relation (UA), which is shown in figure 3.1.  Similarly, permissions 
(P) are associated with roles (R) through the permission-assignment relation 
(PA), which is also shown in figure 3.1.  Roles are arranged in role hierarchies 
through the partial order RH.  A role that is senior to another role inherits the 
permissions of the junior role.  A user that is associated with a senior role in 
the role hierarchy, therefore, may also assume all the roles junior to the senior 
role in the RH partial order. 
3.4.3  Constraints 
Figure 3.1, however, lacks the definition of RBAC2, which adds the concept of 
the constraints.  Figure 3.3 depicts the addition of the concept of constraints 
into RBAC.  Constraints affect every part of the relationships between the 
RBAC entities.   
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Figure 3.3 Role-based access control model with constraints (Sandhu, 1996) 
Constraints are considered to be a very important aspect of RBAC.  They are 
the mechanism through which the organisation’s policies can be enforced.  
Constraints that are in place will ensure that associations between the RBAC 
entities will comply with what is allowable by the policies.  As such, the 
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administrator’s job will be eased, as the RBAC environment will ensure the 
integrity of the data.   
An example of a constraint would be mutually exclusive roles such as the 
Manager and the Stock Controller roles.  A user may not be a member of both 
of these roles, as this would create an opportunity for fraud.  This principle is 
known as separation of duties.   
Due to the nature of the concept of the constraint, numerous types can be 
identified.  These types of constraints include:  
Mutually exclusive roles, which ensure that two roles cannot be assigned to 
the same user.  This helps to ensure separation of duty requirements.   
Mutually exclusive permissions, which provides additional assurances for 
ensuring separation of duty requirements.   
Dual constraint on permission assignment, which restricts a permission from 
being assigned to more than one role in a mutually exclusive set.   
User assignment constraints, which, among many possible uses, could restrict 
the number of users that may be assigned to a role.   
Not all of the possible constraints would be needed in a system.  The 
constraints and the conflicts between entities that are used within this 
research are discussed in more detail in chapter 6.   
Also, the concept of the session is not considered within this research, as 
access control requirements and separation of duty requirements do not need 
the session entity in order to be enforced.   
3.4.4  Formal Summary of RBAC96 
Consider a short formal summary of the relevant components in the RBAC96 
model, based on the work of Sandhu et al (1996) and Ahn & Sandhu (1999):   
Definition 3.1 formalises the entities that are evident.   
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Definition 3.1: RBAC entities 
There are sets of users, roles and permissions. 
U = set of users, {u1,u2,…,ul} 
R = set of roles, {r1,r2,…,rm} 
P = set of permissions, {p1,p2,…,pn} 
Definition 3.2 formalises the associations that can exist between the entities.   
Definition 3.2: RBAC associations 
Users and permissions can be associated with roles and roles can form a 
hierarchy with other roles. 
UA Í U ´ R, a many-to-many user-to-role assignment relation 
PA Í P ´ R, a many-to-many permission-to-role assignment relation 
RH Í R ´ R, a partial order on R called the role hierarchy, also written 
as £  
Definition 3.3 formalises the functions that are used to ascertain the roles that 
a user or permission may be associated with.  This is necessary in order to 
know which users are allowed to receive the different worklist items that are 
generated by the workflow enactment service.   
Definition 3.3: Roles function 
roles: U È P®2R, a function mapping the sets U and P to a set of roles 
roles* : U È P®2R extends roles in the presence of a role hierarchy 
roles(ui)={rÎR½(ui,r)ÎUA} 
roles(pi)={rÎR½(pi,r)ÎPA} 
roles*(ui)={ rÎR½($r £  r')[(ui,r')ÎUA]} 
roles*(pi)={ rÎR½($r' £ r)[(pi,r')ÎPA]} 
Note that the definition of roles* is carefully formulated to reflect the role 
inheritance with respect to users going downwards and with respect to 
permissions going upwards. 
Definition 3.4 formalises the functions that are used to ascertain the 
permissions that a user may be associated with through the user’s role 
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association.  This is necessary in order to know when a user may have 
access to a system object.   
Definition 3.4: Permissions function 
perm: U È R ® 2P, a function mapping users and roles to a set of 
permissions.   
perm*: U È R ® 2P, extends perm in the presence of a role hierarchy.   
perm(ri) = {p Î P ½ (p,ri) Î PA} 
perm(ui) = {p Î P ½ ($rÎroles(ui))[(p,r) Î PA]} 
perm*(ri) = {p Î P ½ ($r' £ ri)[(p,r') Î PA]} 
perm*(ui) = {p Î P ½ ($r Î roles*(ui))[(p,r) Î PA]} 
Additions can now be made to these formalisations in order to extend RBAC’s 
functionality.  As such, RBAC can be adapted in order to enhance its 
effectiveness within a workflow environment.   
3.5  Conclusion 
This chapter contributed to this research by firstly, introducing information 
security and the information security services, and then discussing access 
control and role based access control.  The formal definition of the RBAC 
environment will allow for the expansion of the RBAC environment to cater for 
the needs of the workflow environment.   
RBAC is not considered to be perfect for every access control scenario.  This 
is particularly evident with situations where sequences of operations will 
necessitate more complex control.  An example of this is a purchase 
requisition where certain steps must be accomplished before the item can be 
issued.  Other types of access control mechanisms could be built onto RBAC 
to extend its functionality for this purpose (Sandhu et al., 1996).  Control of 
sequence is generally the domain of workflow systems.   
Thomas and Sandhu have argued that it is time to move towards new 
paradigms in access control (1993).  They have stated that authorisation 
(access control) in distributed applications should be distinguished in terms of 
tasks rather than individual objects.  This observation is partly based upon the 
emergence of workflow type software applications within organisations.  This 
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research takes the concept of tasks and integrates it within the RBAC 
environment to actively support workflow environments.   
It is important for an organisation to prevent fraud; one way to accomplish this 
is to use separation of duty (Thomas & Sandhu, 1993).  Separation of duty 
aims to prevent fraud by separating the responsibility for a process between 
different users.  This enforcement of separation of duty requirements could be 
accomplished through the use of constraints within the RBAC environment.  
Separation of duty forms an essential component of this research and as such 
it will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4.  
Separation of Duty 
A dominant security issue within organisations is the prevention and restriction 
of fraud.  The principle of separation of duty (SoD) is a time-honoured 
principle for achieving this goal.  Separation of duty involves never allowing an 
individual to have enough privileges within the organisation to commit fraud on 
his own (Sandhu, 1990).  This is achieved through the breaking up of 
business processes into smaller tasks and having these tasks performed by 
different users.   
A more formal definition of SoD is that it is a security principle that is used to 
formulate multi-person control policies, requiring two or more distinct people to 
be responsible for the completion of a task or set of tasks (Simon & Zurko, 
1997).  In doing so, fraud is discouraged by the distribution of the 
responsibility between more than one user.  The spreading of the 
responsibility raises the risks of fraud by necessitating the involvement of 
more than one individual.   
Users only deal with smaller tasks that constitute a business process within a 
workflow environment.  And as such, the workflow environment could support 
SoD principles.   
This is achieved in the workflow example, which has been covered in chapter 
2, by making use of three different roles to complete the various tasks when 
processing an internal purchase order.  Firstly, there is the employee role that 
completes the order form, after which the order may be approved by the 
manager role, and finally there is the stock controller role that gets the ordered 
item to the employee.  Fraud can be committed at various positions within this 
process.   
An example of a fraudulent act is if the person who is the manager places an 
order for something expensive and then proceeds to approve the order.  By 
preventing the manager from approving his own order, fraud is prevented.  
This is an example of one SoD requirement in the cited example.   
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To understand how SoD is used and how it fits into the workflow environment, 
it is imperative to consider its history.   
4.1  Related SoD Research 
The term "separation of privilege" was identified as one of eight design 
principles for the protection of information in computer systems by Saltzer and 
Schroeder (1975).  They built on the observation that a security system with 
two keys is more robust and flexible than one that requires a single key.  No 
single accident, deception or breach of trust is therefore sufficient to 
compromise the system.   
Clark and Wilson (1987) identified separation of duty as one of the two major 
mechanisms that can be implemented to ensure data integrity.  SoD serves as 
a mechanism to counteract fraud and error, whilst assuring correspondence 
between system objects and the real world objects that they represent.  They 
asserted that, at the policy level, processes are divided into steps, with each 
step being performed by a different person.  Separation of duty is thus tightly 
connected to application semantics.   
The issue of separation of duty has been addressed from different 
perspectives by several authors.  Examples can be found in various 
references: (Baldwin, 1990; Gligor, Gavrila & Ferraiolo, 1998; Nash & Poland, 
1990; Sandhu, 1988; Sandhu, 1990; Simon & Zurko, 1997).  Here, only work 
in which concepts are directly quoted in our interpretation, is examined.   
Kuhn (1997) explored the mutual exclusion of roles as a means of expressing 
separation of duty requirements.  He presented a taxonomy whereby 
separation of duty requirements are categorised according to the time at 
which mutual exclusion is applied (static vs. dynamic), as well as the degree 
to which privileges are shared by mutually exclusive roles (strong or partial 
exclusion).   
Strong exclusion, on the one hand, implies no common permission or user 
assignments for exclusive roles.  Partial exclusion, on the other hand, implies 
that mutually exclusive roles may share permissions (or users) but that each 
role should have permissions assigned that are unique to that role.   
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Nyanchama and Osborn (1999) discussed various types of conflicts that have 
to be considered when implementing separation of duty requirements.  They 
evaluated the effect of role hierarchies in great depth in terms of their role-
graph model.   
Ahn and Sandhu (1999) defined the RSL99 language for specifying 
separation of duty constraints.  They based their SoD requirements on the 
concepts of conflicting users, conflicting roles and conflicting permissions.  
The RSL99 language can be used to study SoD within RBAC environments 
as it helps with the identification of SoD properties that may not have been 
known or understood.   
SoD requirements are enforced through constraints.  It is necessary to 
understand the foundation for the constraints and the use of the constraints in 
order to apply separation of duties to its full effect.   
4.2  A Taxonomy of SoD Constraints 
Simon and Zurko (1997) have formally defined a variety of different forms of 
SoD.  All of these variations fall under two main categories, which are: static 
SoD and dynamic SoD.  This is shown in figure 4.1.   
 SoD 
Static SoD Dynamic SoD 
Simple 
Object-based 
Operational 
History-based  
Figure 4.1 Categories of Separation of Duties. 
Particular attention is paid to static SoD due to the scope of the research, 
which is outlined in chapter 5.   
4.2.1  Static Separation of Duty 
Static SoD constraints are considered the simplest variation of SoD (Ahn & 
Sandhu, 1999).  Constraints can exist for each of the RBAC entities.   
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This includes constraints such as not allowing the same user to be a member 
of two conflicting roles.  If a user were associated to both of the conflicting 
roles, then that user would be able to commit fraud.  An example of this is the 
manager role and the stock controller role from the workflow example in 
chapter 2.  These roles are conflicting and as such a user may not be 
associated to both of them.   
Another constraint is that a user may not be associated to conflicting 
permissions.  Since permissions are obtained through role associations, care 
must be taken when associating permissions to roles.  An example of this is 
the permissions needed to submit an order and to approve an order.  These 
permissions are conflicting, and as such may not be associated to a common 
user through the role associations.  This means that conflicting permissions 
may not be associated to a common role.   
These constraints are summarised in table 4.1.   
Conflicting Entities Cannot be associated to: 
Conflicting Roles Common User 
Conflicting Permissions Common Role 
Table 4.1 Static SoD constraints. 
Other constraints exist and are identifiable through the use of methods such 
as Ahn and Sandhu’s RSL99 language (1999).  Chapter 6 formalises the 
constraints that have been identified during this research.   
These strongly exclusive relationships could be very useful in the 
administration environment as an aid to the security administrator.  It can also 
form the basis for dynamic SoD.   
4.2.2  Dynamic Separation of Duty 
Dynamic SoD provides an improved set of possible policies.  This is done by 
the controlled activation and use of the roles in a system.  As long as the 
constraints are satisfied, users may be members of what would be considered 
strongly exclusive roles in a static SoD environment. 
An example of this would be a user who places an order as a member of the 
Employee role but may not approve the order as a member of the manager 
role. This allows dynamic SoD to reflect the functioning of an organisation.   
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There are many variations of dynamic SoD. 
Simple Dynamic SoD is the simplest variation that states that restricted roles 
may have the same members but a member may only be assigned to one role 
at a time. 
Object-based SoD states that restricted roles may have common members 
and these members may assume both roles at the same time.  Users may not 
act upon any system object that they have previously operated upon.   
Operational SoD implies that restricted roles may contain common members 
as long as the union of the activities the roles perform does not contain all the 
activities in a complete business process.  It prevents any one person from 
performing an entire business process. 
History-based SoD handles various desirable actions that are prevented by 
the previously mentioned SoD variations.  It does this by the combination of 
object-based SoD and operational SoD.   
This research is only concerned with the specification and not the 
enforcement of dynamic SoD.   
4.3  Conclusion 
The concept of separation of duties was introduced within this chapter.  This 
knowledge is essential in understanding how the RBAC environment needs to 
function within the workflow environment in order to ensure that SoD 
requirements are enforced.   
The purpose of SoD policies is to prevent fraud.  In doing so, an individual 
user should be prevented from receiving mutually exclusive tasks.  Stated in 
another way, a user should not receive access rights to system objects that 
could enable the user to commit fraud.  This dissertation refers to access 
rights as permissions, which is one of the entities of the RBAC model.   
To prevent users from receiving mutually exclusive permissions, these 
permissions can be set as conflicting.  This conflicting paradigm is applicable 
to the other RBAC entities and to workflow extensions to the RBAC model in 
this research.  These conflicts and how they associate to the administration 
paradigm are discussed in-depth in chapter 6.   
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In order to clearly discuss the conflict paradigm, it is important to show the 
scope of the research, and its conceptual framework.   
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Chapter 5.  
SoDA: The Concept and Model 
With the increasing amount of information available electronically it is not only 
necessary to find a means to ease the job of the security administrator, but 
also to ensure that the information is protected and managed according to 
organisational policies.  On the one hand, RBAC has been promoted as a 
possible solution to the administration nightmares that face security 
administrators (Ferraiolo, Barkley, & Kuhn, 1999).  On the other hand, 
workflow technology has been boasted as a means of controlling the flow of 
information according to business process models.  RBAC mechanisms 
employed in the workflow environment should thus be sensitised to the 
context of the work (Cholewka et al., 2000; Thomas & Sandhu, 1993).   
The context of the work is determined by factors such as the sequence and 
history of events, as well as the organisational policies.  One expression of 
organisational policy can be found in the age-old principle of separation of 
duty.   
The primary objective of separation of duty is to prevent fraud, i.e. protect the 
integrity of the information (Clark & Wilson, 1987).  SoD can be enforced 
through the correct use of access control mechanisms.   
Access control is a two-phase process as depicted in figure 5.1.  During 
phase one, users receive potential to perform certain activities – this is called 
access control administration.  Phase two occurs when an application is used 
and the actual permissions are granted to the user – this is called run-time 
access control.   
Chapter 4 showed that SoD requirements could be evaluated and enforced at 
two points in time.  This can happen through the administration tool and 
through the run-time environment.  When evaluation and enforcement occur in 
the administration tool it is referred to as static separation of duty.  When 
evaluation and enforcement occur within the run-time environment it is 
referred to as dynamic separation of duty.   
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 Phase 1 Phase 2 
Potential to perform 
activities 
Actual permissions 
Access control 
administration 
Run-time access 
control  
Figure 5.1 Access control phases 
Static SoD requirements include constraints such as not allowing conflicting 
permissions to be assigned to a common user.  This type of requirement 
would be evaluated when assigning a user to a role and when assigning 
permissions to roles.  If the assignment is going to cause constraint errors, 
then the administration environment can prevent the assignment.   
An example of a dynamic SoD requirement would be to prevent a common 
user from working on conflicting tasks in the same workflow process.  This 
SoD requirement can be enforced within the run-time environment by not 
allowing the user access to the conflicting task.   
These concepts are central to the scope of this dissertation.  In order to 
understand the model it is important to appreciate the scope of the proposed 
solution.   
5.1  Scope of Proposed Solution 
The proposed model focuses on the technical enforcement of static 
separation of duty requirements in workflow systems.  The scope of the 
proposed model is, however, best defined by considering its information 
technology scope and its information security scope.   
5.1.1  Information Technology Scope 
The information technology scope of the research, which is presented in this 
dissertation, is primarily described in terms of the information technology 
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domain it addresses, namely, workflow systems.  Moreover, workflow systems 
have been identified in chapter 2 as consisting of administration and run-time 
components.   
The information technology focus is thus on workflow systems, and in 
particular, the administration component of workflow systems.  Figure 5.2 
shows the information technology scope by means of concentric circles.  The 
outer circle encapsulates information technology while the larger dashed inner 
circle encapsulates workflow systems.  The workflow circle is divided into a 
run-time area and an administration area, which is shown as a grey disk in the 
centre of the circles.   
 
Authentication 
Integrity 
Non-repudiation 
Access Control 
Confidentiality 
Workflow systems 
Information technology scope 
Information security scope 
Run-time execution 
Administration 
 
Figure 5.2 Scope of the proposed model 
It is also important to know what areas of information security this research 
focuses on.   
5.1.2  Information Security Scope 
The triangle in figure 5.2 represents the field of information security.  It is 
shown to overlap with information technology, in particular, also workflow 
systems.   
Chapter 5. SoDA: The Concept and Model 
 42 
Information security has been shown in chapter 3 to involve five security 
services: authentication, confidentiality, integrity, access control and non-
repudiation.  These services are depicted as slices of the information security 
triangle in figure 5.2.  The access control service was chosen as the 
information security scope of this research, as indicated by the shaded portion 
of the triangle.   
The darker shading indicates the overlap between the information technology 
scope and the information security scope.  This shaded overlap represents 
the scope of this research and can be defined as the administration of access 
control for workflow systems.   
A more detailed look at the research scope will shed light on the conceptual 
overview wherein this research was conducted.   
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Figure 5.3 Detail scope for SoDA 
5.2  Conceptual Overview 
The proposed model constitutes two basic components: an administration 
paradigm and an enforcement strategy.   
These components can be observed in terms of its relation to separation of 
duty in figure 5.3, which provides a magnified view of the darkly shaded area 
in figure 5.2.  The administration paradigm involves the specification of access 
control, while the enforcement strategy is concerned with enforcing static 
access control requirements, specifically, requirements that can be checked at 
administration time.  Note that the enforcement of access control 
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requirements that rely on the workflow execution environment falls explicitly 
outside the scope of this research.   
Figure 5.4 depicts these two components graphically.  Consider each in turn. 
 Administration Paradigm 
User, Roles, Permissions, 
Tasks and their associations 
Conflicting Entities Separation of duty 
CU 
CR 
CP 
CT 
Static Dynamic 
Enforcement 
Strategy 
ON admin-event 
  IF condition 
  THEN disallow 
Enforcement 
in workflow 
environment 
Outside 
scope of 
this research  
Figure 5.4 SoDA: Conceptual view 
5.2.1  The administration paradigm 
The proposed model strongly hinges on role-based access control.  The 
identification of users, roles and permissions thus is integral to the model.  In 
addition to these entities the concept of a task is introduced.  Administration 
tools will allow for the associations between users, roles, permissions and 
tasks.  These associations may be constrained according to static separation 
of duty requirements.  The “Conflicting Entities” administration paradigm is 
introduced as a way of expressing these constraints.  This paradigm is based 
on the concept of mutual exclusion in sets, i.e. that two tuples may not belong 
to the same set.  A distinction is made between the time of exclusion, viz. at 
administration-time or run-time.  Run-time exclusion must be managed by the 
workflow system and is thus not further addressed.   
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5.2.2  The enforcement strategy 
The administration time exclusions are addressed in the second component 
by providing an enforcement strategy.  The enforcement strategy is based on 
active database technology and is thus defined in terms of event-driven action 
rules.   
The objective of the security administration paradigm is to disallow 
assignments or associations that will violate the static SoD requirements.  It 
will, by default, disallow these prohibited actions.  Algorithms to check the 
conditions have been developed as part of the enforcement strategy.   
5.3  Conclusion 
The current chapter set the scope of the SoDA model and provided a 
conceptual overview of its components.  Chapters 6 to 8 will discuss these 
components in more detail.   
Chapter 6 will develop an administration paradigm and state its properties for 
the static aspect mathematically. 
Chapter 7 will develop algorithms for the use by an implementation of the 
SoDA model.  These algorithms will ensure that the static separation of duty 
requirements remain valid.   
Chapter 8 will describe the implementation details of the SoDA prototype 
implementation.   
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Chapter 6.  
SoDA: The Administration Paradigm 
As described in chapter 5, the scope of the model involves the specification of 
static and dynamic SoD and the enforcement of static SoD.  These operations 
occur within the administration environment of a workflow system.  SoD is 
built upon the access control specifications.   
In order to specify the access control requirements, it is necessary to identify 
the entities involved.   
This chapter will formalise the aspects of the model by: 
· Introducing the entities involved.   
· Introducing the conflicting entities administration paradigm.   
· Developing a model of the integrity requirements for static SoD.   
The information that the workflow environment adds to the RBAC environment 
is referred to as the workflow extensions.   
6.1  Workflow extensions 
The proposed extensions to the RBAC environment build upon the definitions 
already outlined in chapter 3.  For notational convenience they are reproduced 
in table 6.1.   
A typical process definition is a set of tasks linked together in a network, thus 
forming a business process (Hollingsworth, 1995).  The workflow system is 
responsible for determining the route that work will follow through the 
organisation.  From an access control perspective the basic building blocks 
are tasks that may be performed by a specific organisational role. 
Figure 6.1 presents the RBAC entities with the task entity added.  The 
constraints are not shown to maintain clarity.   
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RBAC entities 
U = set of users, {u1,u2,…,ul} 
R = set of roles, {r1,r2,…,rm} 
P = set of permissions, {p1,p2,…,pn} 
RBAC associations 
UA Í U ´ R, a many-to-many user-to-role assignment relation 
PA Í P ´ R, a many-to-many permission-to-role assignment relation 
RH Í R ´ R, a partial order on R called the role hierarchy, also written as £ 
Roles function 
roles: U È P®2R, a function mapping the sets U and P to a set of roles 
roles* : U È P®2R extends roles in the presence of a role hierarchy 
roles(ui)={rÎR½(ui,r)ÎUA} 
roles(pi)={rÎR½(pi,r)ÎPA} 
roles*(ui)={ rÎR½($r £  r')[(ui,r')ÎUA]} 
roles*(pi)={ rÎR½($r' £ r)[(pi,r')ÎPA]} 
Permissions function 
perm: U È R ® 2P, a function mapping users and roles to a set of 
permissions.   
perm*: U È R ® 2P, extends perm in the presence of a role hierarchy.   
perm(ri) = {p Î P ½ (p,ri) Î PA} 
perm(ui) = {p Î P ½ ($rÎroles(ui))[(p,r) Î PA]} 
perm*(ri) = {p Î P ½ ($r' £ ri)[(p,r') Î PA]} 
perm*(ui) = {p Î P ½ ($r Î roles*(ui))[(p,r) Î PA]} 
Table 6.1 RBAC definitions 
P
Permissions
R
Roles
U
Users
RH
Role Hierarchy
UA
User
Assignment
PA
Permission
Assignment
Many to Many
One to Many
S
Sessions
T
Tasks
TA
Task
Assignment
 
Figure 6.1 Role-based access control model extended with tasks 
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The task entities form a many-to-many relationship with the role entities just 
as the user and permission entities do.  The following formalisations add the 
concept of the workflow’s task to the formal RBAC definitions that were 
summarised in table 6.1.   
Definition 6.1: Workflow entities 
There are sets of tasks.   
T = Set of tasks, {t1,t2,…,tn}, a set of task definitions.   
The task entities will relate to the role entities as defined in the following 
definition.   
Definition 6.2: Workflow Associations 
Tasks can be associated with roles.   
TA Í T ´ R, a many-to-many task-to-role assignment relation.   
The set TA, as defined in definition 6.2, will contain the task to role 
associations that will be created.  The RBAC96 functions must thus be 
extended to cater for the addition of this relationship.   
Definition 6.3: Extended roles function 
roles: U È P È T ® 2R, a function mapping the sets U and P and T to a 
set of roles. 
roles* : U È P È T ®2R extends roles in the presence of a role 
hierarchy.   
roles(ui),roles(pi), roles*(ui) and roles*(pi) remain according to Definition 
3.3.   
roles(ti)={rÎR½(ti,r)ÎTA} 
roles*(ti)={ rÎR½($r £  r')[(ti,r')ÎTA]} 
The standard roles functions that are listed in table 6.1 have been adapted to 
cater for the addition of the task entity.  The permission functions also need to 
be adapted.   
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Definition 6.4: Revised permissions function 
perm: U È R È T ® 2P, a function mapping users, roles and tasks to a 
set of permissions.   
perm*: U È R È T ® 2P, extends perm in the presence of a role 
hierarchy.   
perm(ri), perm(ui), perm*(ri) and perm*(ui) remain according to 
Definition 3.4.   
perm(ti) = {p Î P ½ ($r Î roles(ti))[(p,r) Î PA]} 
perm*(ti) = {p Î P ½ ($r Î roles*(ti))[(p,r) Î PA]} 
The revised definitions give the elements which are essential to the 
administration of access control in the workflow environment.  The following 
section will suggest a conflict paradigm to define further restrictions required 
to support static SoD requirements.   
6.2  The conflicting entities administration paradigm 
The concept of conflicting entities needs to be described in order to 
understand how SoD can be enforced.  Any two of the identified entities may 
be conflicting.  That is, any two permissions, users, roles, or tasks may be 
conflicting.  Integrity is maintained by constraining the associations between 
entities based on the conflicts between entities.  As such it is important to 
understand the conflicts that can occur.   
The term conflicting permissions indicates two permission entities that are in 
conflict with one another.  This means that if two conflicting permissions were 
associated to a common user, then that user would be able to commit fraud.  
An example of conflicting permissions is the permissions needed to submit an 
order and to approve an order.   
If a user were associated to both of these permissions then that user would be 
able to approve a self-placed order.  By assigning a conflict between the two 
permissions it becomes possible for the administration environment to 
constrain any associations between the permissions and the users.   
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The term conflicting users is misleading.  The users are in fact not conflicting 
at all.  Rather, it is the user’s friendship that can result in an alliance to commit 
fraud.  With this description it becomes relevant to consider that single users 
are in conflict with themselves.   
It is important to realise that permissions are not directly associated to users.  
Users receive permissions through their associations with roles.  Figure 6.1 
displays how the permission, user and task entities all connect with the role 
entities with many-to-many relationships.  In this way users will receive the 
permissions that have been associated with the roles that they are associated 
with.  Permissions will also be associated with those tasks that share common 
roles.  It is therefore important to understand the consequences of assigning 
conflicts between roles.   
The term conflicting roles indicates two role entities that are in conflict with 
one another.  It is through conflicting roles that the associations between all 
the entities can be controlled.  An example of this is how conflicting 
permissions are prevented from being associated to conflicting users.  This 
prevention is achieved by constraining the associations between permissions, 
roles, and users.   
For example, the manager and employee roles have to be conflicting before 
being associated to the permissions needed to submit an order and to 
approve an order.  But this constraint alone is not enough to prevent 
conflicting users from being associated with the conflicting permissions.   
In order to prevent conflicting users from being associated with conflicting 
permissions, conflicting users must be constrained from being associated with 
conflicting roles.  This constraint will prevent conflicting users from receiving 
conflicting permissions.   
Another constraint for conflicting roles is that conflicting roles cannot form part 
of a role network.  This is due to the fact that permissions get inherited from 
the roles in a role network.  If the employee and manager roles were part of a 
role network, then the manager role will inherit the permissions that are 
associated to the employee role.  In so doing, any user associated to the 
manager role would receive conflicting permissions.   
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From the workflow environment’s point of view, the users and permissions 
required to perform a task are obtained from role associations.  It is with 
conflicting tasks that SoD can be enforced within the workflow environment.  
The term conflicting task indicates two task entities that are in conflict with one 
another.   
Tasks that are conflicting are workflow process tasks that may not be 
performed by conflicting users.  If conflicting users were allowed to perform 
these tasks then there exists the possibility of fraud being committed.  An 
example of two conflicting tasks can be seen in Figure 2.2.  This figure shows 
the tasks that make up a workflow process and the “complete order form” task 
and the “approve order” task are conflicting tasks.   
In order to prevent these tasks from receiving conflicting users it is necessary 
to restrict their associations with roles in the same way as conflicting 
permissions are constrained.  This is accomplished by not allowing conflicting 
tasks to be associated with non-conflicting roles.  Therefore, the “complete 
order form” task and the “approve order” task must be associated with 
conflicting roles such as the employee role and the manager role.   
It has been shown that the conflicting entities paradigm can be used to 
enforce static and dynamic SoD.  Although conflicts between entities can be 
used to enforce a variety of constraints within the run-time environment, this is 
beyond the scope of this research and as such is not covered.   
The conflicting entities administration paradigm has been discussed in an 
informal manner.  The following definitions formalise the aspects required for 
enforcement.  Conflicting permissions are formalised first as power is vested 
in permissions.   
Definition 6.5:  Conflicting permissions are permissions that can result in 
unnecessary power if bestowed on the same person.  Formally it is 
represented by  
CP Í P ´ P, a many-to- many relation indicating conflict between 
permissions with 
(pi,pj) Î CP Û (pj,pi) Î CP and (pi,pi) Ï CP. 
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We can now present the following axiom, which will represent our basic safety 
condition.  The basic safety condition is the basic requirement for all proofs.  If 
an association between entities violates this basic safety condition then that 
association is not to be allowed.   
Basic Safety Condition: Conflicting permissions may not be assigned to a 
user.   
Formally, (perm*(u) ´ perm*(u)) Ç CP = Æ) 
Since non-conflicting permissions cannot influence the basic safety condition 
the following axiom, to supplement the basic safety condition, is formulated.   
Axiom 6.5: Non-conflicting permissions may be assigned to either conflicting 
or non-conflicting roles.   
It is also important to look at the other conflicting entities that form part of the 
conflicting entity paradigm.   
Definition 6.6:  Conflicting users are users who are likely to conspire.  
Formally they are represented by 
CU Í U ´ U, a many-to-many relation indicating conflict between users 
with  
(ui,uj) Î CU Û (uj,ui) Î CU and (ui,ui) Ï CU. 
It can be seen that a single user could commit fraud without conspiring with 
other users.  As such, the following axiom is stated.   
Axiom 6.6: Conflicting users are considered as a single user.  
In practical terms conflicting users may be family members or people who are 
known to have conspired.   
Definition 6.7:  Conflicting roles are roles that together have the ability to 
conspire, i.e. they are assigned some (but not all) conflicting permissions.  
They are represented by 
CR Í R ´ R, a many-to-many relation indicating conflict between roles 
with  
(ri,rj) Î CR Û (rj,ri) Î CR , (ri,ri) Ï CR and  
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(ri,rj) Î CR Þ perm*(ri) ´ perm*(rj) Ç CP ¹ Æ 
Note that roles are abstractions to ease administration.  Although the 
conflicting permissions may not be identified as such in the administration 
tool, making roles conflict if they are not assigned some conflicting 
permissions is senseless.  This principle thus is a logical principle, which in 
practice may not be checked literally in the administration tool.   
Since conflicting roles must have some conflicting permissions we can state 
that non-conflicting roles do not have conflicting permissions.  In the spirit of 
Axiom 6.5, the following axiom is formulated.   
Axiom 6.7: Non-conflicting roles may be assigned either non-conflicting or 
conflicting users.   
Definition 6.8:  Conflicting tasks are tasks requiring conflicting permissions 
to complete.  Formally they are represented by  
CT Í T ´ T, a many-to-many relation indicating conflict between tasks 
with  
(ti,tj) Î CT Û (tj,ti) Î CT,  (ti,ti) Ï CT and  
(ti,tj) Î CT Þ perm*(ti) ´ perm*(tj) Ç CP ¹ Æ 
Note that conflicting tasks are assigned conflicting permissions.  Since non-
conflicting tasks can have only non-conflicting permissions assigned to them, 
we can see that they could not influence the basic safety condition, therefore, 
the following axiom is formulated.   
Axiom 6.8: Non-conflicting tasks may be assigned to conflicting and non-
conflicting roles.   
These principles and definitions are essentially focused on the permissions 
exercised by the users.  The integrity of the access control information is, 
however, determined by the associations in the access control model.  In a 
RBAC environment users are never assigned directly to permissions.  The 
role construct plays a pivotal role in linking tasks, users and permissions 
together.  The next section will therefore show the integrity requirements 
pertaining to the associations allowed in the access control model.   
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6.3  Integrity Requirements 
The previous section dealt with the definitions for conflicting entities.  It also 
introduced the basic safety condition.  This section presents a number of 
theorems reflecting integrity requirements that will have to be upheld in a 
security administration tool.   
These theorems outline a model of enforcement that can be used to enforce 
SoD within the administration tool.  These theorems can be considered as 
being rules or constraints.  These theorems are enforced through the use of 
conflicting entities.   
Theorem 6.9: Under the basic safety condition, conflicting roles may only 
have non-conflicting users assigned to them, i.e.   
(ui,rk) Î UA Ù (uj,rl) Î UA Ù (rk,rl) Î CR Þ (ui,uj) Ï CU 
Proof:  
Assume that (ui,rk)ÎUA Ù (uj,rl)ÎUA) Ù (rk,rl)ÎCR. Ù (ui,uj)ÎCU: 
perm*(ui) Ê perm*(rk)    (Def 3.4) 
perm*(uj) Ê perm*(rl)    (Def 3.4) 
(rk,rl)ÎCR. 
Þ    perm*(rk) ´ perm*(rl) Ç CP ¹ Æ  (Def  6.7) 
Þ    perm*(ui) ´ perm*(uj) Ç CP ¹ Æ 
which contradicts the Basic Safety Condition. QED.  
Theorem 6.10: Under the basic safety condition, conflicting permissions may 
only be assigned to conflicting roles. Formally  
(pi,rk) Î PA Ù (pj,rl) Î PA Ù (pi, pj) Î CP Þ (rk, rl) Î CR 
Proof: 
Assume that two conflicting permissions pi and pj are assigned to non-
conflicting roles rk and rl, i.e.  
(pi,rk) Î PA Ù (pj,rl) Î PA Ù (pi,pj) Î CP Ù (rk,rl) Ï CR 
Choose a user ux and associate it with roles rk and rl. Since (rk,rl) Ï CR 
this is allowed by Th. 6.9. 
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\  (ux,rk) Î UA Ù (ux,rl) Î UA Ù  
 (pi,rk) Î PA Ù (pj,rl) Î PA 
Þ       {pi, pj} Í perm*(ux)   (Def 6.6) 
But (pi, pj) Î CP, which contradicts the Basic Safety Condition. 
     QED. 
Theorem 6.11: Under the basic safety condition, conflicting tasks may only be 
assigned to conflicting roles.  That is 
(ti,rk) Î TA Ù (tj,rl) Î TA Ù (ti,tj) Î CT Þ (rk, rl) Î CR 
Proof:  
Assume that two conflicting tasks ti and tj are assigned to non-
conflicting roles rk and rl.  
(ti,rk) Î TA Ù (tj,rl) Î TA Ù (ti,tj) Î CT Ù (rk,rl) Ï CR 
Choose a user ux and associate it with roles rk and rl. Since (rk,rl) Ï CR 
this is allowed by Th. 6.9. 
perm*(rk) Í perm*(ux)    (Def 3.4) 
perm*(rl) Í perm*(ux)    (Def 3.4) 
also    perm*(ti) Í perm*(rk)    (Def 6.4) 
perm*(tj) Í perm*(rl)    (Def 6.4) 
\        perm*(ti) Í perm*(ux)  
and     perm*(tj) Í perm*(ux)  
Þ    perm*(ti) ´ perm*(tj) Ç CP ¹ Æ   (Def 6.8) 
Þ         perm*(ux) ´ perm*(ux) Ç CP ¹ Æ 
which contradicts the Basic Safety Condition.  QED. 
Using truth table equivalence we state the following corollary. 
Corollary 6.11: Under the basic safety condition, non-conflicting roles may 
only have non-conflicting tasks assigned to them.  That is 
(ti,rk) Î TA Ù (tj,rl) Î TA Ù (rk, rl) Ï CR Þ (ti,tj) Ï CT 
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These theorems limit the associations that can be allowed between users, 
roles, permissions and tasks.  By using the conflicting entities they are able to 
ensure that integrity is maintained.  These integrity requirements are essential 
for the enforcement of SoD.   
The following table summarises the results of this chapter.   
 Roles 
May be associated with 
Conflicting Non - conflicting 
Conflicting û ü 
Users 
Non - Conflicting 
Th 6.9 
ü 
Ax 6.7 
ü 
ü û 
Conflicting 
Theorem 6.10 
ü ü 
Permissions 
Non - Conflicting 
Axiom 6.5 
ü û 
Conflicting 
Theorem 6.11 
ü ü 
Tasks 
Non - Conflicting 
Axiom 6.8  
Table 6.2 Conflicting entities matrix 
A ü in the table indicates that an association is allowed, whilst a û shows that 
an association is prohibited. For example, theorem 6.9 proves that non-
conflicting users may only be assigned to conflicting roles while axiom 6.8 
states that non-conflicting tasks may be assigned to either conflicting or non-
conflicting roles.   
6.4  Conclusion 
This chapter explored the model required for the conflicting entities 
administration paradigm.  This paradigm is able to ensure static separation of 
duty requirements and enable the specification of dynamic separation of duty 
requirements in workflow environments.   
This paradigm was enabled through the extension of the RBAC components 
with workflow specific components.  In particular, it demonstrated how static 
separation of duty requirements specified through the use of conflicting users, 
conflicting roles, conflicting permissions and conflicting tasks could be 
enforced.  Entities that are conflicting would imply certain constraints and as 
Chapter 6. SoDA: The Administration Paradigm 
 56 
such would ensure the integrity of the associations.  Enforcement is based on 
maintaining the integrity of the associations allowed between entities.   
Formulated algorithms, which would maintain the integrity of the associations, 
were developed next.  Thereafter, a prototype that demonstrates that the 
SoDA model could be effective for the enforcement of static SoD in 
administration tools was developed.   
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Chapter 7.  
SoDA: The Enforcement Strategy 
The previous chapter identified the entities involved in the conflicting entities 
administration paradigm.  It also introduced mathematical definitions and 
proofs that describe how different associations between entities must be 
evaluated and enforced.  In so doing, it described a model that can be used to 
ensure the integrity of the data and to prevent the possibility of fraud.   
The integrity constraints imposed by the conflict paradigm were summarised 
in the form of a matrix in chapter 6.  This matrix shows the integrity constraints 
as allowable/disallowable associations.   
The SoDA model outlines algorithms for each of the possible actions that may 
be performed upon the entities.  These algorithms are designed according to 
the specifications that have been defined in chapter 6 and are described in 
detail in the current chapter.   
Chapter 6 described the SoDA model in mathematical terms while this chapter 
describes the algorithms using relational database system terminology.  As 
such, it is important to define a conceptual entity-relationship diagram (ERD) 
for the SoDA model.   
7.1  The conceptual Entity Relationship Diagram 
It is possible to express the mathematical relations between the sets of 
entities defined in chapter 6 as database tables.  This is shown using an ERD 
in figure 7.1.   
Expressing the mathematical relations in this way simplifies the development 
of the algorithms.  There are three different categories of database tables 
depicted in figure 7.1.  These are associations, conflicts, and entities.   
The associations are depicted by the UA, PA, TA and RH database tables.  
Each association allows for a many-to-many relationship between a role and 
another entity.  The RH association is slightly different to the others.  It is used 
to create a role network.   
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Figure 7.1 Conceptual ERD 
The conflicts between entities are depicted by the CU, CP, CR and CT 
database tables.  As can be seen, a conflict is a many-to-many relationship 
between the entities of a particular set.   
Finally, there are the database tables that represent the sets of entities.  
These are denoted as U, P, R and T.   
Within each of the categories, there exists the potential for a variety of 
conflicts.  Each possibility needs an algorithm that will outline what an 
administration tool will do to test whether the action will violate an integrity 
requirement.  Any action that will violate an integrity requirement will not be 
allowed to continue.   
This includes actions such as adding or deleting entities from the system.  
With the integrity of the system being an important aim, it will not be possible 
to delete an entity without first checking the repercussions the deletion will 
cause.   
The algorithms involved with the associations action will be evaluated first, 
followed by the algorithms for the conflicts action and finally, the algorithms for 
the entities action.  The layout of this is shown in table 7.1.   
This table has two columns that show the operations that can be performed 
upon the entities and their associations.  These operations are Add and 
Delete.  The SoDA model allows for updates or modifications through a 
twofold process of first deleting and then adding.   
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Operations  
Add Delete 
UA 
PA 
TA 
7.2.1 7.2.2 Associations 
(7.2) 
RH 7.2.3 
CU 
CP 
CR 
Conflicts 
(7.3) 
CT 
7.3.1 7.3.2 
Users 
Permissions 
Tasks 
Entities 
(7.4) 
Roles 
7.4.1 7.4.2 
Table 7.1 The enforcement model chapter layout 
7.2  Algorithms for Entity Associations 
It is assumed that a set of entities and their conflicts already exist within the 
administration environment.  The algorithms involved with the creation and 
deletion of entities and conflicts will be dealt with in the following sections.   
7.2.1  Creating Associations 
The first algorithm to be discussed will be the creation of a user to role 
association.  As mentioned earlier, an example of this would be assigning 
user A to the manager role.  This association is denoted as (ui,r) Î UA.  
Before this association may be allowed to take place, the steps shown in 
figure 7.2 must be undertaken.   
· Step 1: Does the user ui have any conflicting users?  This is done by 
iterating through all the conflicting user records where one of the users in 
the record is the user being added to the association.  If the answer to this 
is yes, proceed to step 2, else create the association.   
· Step 2: Find all the roles that have already been associated to the 
conflicting users found in step 1.  This is done by iterating through the 
entire user to role association table where any of the associated users are 
in the group of users found in step 1.  If no roles are found then the 
association can be safely made, else proceed to step three.   
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 Add user/role association 
( u i  ,  r )  Î  UA 
Does  u 
i  have 
conflicting users? 
Determine 
conflicting user's 
associated roles 
Yes 
No 
Add association 
Does role  r conflict 
with any of the
found roles? 
Found 
None 
Found 
1 
2 
4 
3 
No 
Yes 
 
Figure 7.2 Adding user/role associations 
· Step 3: Do any of the roles found in step 2 conflict with the added role r?  
This is accomplished by iterating through the conflicting roles records 
where the current role and any of the roles found in step 2 form a record.  
If none are found the association can be safely made, else the association 
may not proceed.   
· Step 4: Add the association as a record to the appropriate database table.   
The algorithm used when adding permission to role associations is discussed 
next.  An example of this association would be assigning the permission that 
encompasses the access rights to approve an order to the manager role.  This 
association is denoted as (pi,r) Î PA.  Before this association may be allowed 
to take place, the steps shown in figure 7.3 must be undertaken.   
· Step 1: Does the permission pi have any conflicting permissions?  This is 
done by iterating through all the conflicting permission records where one 
of the permissions in the record is the permission being added to the 
association.  If the answer to this is yes, proceed to step 2, else create the 
association.   
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 Add permission/role 
( p i  ,  r )  Î  PA 
or task/role association 
(t i  , r)  Î TA 
Does  p 
i  or  t i  have 
any conflicting 
entities? 
Determine conflicting 
perm's or task's 
associated roles 
Yes 
No 
Add association 
Does role  r conflict 
with all of the 
roles? 
Found 
None 
Found 
1 
2 
4 
3 
Yes 
No 
 
Figure 7.3 Adding permission/role or task/role associations 
· Step 2: Find all the roles that have already been associated to the 
conflicting permissions found in step 1.  This is done by iterating through 
the entire permission to role association table where any of the associated 
permissions is in the group of permissions found in step 1.  If no roles are 
found then the association can be safely made else proceed to step three.   
· Step 3: Do all of the roles found in step 2 conflict with the added role r?  
This is accomplished by iterating through the conflicting roles records 
where the current role and any of the roles found in step 2 form a record.  
If none is found the association can be safely made, else the association 
may not proceed.  This step differs from the user to role association 
algorithm in that only if all the found roles are conflicting then may the 
association take place.   
· Step 4: Add the association as a record to the appropriate database table.   
Since the algorithm for adding a task to role association is so similar to the 
algorithm for adding a permission to role association, figure 7.3 will be used 
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as its reference.  An example of this association would be assigning the task 
‘Approve Order’ to the manager role.  This association is denoted as (ti,r) Î 
TA.  Before this association may be allowed to take place, the steps shown in 
figure 7.3 must be undertaken.   
· Step 1: Does the task ti have any conflicting tasks?  This is done by 
iterating through all the conflicting task records where one of the tasks in 
the record is the task being added to the association.  If the answer to this 
is yes, proceed to step 2, else create the association.   
· Step 2: Find all the roles that have already been associated to the 
conflicting tasks found in step 1.  This is done by iterating through the 
entire task to role association table where any of the associated tasks are 
in the group of tasks found in step 1.  If no roles are found then the 
association can be safely made, else proceed to step three.   
· Step 3: Do all of the roles found in step 2 conflict with the added role r?  
This is accomplished by iterating through the conflicting roles records 
where the current role and any of the roles found in step 2 form a record.  
The association can be safely made if all of these roles conflict with the 
added role r, else the association may not proceed.   
· Step 4: Add the association as a record to the appropriate database table.   
7.2.2  Deleting Associations 
There is no restriction upon the deletion of these associations, as it will not 
affect the secure nature of the environment.  It may be necessary to ensure 
that certain associations remain intact for the work processes to execute 
correctly.  The SoDA model does not cater for these situations.   
7.2.3  Maintaining Role Networks 
The last type of association that can be made is the role network, which is 
defined in chapter 3.  Each role can have a parent role and a child role and it 
is important to not allow circular references to occur within a role network.  
Figure 7.4 displays the algorithm for adding roles to a role network, which is 
denoted as (rp,ri) Î RH.  The role rp is the parent role which is used to identify 
where the role ri will be inserted.   
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Add role to role network
(rp , ri) Î RH
Is ri conflicting
with any roles in
network?
Disallow
Yes
No
Add role to role
network
No
Will ri create a
circular reference?
Disallow
Yes
1
2
3
4
5
 
Figure 7.4 Adding roles to a role network 
· Step 1: Does the role ri conflict with any of the roles in the role network?  
This is done by iterating through the conflicting role database table where 
the role ri and any of the roles in the role network form a record.  The roles 
within the role network can be ascertained from the role network database 
table.  If the answer to this is yes, proceed to step 2, else proceed to step 
3.   
· Step 2: Disallow the addition.  This is accomplished in the form of an on 
screen dialog that warns the administrator.   
· Step 3: Check whether the addition of the role ri will create a circular 
reference.  A circular reference is where the same role is referenced again 
along a branch of the role network.  This check is accomplished by 
recursively checking the branch for any occurrences of the current role.  If 
a circular reference is detected then the addition of this association will be 
disallowed through step 4, else it will be created in step 5.   
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· Step 4: Disallow the addition.  This is accomplished by an on screen dialog 
that warns the administrator.   
· Step 5: Create the role network association by writing the correct record 
into the role network database table.   
When a role is deleted from the role network, it becomes important to make 
sure that a hole is not left behind.  This is solved through making sure that the 
parent and child roles of the role that was removed get associated with each 
other.  An algorithm that describes this logic is described with figure 7.5.   
 Delete role to role 
association 
( r p  ,  r i )  Ï  RH 
Does the 
association being 
deleted have child 
associations? 
No 
Prevent delete 
of entity. 
Yes 
1 
2 
 
Figure 7.5 Deleting role associations from a role network 
· Step 1: Does the association that is being deleted have any existing 
children associations?  This is done by selecting all records where the 
parentid equals the deleted record’s childid within the same role network.  
If child associations exist, proceed to step 2.   
· Step 2: Raise an error and prevent the delete.   
Other issues are evident and should be understood when working with roles in 
a role network.  These issues include the inheritance of permissions and 
assigning ambiguous roles or roles with similar or identical permissions.  
These issues are not catered for in the SoDA model.   
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7.3  Algorithms for Entity Conflicts 
It is important to be able to correctly maintain the conflicts between entities in 
order for an administration tool to control the integrity of the data effectively.  
We still assume that we have entities already in the administration 
environment.   
7.3.1  Creating conflicting entities 
Conflict assignments follow the same rules for all entities.  The same general 
algorithm can be used to control all conflict assignments.  These are depicted 
mathematically as (ti,tj) Î CT for conflicting tasks, (ri,rj) Î CR for conflicting 
roles, (ui,uj) Î CU for conflicting users and (pi,pj) Î CP for conflicting 
permissions.  This algorithm is depicted in figure 7.6.   
· Step 1: Check whether the entities are already conflicting with each other.  
This is done by checking the records in the relevant database table for one 
that matches the current entities.  If a record is found, then this conflict 
assignment has already been done and should not be done again.  If an 
existing conflict is not found, then it should proceed to step 2.   
· Step 2: Check whether the entities form associations.  This is done by 
iterating through all the applicable database tables, searching for any prior 
associations for either of the entities.  If an association is found then step 3 
must be performed, else the conflict may be created.   
· Step 3: An association may become invalid if the conflict assignment goes 
ahead.  It is therefore necessary to disallow any conflict assignment that 
will cause integrity problems.  This step is expanded in figures 7.7, 7.8 and 
7.9 to show exactly what processing needs to be done to accomplish this 
check for the different entities.  If no problems will be caused by the 
conflict, then the conflict can be created, else the conflict must be 
disallowed.   
· Step 4: Disallow the addition.  This is accomplished in the form of an on 
screen dialog that warns the administrator.   
· Step 5: Create the conflict assignment by writing a record into the 
appropriate database table.   
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Add conflict
(ri , rj) Î CR, (ui , uj) Î CU
(pi , pj) Î CR, (ti , tj) Î CU
Are entities already
conflicting?
Yes
No
Create conflict
No
Are the entities
already associated
with something
else?
Will conflict cause
integrity problems?
Yes
No
Yes
Disallow
1
2
3
4
5
 
Figure 7.6 Adding conflicting entities 
If the conflict assignment is created between two users ((ui,uj) Î CU) then the 
algorithm in figure 7.7 is performed.   
· Step 3.1: We assume that the users ui and uj already conflict and we find 
all of the associated roles for both users.  If associated roles are found for 
both users then go to step 3.2, else allow the conflict to be created.   
· Step 3.2: Check whether any of the roles that are associated with the user 
ui are conflicting with any of the roles that are associated with the user uj.  
This is done by checking for the existence of the role pairing in the 
conflicting roles database table.  If none of the roles are conflicting, then 
allow the conflict to be created.   
· Step 3.3: Do not create the conflict, as it will cause an existing association 
to become illegal.   
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Check user/role association
when adding user conflicts
(ui , uj) Î CU
Determine all
associated roles for
both ui and uj
Allow Conflict
Do ui 's associated
roles conflict with
any of uj 's
associated roles?
Found
None
Found
3.1
3.2
3.3
No
Yes
Disallow Conflict
3.4
 
Figure 7.7 Checking user/role association 
· Step 3.4: Create the conflict by writing a record into the appropriate 
database table.   
If the conflict assignment is created between two permissions ((pi,pj) Î CP) or 
two tasks ((ti,tj) Î CT) then the algorithm in figure 7.8 is performed.   
· Step 3.1: We assume that the entities pi and pj or ti and tj already conflict 
and we find all of the associated roles for both entities.  If associated roles 
are found for both entities, then go to step 3.2, else allow the conflict to be 
created.   
· Step 3.2: Check whether all of the roles that are associated with the first 
entity (pi or ti) are conflicting with all of the roles that are associated with 
the second entity (pj or tj).  This is done by checking for the existence of 
the role pairing in the conflicting roles database table.  If all of the roles are 
conflicting, then allow the conflict to be created.   
· Step 3.3: Do not create the conflict, as it will cause an existing association 
to become illegal.   
· Step 3.4: Create the conflict by writing a record into the appropriate 
database table.   
Chapter 7. SoDA: The Enforcement Strategy 
 68 
Check permission/role or task/
role association when adding
permission or task conflicts
(pi , pj) Î CP or (ti , tj) Î CT
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Figure 7.8 Checking permission/role and task/role associations 
If the conflict is created between two roles, then the algorithm shown in figure 
7.9 is used.  It is only necessary to check whether conflicting users are 
assigned to the two roles, as this is the only association that will be affected 
by the roles becoming conflicting.   
· Step 3.1: Check whether both roles (ri and rj) are already part of a role 
network.  If they are, then it must go to step 3.5 to disallow the conflict, 
else it must go to step 3.2.   
· Step 3.2: We assume that the roles ri and rj are already conflicting and we 
find all of the associated users for both roles.  If associated users are 
found for both roles, then go to step 3.3, else allow the conflict to be 
created.   
· Step 3.3: Check whether any of the users that are associated with the role 
ri are conflicting with any of the users that are associated with the role rj.  
This is done by checking for the existence of the user pairing in the 
conflicting users database table.  If any of the users are conflicting, then do 
not allow the conflict to be created.   
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Check user/role association
when adding role conflicts
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Figure 7.9 Checking user/role associations for role conflict assignments 
· Step 3.4: Do not create the conflict, as it will cause an existing association 
to become illegal.   
· Step 3.5: Create the conflict by writing a record into the appropriate 
database table.   
Following these algorithms will ensure that the data’s integrity remains intact. 
7.3.2  Deleting conflicting entities 
It is important to know what integrity requirements must be checked and 
maintained for each conflict type that is to be deleted.   
User, permission and task conflicts may be safely removed without affecting 
the integrity of the system.  This is because only the conflicting entities restrict 
how they are associated with the roles.   
Deleting role conflicts require proper integrity checks to ensure that the 
existing associations remain valid.  This algorithm is shown in figure 7.10.   
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Check permission/role or
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Figure 7.10 Checking entity associations for role conflict deletion 
· Step 1: We find all of the associated permission and tasks for both roles ri 
and rj.  If associated entities are found for both roles, then go to step 2, 
else allow the conflict to be deleted.   
· Step 2: Check whether any of the permissions that are associated with the 
role ri are conflicting with any of the permissions that are associated with 
the role rj.  Also, check whether any of the tasks that are associated with 
the role ri are conflicting with any of the tasks that are associated with the 
role rj.  This is done by checking for the existence of the entity pairing in 
the correct conflicting entity database table.  If any of the permissions or 
tasks are conflicting, then do not allow the conflict to be deleted.   
· Step 3: Do not delete the conflict, as it will cause an existing association to 
become illegal.   
· Step 4: Delete the conflict by removing the record from the appropriate 
database table.   
The creation and deletion of entity associations as well as the creation and 
deletion of conflicting entities have now been covered.  The final set 
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algorithms which needs to be discussed are those to do with the creation and 
deletion of entities.   
7.4  Algorithms for Entity Maintenance 
The algorithms that have been discussed so far have all assumed that there 
were entities already in an administration environment.  This section 
discusses the issues surrounding the creation and deletion of entities within 
an administration environment.   
7.4.1  Creating entities 
Entities may be added an administration environment at any time.  New 
entities do not affect the integrity of the data in the system.  Care must be 
taken when deleting entities to ensure the integrity of the system remains 
intact.   
7.4.2  Deleting entities 
Any entity may be safely deleted if that entity does not form part of any 
associations.  The SoDA model will not allow any type of entity from being 
removed if that entity has an association of any kind.   
This logic is displayed in figure 7.11, which shows the algorithm used for the 
user (ui Ï U), permission (pi Ï P) and task (ti Ï T) entity deletion.  This 
algorithm also caters for deleting roles (ri Ï R) as step 1 also handles role to 
role associations or role networks.   
· Step 1: Check whether the entity has an association.  This is done by 
checking the records in the relevant entity association database table for 
one where the entity matches the current entity.  If the entity is a role, then 
it will be necessary to check whether the role forms part of a role network 
as well by checking the relevant database table.  If a record is found, then 
this deletion may not continue, else if none are found then it can proceed 
to step 3.   
· Step 2: Disallow the delete from continuing.  The administration tool will 
display the reason for the error by prompting the administrator.   
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· Step 3: Check for the existence of any conflict assignments between the 
current entity and any others.  This is done by iterating through the 
respective entity’s conflict database table where any of the entities in the 
records matches the current entity.  If an entry is found, then the record 
must be deleted.  If none is found, then the entity can be safely deleted.   
Delete entity
ui Ï U or pi Ï P or ti Ï T or ri Ï R
Does an entity to
role association
exist?
Disallow Delete
Yes
No
Delete entity
No
Are there conflict
assignments for the
entity?
Remove conflict
Yes
1
32
4
5
 
Figure 7.11 Deleting a user, permission or task entity 
· Step 4: Remove any conflicts that are between the current entity and any 
other entities.   
· Step 5: Delete the current entity.  This is done by simply removing the 
entity’s record from the respective entity’s database table.   
7.5  Conclusion 
This chapter built algorithms according to the definitions, theorems and 
axioms in chapter 6 for use within the SoDA model.  These algorithms 
describe exactly how the SoDA model maintains the integrity of the data.   
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Chapter 8 will describe the prototype that was used to demonstrate the SoDA 
model.  This prototype was assembled following the concepts defined in the 
previous chapters.  It demonstrates how the SoDA model can be implemented 
in an administration tool.   
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Chapter 8.  
SoDA: The Prototype 
Chapter 6 developed the concept of the integrity constraints while chapter 7 
discussed various algorithms necessary to enforce these SoD requirements.  
This chapter introduces a prototype used to demonstrate the concepts of the 
SoDA model.   
Two prototypes were developed for this purpose.  The first prototype’s design 
approach for enforcing the SoD requirements was markedly different to the 
approach taken by the second prototype.   
It is necessary to discuss how the first prototype functioned and to show the 
lessons learnt through its design before discussing how the second prototype 
operates.   
8.1  SoDA: The First Prototype 
When development of the SoDA prototype first began it was envisaged that 
the prototype would be a workflow administration tool.  It was decided that the 
algorithms, defined in chapter 7, would be built into a client application.  This 
demanded extra attention to the design of the user interface for the client 
application.  This approach affected the design of the first prototype.   
8.1.1  Design approach 
The first prototype was a Windows based client application with a database 
back-end.  The client application was written using Visual Basic and the 
database management system used was Oracle.  The design approach is 
depicted in figure 8.1.   
The design approach for this prototype was an all-inclusive one.  All of the 
data constraint and integrity logic was built into the prototype.  The prototype 
itself enforced the various associations and would constrain the association 
from occurring if the particular association or assignment would cause 
integrity errors.   
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Client Application, 
Contains all integrity
checking logic 
Database Management 
System, 
Stores data only 
Integrity checking logic 
 
Figure 8.1 Design approach of the first SoDA prototype.   
The client application would accomplish this by dynamically changing options 
depending upon what the user had selected.  In so doing, the prototype gave 
the user only the options that were available for the actions the user was 
performing.  With its design as a workflow administration tool, certain 
functions were included to support the environment it was administrating.   
8.1.2  Functionality 
One of the included functions was form and field creation.  This function 
supported a certain type of workflow system that the prototype was created 
for.   
Each field formed part of a hierarchy, which enabled permission groupings.  
This meant that a logical group of fields would all be accessed through the 
same permission.  For example the “Edit Order Fields” permission would only 
have to be created for the field under which all the order fields fall.  These 
fields would be automatically accessible by a user with rights to this particular 
permission.   
This in turn would generally ease the administration of permissions.  The form 
building front-end is shown in figure 8.2.   
Certain additional workflow functions were taken into account due to the fact 
that the prototype was designed as a fully functional workflow administration 
tool.  An example of these functions is the concept of a workflow process.  
Tasks had to belong to a process and only this process’ tasks could conflict 
with one another.  The second prototype does not cater for this level of detail.   
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Figure 8.2 Form design environment used to create a “Purchase Order”.   
The first SoDA prototype contained all the integrity checking logic as depicted 
in figure 8.1.  This resulted in complex user interface scenarios such as the 
task to role associations shown in figure 8.3.   
 
Figure 8.3 Ensuring conflicting task to conflicting role assignments.   
As can be seen with the screenshot on the left of figure 8.3, the Manager role 
is being associated to the “Approve Order” task.  Once this association has 
been made the user wants to then associate a role to the “Issue Stock” task.  
The screenshot on the right displays only those roles that are allowed to be 
associated with this task.   
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The application will only give the user the allowed choice of roles to choose 
from for a particular task.  It does this by applying the necessary logic to select 
the roles that can be associated with the currently selected task.   
This type of interactivity was considered a feature of the first prototype.  It 
made the conflicting entity paradigm clear through how the user interface 
responded to the user’s actions.   
There were difficulties with the design of the first SoDA prototype due to the 
fact that all of the integrity checks were incorporated into the client application.  
This is most prevalent when considering the multitude of possibilities available 
due to the flexible functionality of the client.   
8.1.3  Difficulties with this approach 
The difficulties experienced with the first prototype included: 
· The first prototype maintained the integrity of the data from the client side 
and not from the database side.  This gave the whole system too much 
flexibility in what could be done and when it could be done.  Every possible 
action needed to be catered for, thus causing the prototype to become 
unnecessarily complicated and cumbersome.   
· Whenever an association was made it was necessary for the prototype to 
check every possible condition that could cause it to fail.  This meant that a 
large section of program code was devoted to querying and checking the 
database tables.  These database queries resulted in increased network 
usage and generally slowed the process of checking for integrity conflicts.   
· There was also nothing preventing a user from accessing the database 
directly and making modifications to the data without the protective shell of 
the prototype to prevent them.   
These issues forced the prototype to be redesigned resulting in version 2.   
8.2  SoDA: The Second Prototype 
The first SoDA prototype did all of the integrity checks from within the client 
application.  Due to the difficulties experienced with this approach the second 
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SoDA prototype moved the integrity checks from the client side and into the 
database.   
This was possible due to the fact that Oracle is able to extend its own 
functionality through the use of procedures and triggers.  The difficulties 
experienced with the first prototype were thus solved through the use of a 
different design approach.   
8.2.1  Design approach 
One of the design decisions for the second prototype was to incorporate 
active database techniques.  Active databases react to events in the database 
(Paton & Díaz, 1999).  An event could be caused by the insertion of a record 
into a database table or by the timing out of a logged in user’s session.   
Another aspect of active database management systems is that instead of 
spreading organisational policies across various applications, these policies 
can be placed within the database (Kappel, Rausch-Schott, Retschitzegger & 
Sakkinen, 2001).  Policies will be enforced for every business application 
without encoding the requirements that they impose into those business 
applications.  The SoD requirements, as discussed in this dissertation, would 
thus be enforced by the active database management system.   
 
Client Application, 
Only user interface 
with no logic 
Database Management 
System, 
Contains all integrity
checking logic 
Integrity checking logic
 
Figure 8.4 Design approach of the second SoDA prototype.   
The second SoDA prototype uses the concept of an active database by 
implementing the integrity checks through database triggers.  This approach is 
depicted in figure 8.4. 
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The algorithms in chapter 7, while capable of being implemented on the client 
side, were, in this second version of the SoDA prototype, implemented as 
triggers in an Oracle database.  The redesigning of the original prototype to 
use triggers helped solve the problems of the first prototype in the following 
ways:   
· Network traffic is reduced, as the client no longer has to perform 
extraneous data queries to perform SoD requirements checks.   
· The client application is not required to ensure the validity of an 
assignment or association, as the database will control the inserts and 
deletes.   
· Changes can be made to the triggers to extend the integrity constraint 
logic without necessitating a change in the client application.   
· Users cannot bypass the client application to make changes to the data 
through the database as the database itself prevents it.   
In order to illuminate the ensuing discussion, consider how database triggers 
can be used to enforce integrity constraints such as those imposed by static 
SoD requirements.   
8.2.1.1  Using triggers to achieve integrity 
Using database triggers to enforce the conflict paradigm constraints was the 
primary focus of the second prototype.  The client application was a 
secondary goal and its only purpose was to test that the SoD requirements, 
which were implemented within the database, functioned correctly.   
SoD requirements are, where possible, enforced through foreign key 
constraints and through primary or unique key constraints.  This type of 
integrity constraint is known as declarative integrity constraints.  This integrity 
constraint prevents entities from being deleted if they are already used in 
associations.  If an entity is deleted but only has conflicts with another entity 
and no other associations, then the conflicts are removed automatically 
through the use of cascading deletes.   
An example of this would be a database table that relies on values in another 
database table.  The database can be instructed to ensure that the relied 
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upon records may not be deleted or to delete all records in the first table that 
make use of the relied upon record’s values.  But there are integrity constraint 
situations that the database cannot manage.  In these situations a database 
trigger has to be used to enforce the integrity constraint.   
This type of integrity constraint is known as a procedural integrity constraint.  
An example of this type of integrity constraint would be checking to see if an 
action is allowed to take place at a certain time of day.  In this case a business 
process, such as a sale, could be restricted to business hours.   
Triggers have restrictions on what they can do and how they can be used.  
Therefore, when designing database triggers, special considerations must be 
taken into account.   
8.2.1.2  Special considerations when using triggers 
There are two types of triggers: row-based triggers and statement-based 
triggers (ORACLE, 1999).  Row-based triggers are executed for every row or 
record in a table that a SQL statement affects.  While statement-based 
triggers are only executed once for a SQL statement, no matter how many 
records are affected, row-based triggers are more difficult to work with, as the 
possibility for errors is more prevalent.   
One such error is the mutating table error.  A mutating table error is caused 
when a row-based trigger attempts to read data from a database table that is 
in the process of undergoing change (Oracle, 1999).  The database 
management system raises an error and prevents the trigger from continuing 
since it might read invalid data.   
For example, the following SQL statement, which sets the hourly rate for wage 
earning employees, could have repercussions: 
UPDATE staff SET rate = rate + 10; 
There may be procedural integrity constraints that ensure that the rate 
increase is allowed for under organisational policies.  This could be a 
statement-based trigger, as it would most likely only need checking once for 
the entire table.  Another procedural integrity constraint could check the 
increase for every employee that is affected.  This would be a row-based 
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trigger, as it will need to execute once for every record that is affected.  The 
creation of this trigger would be hampered if it needed to examine values 
within the staff database table due to the mutating table error.   
In designing the triggers for the prototype it was realised that they would have 
to examine the contents of their own changing database tables.  This forced 
them to be designed in such a way to prevent mutating table errors.  This 
problem can be demonstrated practically with the following example.   
A trigger will fire when two conflicting roles are inserted into the conflicting role 
(CR) database table.  This trigger will have to execute every time a conflicting 
pair of roles gets inserted into this table.  This means that this trigger is a row-
based trigger.   
This trigger has to find all of the roles that are already conflicting with the 
conflicting roles that are being added to the CR database table in order for it 
to check the SoD requirements.  This requires it to query the CR table that is 
presently in the process of changing.  Oracle will not allow this query to 
proceed and will generate a mutating table error.   
In order to work around this problem it was necessary to create an Oracle 
package to hold PL/SQL table variables for each trigger.  A package is a 
globally accessible collection of variables and routines (ORACLE, 1999).  A 
PL/SQL table is an array-like structure that can be used to hold the values of 
database records.   
In order to make use of the PL/SQL tables in the package it was necessary to 
design the triggers correctly.  This design involves the creation of three 
triggers, one for each type of action for each database table.  This solution is 
represented graphically in figure 8.5.   
The package defines two PL/SQL tables for each database table and for each 
action that will be handled.  So there are two PL/SQL tables for inserting a 
record into the role to role database table when creating role networks.  There 
are also two PL/SQL tables for the triggers that handle deleting records from 
the role to role database table.   
Of the two PL/SQL tables for each trigger, the first table holds the actual data 
while the second is simply an empty structure used to reinitialise the first.   
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Figure 8.5 A solution to the problem of mutating tables.   
The first of the three triggers does the reinitialising of the first PL/SQL table.  
This trigger is a statement trigger that will run at the beginning of the insert or 
delete action on a database table.   
The second trigger is a row-based trigger that gets activated for every row that 
is affected.  This trigger adds the values of the fields of the affected records to 
the first PL/SQL table’s fields and increments the first PL/SQL table’s counter 
by one each time.   
The third trigger is a statement-based trigger that fires after the changes on 
the database table.  This trigger loops through all the records in the first 
PL/SQL table and checks the SoD requirements for the record that was 
inserted or deleted.  It must be remembered that at this point the record is 
either already in the database table if it was inserted or it is already deleted 
from the database table if deleted.  If the SoD requirement check fails, then it 
is necessary for the third trigger to raise an exception to cause the database 
to cause a rollback to reverse the changes.   
The client application for this approach has no SoD requirement checking 
logic. It relies upon the database in order to operate effectively and securely.  
This does have the added disadvantage that the client tends to show every 
possibility as being available.  Only after the user attempts an assignment or 
association does the client show the error raised by the database.   
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It is possible to address this issue by using stored procedures for the SQL 
queries that will return a sensitised record set.  However, this is a user 
interface issue and not an integrity issue, and as such falls outside the scope 
of this dissertation.   
It is also possible to combine the approach taken with the first prototype and 
the approach taken with the second prototype.  Certain SoD requirements, 
such as not allowing the same role to be conflicting with itself, could very 
easily be guarded against from the client side as well as from the database.   
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the second prototype’s approach, it was 
necessary to make the client application as simple as possible.  The client 
application for the second SoDA prototype is just a user interface that 
facilitates the creation of entities, conflict assignments and associations.  The 
client application contains no SoD requirements checking logic.  As such, only 
the triggers, which were coded in Oracle’s PL/SQL programming language, 
are listed in appendix C along with the database tables and the declarative 
constraints.   
An in-depth discussion of the functionality of the triggers is required in order to 
understand how this solution creates an environment that handles separation 
of duty constraints.   
8.2.2  Functionality 
The second SoDA prototype implements the algorithms in chapter 7 as a set 
of triggers.  A scenario based on the workflow example in chapter 2 is 
introduced in order to describe the functioning of these triggers.   
The security administrator will create all of the conflict assignments.  Once the 
conflicts between entities have been identified, it will be up to the workflow 
administrator, whose job it is to manage the workflow process definitions, to 
create the associations between the entities.  These employee assignments 
are depicted in figure 8.6.   
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Figure 8.6 Anticipated employee assignments for the SoDA environment.   
To facilitate the scenario, the following pre-existing entities shall be used:   
Users UserID  Tasks TaskID 
Thomas 1  Complete Order Form 1 
Peter 2  Approve Order 2 
Frank 3  Check Stock 3 
   Issue Stock 4 
   Order Stock 5 
   Write Rejection Memo 6 
 
Roles RoleID  Permissions PermID 
Employee 1  Edit Order Fields 1 
Stock Controller 2  Edit Approve Order Fields 2 
Manager 3  Edit Rejection Fields 3 
   Read Order Form 4 
   Edit Order Completed Fields 5 
 
The permissions declared here are similar to the permissions defined for the 
first prototype.  That is, they are named groupings of access rights to objects.  
In this example, the permissions are derived from the concept of form-based 
workflow.  The permission “Edit Approve Order Fields” is thus a group of 
access rights for a user to achieve a specific activity.   
Within the first prototype, the security administrator would assign access 
rights to the fields within a form to a named permission group.  The second 
prototype does not cater for this step, but rather treats permissions at a higher 
level of abstraction.   
The outline of this scenario is shown in table 8.1. 
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 Operation Section 
Conflicts 
Creating role conflicts 
Creating user conflicts 
Creating permission conflicts 
Creating task conflicts 
Deleting conflicting entities 
8.2.2.1 
8.2.2.2 
8.2.2.3 
8.2.2.4 
8.2.2.5 
Role Networks Creating the role network 
Deleting a role from a role network 
8.2.2.6 
8.2.2.7 
Associations 
Creating user to role associations 
Creating permission to role associations 
Creating task to role associations 
Deleting associations 
8.2.2.8 
8.2.2.9 
8.2.2.10 
8.2.2.11 
Table 8.1 The SoDA model prototype scenario layout 
It is possible to begin with any of the associations or conflict assignments, but 
in order to keep this explanation simple, the scenario will begin with the 
creation of conflicts.   
8.2.2.1  Creating role conflicts   
In the example, only two roles are conflicting: the manager role and the 
employee role.  If these roles were not conflicting then they would be able to 
exist in the same role network.  Since permissions are inherited from the role 
network, it would mean that one of the roles would have the permissions that 
would permit fraud.   
In order to set the conflict, which is denoted as (r1,r3) Î CR, a SQL statement 
will insert a record into the CR database table.  For these roles this can be 
coded as: 
INSERT INTO cr VALUES(1,3); 
The “crstatafter_trig” trigger will check that this is possible by first checking 
that they are not already conflicting.  The algorithm for this trigger can be 
found in chapter 7, section 7.3.1, figures 7.6 and 7.9.  The primary key 
constraint already present for the database table will capture this error 
sometimes, but the roles may be reversed for the current record and so this 
check is necessary.   
It will then check whether the two roles form part of the same role network.  If 
they are, then the following error is raised: 
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ORA-20223: Cannot insert role conflict - both roles are 
already part of a role network. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.CRSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 25 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.CRSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
The trigger will proceed to check whether any of the users that are associated 
with the first role are conflicting with any of the users that are associated with 
the second role.  If there are any then it will raise the following error: 
ORA-20205: Cannot insert role conflict - both roles are 
already associated to conflicting users. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.CRSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 43 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.CRSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
Only once these integrity constraint checks have passed will the trigger allow 
the conflict to be inserted.   
Conflicting roles restrict which associations may be made with other entities 
and the roles that may form part of a role network.   
8.2.2.2  Creating user conflicts   
For this example it is not necessary to create conflicts between any of the 
users.  For thoroughness, a description of how the logic operates for an 
example is described.   
If the users Thomas and Frank were brothers it may be necessary to create a 
conflict between them.  In order to set the conflict, which is denoted as (u1,u3) 
Î CU, a SQL statement will insert a record into the CU database table.  For 
these users this can be coded as: 
INSERT INTO cu VALUES(1,3); 
The “custatafter_trig” trigger will check that this is possible by first checking 
that they are not already conflicting.  The algorithm for this trigger can be 
found in chapter 7, section 7.3.1, figures 7.6 and 7.7.  The primary key 
constraint already present for the database table will capture this error 
sometimes, but the users may be reversed for the current record and so this 
check is necessary.   
The trigger will then check if the first user has any associated roles that are 
conflicting with any of the second user’s associated roles.  If so, it generates 
the following error: 
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ORA-20207: Cannot insert user conflict - both users are 
already associated to conflicting roles. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.CUSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 43 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.CUSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
If conflicting users have been defined, these conflicts will restrict which roles 
may be associated with these users as well as the roles that may be part of a 
role network.   
8.2.2.3  Creating permission conflicts   
The primary means for preventing fraud is by the manipulation of access 
rights to the objects within a system.  These access rights are known as 
permissions and creating conflicts between certain permissions is the means 
of manipulation necessary to enforce static separation of duty.   
The security administrator needs to decide which permissions are conflicting.  
Once the conflicting permissions have been identified it is necessary to set 
them as conflicting.   
In this example the permissions that are conflicting are: 
Permission Conflicts with 
Edit Approve Order Fields 
Edit Order Fields 
Edit Rejection Fields 
 
In order to set these conflicts, which are denoted as (p1,p2) Î CP and (p1,p3) Î 
CP, a SQL statement will insert two records into the CP database table.  For 
these permissions this can be coded as: 
INSERT INTO cp VALUES(1,2); 
INSERT INTO cp VALUES(1,3); 
The “cpstatafter_trig” trigger will check that this is possible by first checking 
that they are not already conflicting.  The algorithm for this trigger can be 
found in chapter 7, section 7.3.1, figures 7.6 and 7.8.  The primary key 
constraint already present for the database table will capture this error 
sometimes, but the permissions may be reversed for the current record and 
so this check is necessary.   
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The trigger will then check that all of the first permission’s associated roles are 
conflicting with all of the second permission’s associated roles.  If this is not 
so, it will generate the following error: 
ORA-20209: Cannot insert permission conflict - one or more 
of the associated roles of the two permissions are not 
conflicting. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.CPSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 47 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.CPSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
It is important to note that if one of the permissions does not have any 
associated roles, then the conflict may be created.   
Conflicting permissions will restrict which roles may be associated with them, 
which causes a cascading effect that restricts the permissions assigned to 
users.   
Up to now this scenario has only dealt with the entities that are normally a part 
of role based access control.  Now it is necessary to include the concept of a 
task.   
8.2.2.4  Creating task conflicts   
The workflow task helps to incorporate the separation of duty constraints into 
the workflow environment.  The enforcement of separation of duty 
requirements becomes easier for workflow processes once the tasks have 
been incorporated into conflict assignments and into the associations.   
The security administrator will need to create conflicts between the following 
tasks: 
Task Conflicts with 
Approve Order 
Complete Order Form 
Write Rejection Memo 
 
It could be argued that even more conflicts could be created between various 
other tasks.  These conflicts could be made but they are dependent upon the 
level of security needed.   
In order to set these conflicts, which are denoted as (t1,t2) Î CT and (t1,t6) Î 
CT, a SQL statement will insert two records into the CT database table.  For 
these tasks this can be coded as: 
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INSERT INTO ct VALUES(1,2); 
INSERT INTO ct VALUES(1,6); 
The “ctstatafter_trig” trigger will check that this is possible by first checking 
that they are not already conflicting.  The algorithm for this trigger can be 
found in chapter 7, section 7.3.1, figures 7.6 and 7.8.  This logic is identical as 
that for the permission conflicts.   
The trigger will then check that all of the first task’s associated roles are 
conflicting with all of the second task’s associated roles.  If this is not so, it will 
generate the following error: 
ORA-20211: Cannot insert task conflict - one or more of the 
associated roles of the two tasks are not conflicting. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.CTSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 48 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.CTSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
As with the permission conflict assignment, it is important to note that if one of 
the tasks does not have any associated roles then the conflict may be 
created.   
Conflicting tasks will prevent the possibility of conflicting permissions from 
being assigned to conflicting users within the workflow environment.   
At this point it is necessary to explain what will happen if it is necessary to 
remove conflicts. 
8.2.2.5  Deleting conflicting entities   
Most conflict assignments can be removed without any repercussions.  This is 
due to the fact that the removal of most conflicts will not impact the data 
integrity of the SoDA data.   
The exception to this rule is the deletion of a role conflict assignment.  A role 
conflict cannot be removed if the first role’s associated tasks or permissions 
conflict with the second role’s associated tasks or permissions.  This means 
that if two conflicting tasks or permissions are associated with two conflicting 
roles, then the role conflict may not be deleted. 
If the security administrator attempts to delete this role conflict then the 
“dcrstatafter_trig” trigger generates the following error: 
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ORA-20212: Cannot delete role conflict - the roles form part 
of associations to tasks or permissions that will become 
invalid if the role conflict is deleted. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.DCRSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 66 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.DCRSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
The algorithm for this trigger can be found in chapter 7, section 7.3.2, figure 
7.10.  This ensures that the data integrity of the SoDA associations remains 
intact.   
The security administrator has created all of the assignments up to this point 
in the scenario.  Once the conflicts have been created it is no longer the 
security administrator’s job to continue with the associations.  The creation of 
the association is the job of the workflow administrator.   
The workflow administrator must create the associations between all the 
entities in order to support the workflow processes.  These associations can 
be made in any order.  The creation of the role network will be demonstrated 
first to continue the scenario.   
8.2.2.6  Creating the role network   
This scenario’s role network will be very small but the logic works on very 
small or very large role networks.   
The first step to creating a role network is to give the role network a name.  
Inserting a record into the “RoleNet” database table does this.  For his 
scenario the description of the role network will be “Order Fulfilment”.  This 
role network’s ID will be used for every role inserted into this specific role 
network.   
The SQL statement that will insert this role network is: 
INSERT INTO rolenet VALUES(1,’Order Fulfilment’); 
The database table that holds the actual roles assigned to a role network is 
named “RH”.  This database table currently holds no roles for this role 
network.   
The first role to be inserted must be the root role.  This record’s parentid field 
is null with the childid field equal to the roleid being inserted.  In this case it will 
be the manager role.  The SQL statement to insert this record is: 
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INSERT INTO rh VALUES(1,null,3); 
This record will not be inserted if the role network doesn’t already exist.  This 
integrity constraint is enforced by foreign key constraints.  The 
“rhstatafter_trig” trigger will check for a variety of other SoD requirements.  
Firstly it will check whether an existing root role already exists for the 
particular role network.  If one does exist, then the trigger generates the 
following error: 
ORA-20217: Cannot insert role into role network - root role 
already exists for the particular role network. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.RHSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 42 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.RHSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
The next role to be inserted into the RH database table for this role network 
must be a child role of the root role.  In this case it will be the stock controller 
role.  The SQL statement to insert this record is: 
INSERT INTO rh VALUES(1,3,2); 
The “rhstatafter_trig” trigger will check first for the existence of a root role for 
the role network.  The algorithm for this trigger can be found in chapter 7, 
section 7.2.3, figure 7.4.  Once found it then checks whether the parent role of 
the inserted record is already in the role network as a child.  In this case the 
parent role is the manager role and it is in the role network as the root role 
(parentid is null and childid is 3).  If the parent role is not already there, then 
Oracle will raise an error.  The following SQL statement tries to add a role to 
the role network where the parent role does not exist: 
INSERT INTO rh VALUES(1,1,2);  
And it generates the following error: 
ORA-20213: Cannot insert role into role network - the parent 
role is not an existing child role. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.RHSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 87 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.RHSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
The trigger then checks for the possibility of a circular reference.  It does this 
by executing a hierarchical query that will fail if a circular reference has been 
created.  If it will cause a circular reference, the trigger captures the exception 
and raises the following error: 
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ORA-20214: Cannot insert role into role network - it will 
cause a circular reference to occur. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.RHSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 94 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.RHSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
The trigger’s final check is to see whether any of the roles already in the role 
network are already conflicting with the role just inserted.  If there are any then 
the following error is raised: 
ORA-20215: Cannot insert role into role network - 
conflicting role(s) are already present in the role network. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.RHSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 81 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.RHSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
The role network for this scenario is very small.  It only contains two roles, 
namely the manager role as the root role, and the stock controller role as the 
child role.   
As with the creation of a role network, it is important to understand the SoD 
requirement checks required when deleting roles from a role network. 
8.2.2.7  Deleting a role from a role network   
If a role needs to be deleted from a role network then the “drhstatafter_trig” 
trigger checks that the role to be deleted has no children roles in the role 
network.  The delete statement below tries to delete the root role (manager) 
from the role network.   
DELETE FROM rh WHERE parentid IS NULL AND rolenetid = 1 AND 
childid = 3; 
And it generates the following error: 
ORA-20222: Cannot delete role association - children 
associations already exist for the role been deleted. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.DRHSTATAFTER_TRIG", line 17 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.DRHSTATAFTER_TRIG' 
A role network may only be removed when it no longer contains any roles. 
Roles can be associated with all other entities and the scenario will now 
continue with the steps involved with these associations.   
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8.2.2.8  Creating user to role associations   
The workflow administrator will now create associations between the users 
and the roles.  The user to role associations that need to be created for this 
workflow example are displayed in the following table.   
User Role 
Thomas Employee 
Peter Stock Controller 
Frank Manager 
 
A user to role association is denoted mathematically as (ui,ri) Î UA.  The SQL 
statements to insert these associations are: 
The Employee role to the user Thomas: 
INSERT INTO ua VALUES(1,1); 
The Stock Controller role to the user Peter: 
INSERT INTO ua VALUES(2,2); 
The Manager role to the user Frank: 
INSERT INTO ua VALUES(3,3); 
Certain SoD requirements need to be enforced when adding these 
associations and the “uastatafter_trig” trigger checks these SoD requirements.  
The algorithm for this trigger can be found in chapter 7, section 7.2.1, figure 
7.2.  This trigger will generate an error if the user in the user to role 
association has conflicting users that are associated to roles that are 
conflicting with the role being added.   
What this means is that if Frank were being associated to the Manager role 
then it would be necessary to do the following checks: 
· Ascertain if Frank is conflicting with any other users.  For example, 
Frank may be conflicting with Thomas.   
· Check whether any of Thomas’s associated roles are conflicting with 
the Manager role.  The association may continue if Thomas has no 
associated roles.  If a problem was detected then the following error will 
be raised by the trigger: 
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ORA-20201: Cannot insert user to role association - a 
conflicting user is already associated to a conflicting 
role. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.UASTATAFTER_TRIG", line 48 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.UASTATAFTER_TRIG' 
These associations will restrict the permissions and the tasks that can be 
associated with the roles and in effect, the users.   
8.2.2.9  Creating permission to role associations   
The workflow administrator will now create associations between the 
permissions and the roles.  The permission to role associations that need to 
be created for this workflow example are displayed in the following table.   
Permission Role 
Edit Order Fields Employee 
Edit Order Completed Fields Stock Controller 
Edit Approve Order Fields 
Edit Rejection Fields 
Manager 
 
A permission to role association is denoted mathematically as (pi,ri) Î PA.  
The SQL statements to insert these associations are: 
The Employee role to the “Edit Order Fields” permission:   
INSERT INTO pa VALUES(1,1);   
The Stock Controller role to the “Edit Order Completed Fields” permission:   
INSERT INTO pa VALUES(2,5);   
The Manager role to the “Edit Approve Order Fields” and “Edit Rejection 
Fields” permissions:   
INSERT INTO pa VALUES(3,2);   
INSERT INTO pa VALUES(3,3);   
The “pastatafter_trig” trigger will check the role to permission associations that 
are inserted into the database table.  The algorithm for this trigger can be 
found in chapter 7, section 7.2.1, figure 7.3.  This trigger will generate an error 
if the permission in the permission to role association has conflicting 
permissions and that some of these permission’s associated roles are not 
conflicting with the role been added.   
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What this means is that if the “Edit Approve Order Fields” permission is being 
associated with the Manager role, then the following steps need to be taken: 
· Identify all of the “Edit Approve Order Fields” permission’s conflicting 
permissions.  This would identify the “Edit Order Fields” permission.   
· Now identify all of the associated roles for the previously identified 
permissions.  This would identify the Employee role. 
· All of the previously identified roles must conflict with the Manager role.  
In this case they do as the Employee role does conflict with the 
Manager role.  If this were not the case, the trigger would generate the 
following error: 
ORA-20202: Cannot insert permission to role association - a 
conflicting permission must be assigned to a conflicting 
role. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.PASTATAFTER_TRIG", line 48 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.PASTATAFTER_TRIG' 
The task to role association is conceptually equivalent to the permission to 
role association.   
8.2.2.10  Creating task to role associations   
The workflow administrator will now create associations between the tasks 
and the roles.  The task to role associations that need to be created for this 
workflow example are displayed in the following table.   
Task Role 
Complete Order Form Employee 
Check Stock 
Issue Stock 
Order Stock 
Stock Controller 
Approve Order 
Write Rejection Memo 
Manager 
 
A task to role association is denoted mathematically as (ti,ri) Î TA.  The SQL 
statements to insert these associations are: 
The Employee role to the “Complete Order Form” task:   
INSERT INTO ta VALUES(1,1);   
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The Stock Controller role to the “Check Stock”, “Issue Stock” and “Order 
Stock” tasks:   
INSERT INTO ta VALUES(2,3);   
INSERT INTO ta VALUES(2,4);   
INSERT INTO ta VALUES(2,5);   
The Manager role to the “Approve Order” and “Write Rejection Memo” tasks:   
INSERT INTO ta VALUES(3,2);   
INSERT INTO ta VALUES(3,6);   
The “tastatafter_trig” trigger will check the role to task associations that are 
inserted into the database table.  The algorithm for this trigger can be found in 
chapter 7, section 7.2.1, figure 7.3.  This trigger will generate an error if the 
task in the task to role association has conflicting tasks and if some of these 
task’s associated roles are not conflicting with the role being added.   
What this means is that if the “Approve Order” task is being associated with 
the Manager role, then the following steps need to be taken: 
· Identify all of the “Approve Order” task’s conflicting tasks.  This would 
identify the “Complete Order Form” task.   
· Now identify all of the associated roles for the previously identified 
tasks.  This would identify the Employee role. 
· All of the previously identified roles must conflict with the Manager role.  
In this case they do as the Employee role does conflict with the 
Manager role.  If this were not the case, the trigger would generate the 
following error: 
ORA-20203: Cannot insert task to role association - a 
conflicting task must be assigned to a conflicting role. 
ORA-06512: at "STEPHEN.TASTATAFTER_TRIG", line 49 
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 
'STEPHEN.TASTATAFTER_TRIG' 
As previously mentioned, both the permission to role association and the task 
to role association are very similar.  The correct usage of these associations 
will help ensure a secure workflow environment.   
The SoDA prototype also allows for associations to be deleted. 
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8.2.2.11  Deleting associations   
Associations may be deleted without compromising the data integrity of the 
SoDA system.   
This scenario demonstrated the effectiveness of the second version of the 
SoDA prototype.  By ensuring that separation of duty requirements are met 
through the use of database triggers that guarantee the enforcement of the 
integrity constraints, it has exhibited an ability to help and ease the 
administrative burden.   
8.2.3  Further functionality 
While the triggers that form the basis of the second version of the SoDA 
prototype ensure the integrity of the data, they do not cater for many different 
security and management issues.   
The first of these issues is the fact that a user can still connect directly to the 
database and can update any of the records in the database.  This is 
generally easy to solve through a few different approaches.   
For the first approach, triggers could be added to the database tables to 
prevent updates from occurring.  This is not an ideal situation as it 
complicates the whole system unnecessarily. 
Another approach is to maintain security through the proper use of users and 
roles within Oracle.  A specific user with enough access rights and privileges 
would install the SoDA prototype.  Then the users of the SoDA prototype 
would only be given select, insert and delete rights to the database tables.  
This would ensure that even if a user does access the database directly, they 
can do no more damage than if they were using the client application.   
8.3  Implementation Issues 
The SoDA prototype was developed according to the proposed model. As 
such, the design of the database tables followed the design of the sets of 
entities used by the model.  The triggers could be simplified if the database 
tables were denormalised.  This would involve adding redundant information 
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into the database tables so as to improve the performance and to simplify the 
algorithms utilised in the triggers.   
The prototype also had to conform to the restrictions of the database 
management system.  These restrictions dictated how the database triggers 
would function.  The logic of the triggers could be simplified if the database 
management system handled the restrictions differently.   
8.4  Conclusion 
The concept of the SoDA prototype has changed markedly throughout this 
research.  The current version has improved upon the previous version and 
has tried to correct problems inherent in the older design.   
More importantly though, both versions of the SoDA prototypes help 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the conflicting entities paradigm.  This 
paradigm is discussed in chapter 6.  The prototypes show that it is possible to 
help prevent separation of duty conflicts within the workflow environment, and 
in so doing, it could help enforce company policy.  Company policies can also 
be enforced through the use of active database technology.   
It is evident that database management systems are incorporating active 
database techniques and technologies (G. Kappel et al., 2001).  The 
capabilities of database management systems will expand to encompass the 
ability to enforce policy driven rules for the protection of an organisation’s 
data.   
With these developments in database technology it also becomes possible for 
the database management system to encompass elements of a workflow 
system.  It is foreseen that the SoDA prototype would become abstracted into 
the database management system as part of a workflow component.  Without 
tasks it could be implemented as part of an active relational DBMS 
(ARDBMS).   
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Chapter 9.  
Conclusion 
Due to the increasing volume and importance of information available 
electronically it has become necessary to facilitate an organisation’s 
information security administration.  Along with easing the administration of 
information security is the need to enforce organisational policies.  This 
ensures that the information is managed and protected according to the needs 
of the organisation.  For this research, these needs took the form of the 
enforcement of separation of duties within an organisation’s workflow 
environment.   
Separation of duties and the administration thereof can be eased through the 
utilisation of RBAC.  In order to tie this ease of use to the managing of an 
organisation’s information, it was necessary to ascertain if and how RBAC 
could be applied to a workflow environment.   
A workflow environment controls the flow of information according to rules 
defined within business process models.  RBAC employed within the workflow 
environment should thus be sensitised to the context of the work (Cholewka et 
al., 2000; Thomas & Sandhu, 1993).  In order to employ RBAC into the 
workflow environment a workflow specific entity, the task, was added to the 
normal RBAC entities.   
Through the use of the task entity it became possible to enforce separation of 
duty requirements in the workflow environment.  In order to enforce the 
separation of duty requirements it was necessary to ascertain the different 
associations between the entities that may be allowed to take place.   
These associations became the methodology required to implement the 
conflicting entities administration paradigm.  The emphasis of this paradigm is 
to help the security administrator ensure that separation of duty constraints 
get enforced.   
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An implementation of the conflicting entities administration paradigm would 
help security administration by enforcing the integrity constraints for the 
administrators.  The environment becomes sensitive to the requirements for 
enforcing the integrity constraints and is able to prevent potential errors from 
occurring.   
This research relied upon answers for the research questions that were asked 
in the first chapter.  These questions were asked in order to understand the 
requirements for accomplishing the primary research objective.  This objective 
was the creation of a model for an advanced access control administration 
environment.  These questions are now reviewed.   
9.1  Research Questions Reviewed 
The model of an advanced access control administration environment 
required a number of problems to be researched.  These problems were 
specified in the form of questions.   
9.1.1 How can RBAC concepts be applied in the workflow environment?   
RBAC environments formulate access control requirements in terms of Roles, 
Users and Permissions.  An additional element, from the workflow 
environment, was identified and included into these formulations.  This 
identified workflow element, the task, was incorporated into the RBAC 
environment and the RBAC environment was adapted to make use of it.   
9.1.2 How is the specification of SoD requirements influenced by the 
inclusion of the workflow entities?   
It was identified that SoD requirements could be imposed by integrity 
constraints between the RBAC entities.  These integrity constraints and the 
additional integrity constraints required by the addition of the workflow task 
were identified and formalised.  Algorithms based upon these formalisations 
were developed for use in a prototype in order to demonstrate the model’s 
effectiveness.   
Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 101
9.1.3 Can a single administration paradigm successfully formulate the 
range of separation of duty requirements?   
The required range of SoD requirements can be formulated in the single 
administration paradigm.  The single administration paradigm has been shown 
to handle the specification of SoD requirements and to ensure the 
enforcement of these requirements.  The single administration paradigm does 
allow for a consistent and easy to use approach to access control 
administration.   
These questions and their subsequent answers have contributed towards the 
accomplishment of the primary research objectives.   
9.2  Contribution of this dissertation 
The outcome of this research was a model for an advanced access control 
administration environment that handled the administration of SoD constraints 
in a workflow environment.  This model has contributed various concepts.  
These concepts include the conflicting entities administration paradigm and 
enforcement algorithms for static SoD.   
9.2.1  Development of conflicting entities administration paradigm 
Once the concept of the task entity had been adapted into the RBAC 
environment, it became necessary to identify a model for the use of the 
extended RBAC environment.  The solution that is presented is one where an 
administration environment will enforce associations and assignments 
between entities based upon the concept of conflicting entities.   
Conflicting entities may only be related to other entities according to certain 
rules.  The development of these rules was an integral part of this research.  
Once the rules were defined, it became possible to create generic algorithms 
to provide integrity constraint checking.   
9.2.2  Development of enforcement algorithms for static SoD 
These algorithms include the logic required to check for every possible entity 
association or conflict assignment that could occur.  Each of these algorithms 
takes into account various likely scenarios due to the fact that an association 
or assignment needs to do a variety of checks before final approval.   
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These algorithms are generic enough to be realised in a variety of 
implementations.  In order to demonstrate their functionality two prototypes 
were developed.  The first prototype attempted to enforce the integrity 
constraint rules in a client-side application.  In order to improve upon the 
design of the first prototype, it was decided to demonstrate the SoDA model 
using a different approach.  This approach involved the use of active database 
techniques.   
Active database techniques can be used to allow an organisation’s data to 
abide by the organisation’s policies (Kappel et al., 2001).  In so doing, 
application systems do not need to be developed to support these policies as 
the database management system will support them for all application 
systems.   
The second prototype was developed with these motives in mind.  This 
prototype implemented the algorithms as database triggers in order to enforce 
the integrity constraints.  This prototype demonstrated that the implementation 
of the conflicting entities administration paradigm is feasible at the database 
level.   
9.3  Future Research 
There are many areas of this research that require further analysis.  This is 
partly a result of the scope taken.  With this in mind it is clear that more 
integration with the workflow environment is required.   
Future research would undertake to study how to evolve the conflicting 
entities administration paradigm to include the dynamic workflow environment.  
Topics such as the temporality of access rights and dynamic constraints 
would need to be researched.   
Another area of future research is the issue of management. Management 
issues will become increasingly important once the SoDA model has been 
extended to include dynamic SoD.   
Understanding how an organisation can manage their resources efficiently 
and maintain a high level of security would be advantageous.  Research 
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would help in the design of a model that is flexible enough to adapt to any 
organisation’s requirements while still remaining as secure as possible.   
Another future research proposal for consideration is the concept of 
abstraction.  This would involve researching the possibilities and benefits 
involved with abstracting workflow and its information security requirements 
into lower level applications.  These applications include the operating system 
or the database management system.   
Database management systems are evolving into active environments, able to 
handle the enforcement of organisational policies and as such could 
theoretically be extended to support the required workflow and security 
services.  Understanding what should be abstracted and what should remain 
separate would also have to be assessed.   
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Abstract  
The increasing reliance on information technology to support business processes has emphasised the need for information 
security mechanisms.  This, however, has resulted in an ever-increasing workload in terms of security administration.  
Policy-based approaches have been proposed, promising to lighten the workload of security administrators.  Separation of 
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Keywords:  Access Control, Separation of duty, Authorisation constraints, Workflow 
Computing Review Category: D4.6, G2.3, H4.1, K6.5 
 
1 Introduction 
With the increasing amount of information available 
electronically it is not only necessary to find a means to 
ease the job of the security administrator, but also to 
ensure that the information is protected and managed 
according to organisational policies.   
On the one hand, Role-based Access Control (RBAC) 
has been promoted as a possible solution to the 
administration nightmares that face security administrators 
[5].  On the other hand, however, workflow technology 
has been boasted as a means of controlling the flow of 
information according to business process models.  RBAC 
mechanisms employed in the workflow environment 
should thus be sensitised to the context of the work [3,16].   
The context of the work is determined by factors such 
as the sequence and history of events, as well as the 
organisational policies.  One expression of organisational 
policy can be found in the age-old principle of separation 
of duty (SoD).  Separation of duty's primary objective is 
to prevent fraud, i.e. protect the integrity of the 
information [4]. It can, however, be largely enforced by 
means of appropriate access control mechanisms.   
Access control is a two-phase process.  During phase 
one, users receive potential to perform certain activities – 
this is called access control administration.  Phase two 
occurs when an application is used and the actual 
permission is granted to the user – this is called run-time 
access control. 
SoD requirements can, similarly, be evaluated in two 
ways.  In the first instance, the access control 
administration tool can check that specified requirements 
are met.  This is referred to as static separation of duty.  
With static SoD the user would thus not even receive the 
potential to ever perform an activity.  In the second 
instance the SoD requirements can be enforced at run-
time.  This is referred to as dynamic separation of duty.  
With dynamic SoD the roles that the user may activate are 
thus controlled. 
This paper focuses on static SoD requirements, i.e. it 
addresses enforcement from an access control 
administration perspective.   
2 Related SoD Research 
The term "separation of privilege" was identified as 
one of eight design principles for the protection of 
information in computer systems by Saltzer and Schroeder 
[14].  They built on the observation that a security system 
with two keys is more robust and flexible than one that 
requires a single key.  No single accident, deception or 
breach of trust is therefore sufficient to compromise the 
system. 
Clark and Wilson [4] identified separation of duty as 
one of the two major mechanisms that can be 
implemented to ensure data integrity.  SoD serves as a 
mechanism to counteract fraud and error, whilst assuring 
correspondence between system objects and the real world 
objects that they represent.  They asserted that, at the 
policy level, processes are divided into steps, with each 
step being performed by a different person.  Separation of 
duty is thus tightly connected to application semantics.  
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The issue of separation of duty has been addressed 
from different perspectives by several authors.  Interested 
readers are referred to [2],[6],[10],[11], [12] and [15].  
This paper only examines related work in which concepts 
directly called upon in our interpretation are discussed. 
Kuhn [8] explored the mutual exclusion of roles as a 
separation of duty mechanism.  He presented a taxonomy 
whereby a separation of duty requirement is categorised 
according to the time at which mutual exclusion is applied 
(static vs. dynamic), as well as the degree to which 
privileges are shared by mutually exclusive roles (strong 
or partial exclusion).  Strong exclusion implies no 
common permission or user assignments for exclusive 
roles.  Partial exclusion, on the other hand, implies that 
mutually exclusive roles may share permissions (or users) 
but that each role should have permissions assigned that 
are unique to that role. 
Nyanchama and Osborn [9] discussed various types of 
conflicts that have to be considered when implementing 
separation of duty policies.  They evaluated the effect of 
role hierarchies in great depth in terms of their role-graph 
model.  
Ahn and Sandhu [1] defined the RSL99 language for 
specifying separation of duty constraints.  They based 
their SoD requirements on the concepts of conflicting 
users, conflicting roles and conflicting permissions.  New 
static separation of duty properties are discovered through 
the application of their RSL99 language. 
The observation that existing separation of duty 
models do not take into consideration the work processes 
has been made by [1] and [9].  The relevance of work 
process models on the dynamic enforcement of separation 
of duty requirements are easily recognisable, however the 
impact of work process models is not identified.  This 
paper will extend the typical RBAC model to include the 
notion of a task which represents the basic building block 
of work models.  It will show how the task concept 
influences static SoD.  In particular a single administration 
paradigm that includes the task will be presented. 
The administration paradigm presented hinges on the 
understanding of role-based access control.  A detailed 
look at RBAC is thus in order. 
3 Role-Based Access Control 
The basic premise of RBAC is that access permissions 
are assigned to roles rather than to individuals.  
Individuals are assigned to roles in order to obtain the 
access permissions that the individual requires in order to 
work.  This greatly reduces the administration burden. 
In this paper the existing and well-accepted RBAC96 
model [13] is used.  Choosing an independently developed 
existing model for this exercise gives us an element of 
objectivity in assessing the power of the proposed 
administration paradigm.  An overview of the RBAC96 
model must therefore be given.   
3.1  RBAC96 
The RBAC96 model consists of 4 main components: 
users, roles, permissions and sessions.  Since a session is a 
run-time concept it is irrelevant to the administration 
environment and thus to this paper.  
Users (U) are associated with roles (R) through the 
user-assignment relation (UA).  Similarly, permissions (P) 
are associated with roles (R) through the permission-
assignment relation (PA).  Roles are arranged in role 
hierarchies through the partial order RH.  A role that is 
senior to another role inherits the permissions of the junior 
role.  A user that is associated with a senior role in the role 
hierarchy therefore may also assume all the roles junior to 
the senior role in the RH partial order. 
Consider a short formal summary of the relevant 
components in the RBAC96 model [1,13]: 
Definition 3.1:  RBAC entities 
U = set of users, {u1,u2,…,ul} 
R = set of roles, {r1,r2,…,rm} 
P = set of permissions, {p1,p2,…,pn} 
Definition 3.2: RBAC associations 
UA ⊆ U × R, a many-to-many user-to-role assignment 
relation 
PA ⊆ P × R, a many-to-many permission-to-role 
assignment relation 
RH ⊆ R × R, a partial order on R called the role hierarchy, 
also written as ≤  
Definition 3.3: Roles function 
roles: U ∪ P→2R, a function mapping the sets U and P to 
a set of roles 
roles* : U ∪ P→2R extends roles in the presence of a role 
hierarchy 
roles(ui)={r∈R(ui,r)∈UA} 
roles(pi)={r∈R(pi,r)∈PA} 
roles*(ui)={ r∈R(∃r ≤  r')[(ui,r')∈UA]} 
roles*(pi)={ r∈R(∃r' ≤ r)[(pi,r')∈PA]} 
Note that the definition of roles* is carefully formulated to 
reflect the role inheritance with respect to users going 
downwards and with respect to permissions going 
upwards. 
Definition 3.4: Permissions function 
perm: U ∪ R → 2P, a function mapping users and roles to 
a set of permissions.   
perm*: U ∪ R → 2P, extends perm in the presence of a 
role hierarchy.   
perm(ri) = {p ∈ P  (p,ri) ∈ PA} 
perm(ui) = {p ∈ P  (∃r∈roles(ui))[(p,r) ∈ PA]} 
perm*(ri) = {p ∈ P  (∃r' ≤ r)[(p,r') ∈ PA]} 
perm*(ui) = {p ∈ P  (∃r ∈ roles*(ui))[(p,r) ∈ PA]} 
Subsequently we introduce the workflow extensions. 
3.2 Workflow extensions 
A typical workflow is a set of tasks linked together in 
a network, thus forming a business process [7].  The 
workflow system is responsible for determining the route 
SACJ / SART, No 26, 2000               213
   
 
that work will follow through the organisation.  From an 
access control perspective the basic building blocks are 
tasks that may be performed by a specific organisational 
role. 
Definition 3.5: Workflow entities 
T = Set of tasks, {t1,t2,…,tn} 
Definition 3.6: Workflow Associations 
TA ⊆ T × R, a many-to-many task-to-role assignment 
relation 
The RBAC96 functions must thus be extended. 
Definition 3.7: Extended roles function 
roles: U ∪ P ∪ T → 2R, a function mapping the sets U and 
R and T to a set of roles. 
roles* : U ∪ P ∪ T →2R extends roles in the presence of a 
role hierarchy 
roles(ui),roles(pi), roles*(ui) and roles*(pi) remain 
according to Definition 3.3 
roles(ti)={r∈R(ti,r)∈TA} 
roles*(ti)={ r∈R(∃r ≤  r')[(ti,r')∈TA]} 
Definition 3.8: Revised permissions function 
perm: U ∪ R ∪ T → 2P, a function mapping users, roles 
and tasks to a set of permissions.   
perm*: U ∪ R ∪ T → 2P, extends perm in the presence of 
a role hierarchy.   
perm(ri), perm(ui), perm*(ri) and perm*(ui) remain 
according to Definition 3.4 
perm(ti) = {p ∈ P  (∃r ∈ roles(ti))[(p,r) ∈ PA]} 
perm*(ti) = {p ∈ P  (∃r ∈ roles*(ti))[(p,r) ∈ PA]} 
The above definitions give the elements essential to 
the administration of access control in the workflow 
environment.  The following paragraph will suggest a 
conflict paradigm to define further restrictions required to 
support static SoD requirements. 
4 The conflict paradigm 
Separation of duty is concerned with the prevention of 
fraud by ensuring that a single user does not have too 
much power.  Power is vested in permissions, therefore 
the essence of our paradigm lies with conflicting 
permissions. 
Definition 4.1:  Conflicting permissions are permissions 
that can result in unnecessary power if bestowed on the 
same person.  Formally it is represented by  
CP ⊆ P × P, a many-to- many relation indicating conflict 
between permissions with 
 (pi,pj) ∈ CP ⇔ (pj,pi) ∈ CP and (pi,pi) ∉ CP. 
We can now present the following axiom which will 
represent our basic safety condition  
Basic Safety Condition: Conflicting permissions may not 
be assigned to a user.  
Formally, (perm*(u) × perm*(u)) ∩ CP = ∅) 
Since non-conflicting permissions cannot influence the 
basic safety condition the following axiom to supplement 
the basic safety condition is formulated. 
Axiom 4.1: Non-conflicting permissions may be assigned 
to both conflicting or non-conflicting roles. 
Now consider the other conflicting entities that form 
part of the conflicting entity paradigm. 
Definition 4.2:  Conflicting users are users who are 
likely to conspire. Formally they are represented by 
CU ⊆ U × U, a many-to-many relation indicating conflict 
between users with  
(ui,uj) ∈ CU ⇔ (uj,ui) ∈ CU and (ui,ui) ∉ CU. 
Axiom 4.2 Conflicting users are considered as a single 
user.  
In practical terms conflicting users may be family 
members or people who are known to have conspired.   
Definition 4.3:  Conflicting roles are roles that together 
have the ability to conspire, i.e. they are assigned some 
(but not all) conflicting permissions.  They are represented 
by 
CR ⊆ R × R, a many-to-many relation indicating conflict 
between roles with 
 (ri,rj) ∈ CR ⇔ (rj,ri) ∈ CR , (ri,ri) ∉ CR and 
 (ri,rj) ∈ CR ⇒ perm*(ri) × perm*(rj) ∩ CP ≠ ∅ 
Note that roles are abstractions to ease administration. 
Although the conflicting permissions may not be 
identified as such in the administration tool, making roles 
conflict if they are not assigned some conflicting 
permissions is senseless. This principle thus is a logical 
principle, which in practice may not be checked literally 
in the administration tool. 
Since conflicting roles must have some conflicting 
permissions we can state that non-conflicting roles do not 
have conflicting permissions.  In the spirit of Axiom 4.1 
we thus formulate the following axiom. 
Axiom 4.3: Non-conflicting roles may be assigned either 
non-conflicting or conflicting users.   
Definition 4.4:  Conflicting tasks are tasks requiring 
conflicting permissions to complete.  Formally they are 
represented by  
CT ⊆ T × T, a many-to-many relation indicating conflict 
between tasks with 
 (ti,tj) ∈ CT ⇔ (tj,ti) ∈ CT,  (ti,ti) ∉ CT and 
 (ti,tj) ∈ CT ⇒ perm*(ti) × perm*(tj) ∩ CP ≠ ∅ 
Note that conflicting tasks are assigned conflicting 
permissions.  Since non-conflicting tasks can have only 
non-conflicting permissions assigned to them we can see 
that they could not influence the basic safety condition, 
therefore the following axiom is formulated. 
Axiom 4.4: Non-conflicting tasks may be assigned to 
conflicting and non-conflicting roles.   
These principles and definitions are essentially focused 
on the permissions exercised by the users.  The integrity 
of the access control information is, however, determined 
by the associations in the access control model.  In a 
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RBAC environment users are never assigned directly to 
permissions.  The role construct plays a pivotal role in 
linking tasks, users and permissions together. The next 
paragraph will therefore show the integrity requirements 
pertaining to the associations allowed in the access control 
model. 
5 Integrity Requirements 
This paragraph presents a number of theorems 
reflecting integrity requirements that will have to be 
upheld in a security administration tool. 
Theorem 5.1: Under the basic safety condition, 
conflicting roles may only have non-conflicting users 
assigned to them, i.e. 
(ui,rk) ∈ UA ∧ (uj,rl) ∈ UA ∧ (rk,rl) ∈ CR ⇒ (ui,uj) ∉ CU 
Proof:  
Assume that (ui,rk)∈UA ∧ (uj,rl)∈UA) ∧ (rk,rl)∈CR. ∧ 
(ui,uj)∈CU: 
 perm*(ui) ⊇ perm*(rk) (Def 3.4) 
 perm*(uj) ⊇ perm*(rl) (Def 3.4) 
 (rk,rl)∈CR. 
⇒  perm*(rk) × perm*(rl) ∩ CP ≠ ∅ (Def  4.3) 
⇒  perm*(ui) × perm*(uj) ∩ CP ≠ ∅ 
which contradicts the Basic Safety Condition. QED.  
 
Theorem 5.2: Under the basic safety condition, 
conflicting permissions may only be assigned to 
conflicting roles. Formally  
(pi,rk) ∈ PA ∧ (pj,rl) ∈ PA ∧ (pi, pj) ∈ CP ⇒ (rk, rl) ∈ CR 
 
Proof: 
Assume that two conflicting permissions pi and pj are 
assigned to non-conflicting roles rk and rl, i.e.  
(pi,rk) ∈ PA ∧ (pj,rl) ∈ PA ∧ (pi,pj) ∈ CP ∧ (rk,rl) ∉ CR 
Choose a user ux and associate it with roles rk and rl. Since 
(rk,rl) ∉ CR this allowed by Th. 5.1. 
∴  (ux,rk) ∈ UA ∧ (ux,rl) ∈ UA ∧  
 (pi,rk) ∈ PA ∧ (pj,rl) ∈ PA 
⇒  {pi, pj} ⊆ perm*(ux) (Def 4.2) 
But (pi, pj) ∈ CP, which contradicts the Basic Safety 
Condition. 
   QED. 
Theorem 5.3: Under the basic safety condition, 
conflicting tasks may only be assigned to conflicting roles.  
That is 
(ti,rk) ∈ TA ∧ (tj,rl) ∈ TA ∧ (ti,tj) ∈ CT ⇒ (rk, rl) ∈ CR 
 
Proof:  
Assume that two conflicting tasks ti and tj are assigned to 
non-conflicting roles rk and rl.  
(ti,rk) ∈ TA ∧ (tj,rl) ∈ TA ∧ (ti,tj) ∈ CT ∧ (rk,rl) ∉ CR 
Choose a user ux and associate it with roles rk and rl. Since 
(rk,rl) ∉ CR this is allowed by Th. 5.1. 
 perm*(rk) ⊆ perm*(ux) (Def 3.4) 
 perm*(rl) ⊆ perm*(ux) (Def 3.4) 
also  perm*(ti) ⊆ perm*(rk) (Def 3.8) 
 perm*(tj) ⊆ perm*(rl) (Def 3.8) 
∴  perm*(ti) ⊆ perm*(ux)  
and  perm*(tj) ⊆ perm*(ux)  
⇒  perm*(ti) × perm*(tj) ∩ CP ≠ ∅ (Def  4.4) 
⇒  perm*(ux) × perm*(ux) ∩ CP ≠ ∅ 
which contradicts the Basic Safety Condition. QED.  
Using truth table equivalence we state the following 
corollary. 
Corollary 5.3: Under the basic safety condition, non-
conflicting roles may only have non-conflicting tasks 
assigned to them.  That is 
(ti,rk) ∈ TA ∧ (tj,rl) ∈ TA ∧ (rk, rl) ∉ CR ⇒ (ti,tj) ∉ CT 
 
Above theorems limit the associations allowed 
between users, roles, permissions and tasks.   
6 Conclusion 
This paper explored the static separation of duty 
requirements in workflow environments.  This was done 
through extending the RBAC components with workflow 
specific components.  In particular it demonstrated how 
static separation of duty requirements specified through 
the use of conflicting users, conflicting roles, conflicting 
permissions and conflicting tasks could be enforced.  
Enforcement is based on maintaining the integrity of the 
associations allowed between components.   
The following table summarises the work explored in 
this paper.  
 
A ? in the table indicates that an association is 
allowed, whilst a ? shows that an association is 
prohibited. For example, theorem 5.1 proves that non-
conflicting users may only be assigned to conflicting roles 
while axiom 4.4 states that non-conflicting tasks may be 
assigned to either conflicting or non-conflicting roles.   
Roles 
May be associated with 
Conflicting Non-conflicting 
Conflicting ?? ? 
Users 
Non-
Conflicting 
Th 
5.1 ? 
Ax 
4.3 ? 
?? ??Conflicting 
Theorem 5.2 
? ? 
Permis-
sions Non-
Conflicting Axiom 4.1?
?? ??Conflicting 
Theorem 5.3?
? ? Tasks Non-
Conflicting Axiom 4.4?
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A security administration tool may allow conflicting 
assignments to be made if it can ensure the integrity of the 
association by the use of remedial actions.  For example, 
two conflicting permissions may be assigned to two non-
conflicting roles.  The tool would provide the 
administrator with an option to not continue with the 
assignment or to set the two roles to be conflicting and to 
continue with the assignment   
Usability factors in security administration tools will 
be considered in future work.  The extension of the 
paradigm to allow for the specification of dynamic 
separation of duty requirements also needs to be 
considered. 
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Abstract
Access control administration is a huge task. Admin-
istration tools should assist the administrator in en-
suring that the access control requirements are met.
One example of an access control requirement is Sep-
aration of Duty (SoD). SoD requirements specify that
no single person may have suﬃcient authority to com-
plete a business process unilaterally.
The SoDA prototype administration tool has been
developed to assist administrators with the adminis-
tration of SoD requirements. It demonstrates how the
speciﬁcation of both Static and Dynamic SoD require-
ments can be done based on the “conﬂicting entities”
paradigm. Static SoD requirements must be enforced
in the administration environment. The SoDA proto-
type, therefore, enforces the speciﬁed static SoD re-
quirements.
Keywords: Information Security, Access Control Ad-
ministration, Separation of Duty
Computing Review Categories: D4.6, H2.7,
H4.1, K6.5
1 Introduction
Security administrators must manage an ever-
increasing number of systems under their control. In
recent years, Role-based Access Control (RBAC) has
been promoted as a possible solution to the resultant
administration nightmares [5]. With the increasing
amount of information available electronically, it is
necessary not only to ﬁnd a means to ease the job
of the security administrator, but also to ensure that
the information is protected and managed according
to organizational policies.
One expression of organizational policy can be
found in the age-old principle of Separation of Duty
(SoD). Saltzer and Schroeder [10] identiﬁed SoD, or
“separation of privilege” as they called it, as one of
eight design principles for the protection of informa-
tion in computer systems. They built on the obser-
vation that a security system with two keys is more
robust and ﬂexible than one that requires a single
key. No single accident, deception or breach of trust is
therefore suﬃcient to compromise the system. Clark
and Wilson [4] identiﬁed SoD as one of the two ma-
jor mechanisms that can be implemented to ensure
data integrity. SoD serves as a mechanism to counter-
act fraud and error, while assuring correspondence be-
tween system objects and the real world objects that
they represent.
Furthermore, they [4] asserted that, at the pol-
icy level, processes are divided into tasks, with each
task being performed by a diﬀerent person. [1] and [8]
observed that existing SoD models do not take work
processes into consideration. Work processes are of-
ten facilitated through the use of workﬂow systems.
Workﬂow systems are constructed around tasks that
are linked according to business rules to represent a
business process. This paper introduces the task as an
additional building block for expressing SoD require-
ments in workﬂow systems.
Even with the introduction of the task abstrac-
tion, the administration of SoD requirements remains
a mammoth task. In a large organization, there may
be thousands of objects that require protection. The
organization may have thousands of users, ﬁlling hun-
dreds of diﬀerent positions in the organization. The
identiﬁcation of all the access requirements requires a
huge eﬀort. It is virtually impossible to maintain con-
sistency when performing such a huge task, unless the
administration tools provide appropriate assistance.
The SoDA prototype is introduced to assist se-
curity administrators with the speciﬁcation of access
control requirements according to Role-based Access
Control principles. More speciﬁcally, the SoDA pro-
totype is intended to assist with the administration
of SoD requirements. In order to demonstrate the
“conﬂicting entities” administration paradigm as used
within the SoDA prototype, the remainder of the pa-
per is structured as follows. First, a brief review
of role-based access control principles is provided.
Thereafter, the additional concept of a task is intro-
duced. This is followed by a discussion on the use
of the “conﬂicting entities” paradigm to specify SoD
requirements. Finally, we illustrate how the SoDA
prototype is used to administer SoD requirements.
2 Basic Concepts
This section will provide the necessary background to
explain the principle of separation of duty within role-
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Figure 1: Form design environment used to create a
“Purchase Order”
based workﬂow systems.
2.1 Role-based Access Control
The concept of a role is pivotal in role-based ac-
cess control. Users receive access permissions based
on the roles that they may assume. Users are any-
one/anything that accesses resources in the system. A
user may, therefore, be an individual or another pro-
gram. Roles often correspond to positions in the orga-
nizational structure. It is thus a semantic construct,
created to ease the management of access rights. Per-
missions can be interpreted as the right to execute a
certain method of an object.
The SoDA prototype considers an object to be a
document containing various ﬁeld objects. Users may
perform diﬀerent actions on the ﬁeld objects, e.g. add
another instance of the ﬁeld object, delete a ﬁeld ob-
ject, edit the contents of a ﬁeld object or view the
contents of a ﬁeld object. Individual ﬁeld objects may
be grouped, resulting in composite objects. Figure
1 shows how a hierarchical view, representing object
containment, can be used to create the ‘Internal Pur-
chase Order’ object. Permissions could relate to any of
the ﬁeld objects, or composite ﬁeld objects, in the ‘In-
ternal Purchase Order’ object. Permissions assigned
to an object are inherited for objects contained by that
object. For example, the permission to edit Employee
Details will imply the permission to edit all ﬁelds that
form part of Employee Details on the form.
Roles may be related through a partial order. A
role inherits permissions assigned to the roles that are
junior to it in the partial order. For example, the
‘Manager’ role may be considered senior to the ‘Super-
visor’ role. The ‘Manager’ role will, therefore, inherit
the permissions assigned to the ‘Clerk’ role. Figure
2 shows how the SoDA prototype manages the asso-
ciations between roles. In SoDA, roles are related to
other roles within disjoint, named role networks. The
combination of all named role networks is similar to
the role-graph presented by [8], if an artiﬁcial maxi-
 
Figure 2: SoDA associates roles according to named
role networks
mum and an artiﬁcial minimum role were introduced.
The concepts employed in RBAC are indeed very
powerful. However, Sandhu et al. [11] observed that:
“RBAC is not a panacea for all access con-
trol issues. More sophisticated methods are
required to deal with situations that control
operation sequences. [. . . ] Other forms of ac-
cess control can be layered on top of RBAC
for this purpose.”
Workﬂow Systems provides an environment where
the sequences of operations are controlled according to
business rules. The next section introduces workﬂow
concepts, paving the way for the expression of access
control policies in terms of sequence of operations.
2.2 Workﬂow Concepts
Workﬂow Systems are concerned with the automation
and facilitation of business processes [6]. Business pro-
cesses are deﬁned through process deﬁnitions. A pro-
cess deﬁnition consists of sets of tasks, connected ac-
cording to business rules.
The process deﬁnition is enacted by the workﬂow
engine. For each enactment of the business process,
e.g. for each ‘Internal Purchase Order’ that is issued,
a process instance is generated. Task instances are
generated on demand, based on the business rules en-
capsulated as part of the process deﬁnition.
SoDA is a tool that focuses on supporting access
control administration. Access control requirements
are, typically, described within the general context of
a business process and not for a speciﬁc enactment of
the workﬂow. The SoDA prototype is, therefore, only
concerned with the process and task deﬁnitions.
The “conﬂicting entities” paradigm relies on re-
stricting the associations between all the entities that
are involved, namely user, roles, permissions and
tasks.
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3 SoDA – The “conﬂicting enti-
ties” paradigm
Separation of duty requirements are implemented by
restricting the associations allowed between entities.
This is to ensure that a single user may not receive
too many permissions. An example of such a con-
straint may specify that “the permission to approve
an order and the permission to issue an order may
not be assigned to the same role”.
Kuhn [7] explained how mutual exclusive roles, i.e.
roles that may not be assigned to the same user, can
be used to enforce SoD. Ahn and Sandhu [1] showed
through their RSL99 speciﬁcation language that there
are several ways of expressing similar SoD require-
ments. SoDA builds on these observations, and ex-
tends it with the concept of conﬂicting tasks.
The term “conﬂicting entities” does not indicate
that there are any disharmony between the entities.
The “conﬂict” refer, rather to the disharmony that
the entities could cause between the actual and the
desired state of the system. Conﬂict thus indicates
a potential undesirable state of integrity. The “con-
ﬂicting entities” paradigm, as employed in the SoDA
prototype, identiﬁes four types of conﬂict [3]:
Conﬂicting permissions are permissions that can
result in unnecessary power if bestowed on the
same person. For example, a person with the per-
missions required for ﬁnancial audits should not
receive permissions to approve ﬁnancial transac-
tions. If this were allowed, auditors could lose
their independence.
Conﬂicting users are users who will together have
suﬃcient power to collude, and are likely to do
so. In practice, this may be family members or
previously known accomplices.
Conﬂicting roles are roles that together possess the
ability to conspire. This means that they are
assigned conﬂicting permissions. Consider, for
example, the ‘Auditor’ and ‘Financial Manager’
roles. It is common practice that auditors and
ﬁnancial managers should be independent. The
roles may have certain permissions, e.g. ‘view or-
der’, in common. However, the ‘approve order’
and ‘approve audit’ permissions may be assigned
only to one of these roles.
Conﬂicting tasks are tasks requiring conﬂicting
permissions to complete. This would, for exam-
ple, imply that the ‘Audit Purchase Order’ task
and the ‘Approve Purchase Order’ task would be
conﬂicting since they require the ‘approve order’
and ‘approve audit’ permissions. These permis-
sions are, in turn, conﬂicting.
The “conﬂicting entities” paradigm is based on
the observation that power is vested in permissions.
The essence of the “conﬂicting entities” paradigm lies,
therefore, in conﬂicting permissions. It is argued, how-
ever, that tasks provide a more natural abstraction for
the speciﬁcation of SoD requirements. The “conﬂict-
ing entities” paradigm allows for the speciﬁcation of
both Static and Dynamic SoD requirements.
Static SoD requirements, on the one hand, con-
trol the associations between entities during admin-
istration time. They would, for example, disallow a
user to be assigned to a role if an SoD requirement
would be violated. Dynamic SoD, on the other hand,
does not restrict associations between entities at ad-
ministration time. Instead, it controls the execution of
permissions at run-time. It would, for example, allow
a user to belong to the ‘Manager’ and ‘Clerk’ roles.
However, during run-time, the user that initiated the
purchase order (using the ‘Clerk’ role) will not be able
to approve that purchase order (using the ‘Manager’
role).
The speciﬁcation of both Static and Dynamic SoD
requirements within the SoDA prototype is similar.
This will be discussed in Section 4. Static SoD re-
quirements must, however, also be enforced in the ad-
ministration environment. The enforcement of Static
SoD requirements in the SoDA prototype is thus dis-
cussed in Section 5.
4 Separation of duty speciﬁca-
tion in SoDA
The SoDA prototype allows for the speciﬁcation of
conﬂicting users, conﬂicting roles, conﬂicting permis-
sions and conﬂicting tasks. A distinction is made be-
tween static and dynamic SoD. Conﬂicts are based on
the sets U , R, P and T , representing the user, role,
permission and task entities respectively. P is deﬁned
as P ⊆ 2O×M , where O represents the objects and M
the methods that may be performed. Note that not
all the methods may necessarily be deﬁned on all ob-
jects. Thus, the set of permissions is a subset of the
power set.
The speciﬁcation of the conﬂicts is done through
the sets:
CUD, CUS , CRD, CRS , CPD, CPS , CTD, CTS .
The same naming convention is followed. CX denotes
conﬂicting entities of type X, and the subscript indi-
cates whether the conﬂict must be checked statically
(CXS) or dynamically (CXD). The “conﬂicting en-
tities” relations are deﬁned in a symmetric and non-
reﬂexive fashion:
CXY ⊆ X ×X such that ∀xi = xj
(xi, xj) ∈ CXY ⇐⇒ (xj , xi) ∈ CXY
The speciﬁcation for all 8 sets can be derived by re-
placing X with the appropriate entity (U ,R,P or T )
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and Y with S or D, for Static and Dynamic respec-
tively.
Figure 3 shows how conﬂicting tasks are identiﬁed
within the SoDA prototype. The other conﬂicts are
speciﬁed in a similar manner. The interpretation of
the various conﬂicts is summarized in Table 1.
The enforcement of Dynamic SoD requires inter-
pretation of the process instance. Thus it is the re-
sponsibility of the workﬂow system. Consequently, it
falls outside the scope of the administrative tool. For
a more detailed discussing regarding dynamic SoD the
interested reader are refered to [3]. Static SoD must,
however, be enforced in the administration environ-
ment. The next section discusses how this is imple-
mented in the SoDA prototype.
5 Static Separation of Duty en-
forcement in SoDA
In order to enforce Static SoD, the SoDA prototype
ensures that the integrity of the associations between
entities is maintained. If an action cannot be per-
formed, remedial actions are suggested. For exam-
ple, if conﬂicting tasks are assigned to non-conﬂicting
roles, the user is given the option of making the roles
conﬂicting. The associations that are allowed are sum-
marized in Table 2 [9].
To illustrate how the SoDA prototype maintains
the associations, this section will review diﬀerent
static SoD implementations of the requirement: “A
person who issues stock may never approve an order”.
Three approaches to enforcing this SoD requirement in
a static fashion are proposed. This is done by rephras-
ing the SoD requirement in the following ways:
(SoD1) A manager and a stock controller may not
perform the same tasks.
(SoD2) The ‘Issue Stock’ permission and the ‘Ap-
prove Order’ permission may not be assigned to
the same user.
(SoD3) The ‘Issue Stock’ task may not be performed
by someone who performs the ‘Approve Order’
task.
These SoD constraints will be implemented as con-
ﬂicting roles, conﬂicting permissions and conﬂicting
tasks. Conﬂicting users can be used in combination
with these.
Conﬂicting users are interpreted in the same way
as in [AS99]. If two users are conﬂicting, it means
that the chances of them colluding are very high. In
essence, they should, therefore, be treated as if they
were one user. For example, if two tasks may not be
performed by the same user, two conﬂicting users may
not perform them either as the chances of a conspir-
acy are high. We shall now consider how each of the
approaches can, in turn, be handled in the prototype.
 
Figure 3: Specifying conﬂicting tasks
5.1 Conﬂicting Roles
First consider (SoD1) - A manager and a stock con-
troller may not perform the same tasks.
Since managers approve orders, and stock con-
trollers issue stock, the ‘Manager’ role in the ‘Ad-
min’ role network and the ‘Stock Controller’ role in
the ‘Stores’ role network may be set to conﬂict. Due
to the inheritance property of role networks, conﬂict-
ing roles cannot exist in the same role network. If
conﬂicting roles were allowed in one role network, the
topmost role in that role network would inherit the
permissions of both conﬂicting roles. This clearly de-
feats the purpose. A role may conﬂict with more than
one role in another network. Conﬂicts are, however,
inherited up the partial order and setting more than
one conﬂict, as such, may not be necessary. The SoDA
prototype will remove any unnecessary conﬂict.
In Figure 4, the ‘Stores Manager’ inherits the con-
ﬂict set upon ‘Stock Controller’. ‘Stores Manager’
will, therefore, also conﬂict with the ‘Manager’ role
in the ‘Admin’ role network. In Figure 3, the ‘Ap-
prove order’ and ‘Issue stock’ tasks were made con-
ﬂicting tasks. Conﬂicting roles and conﬂicting tasks
impact on the allowable associations as follows. Only
non-conﬂicting users may be assigned to conﬂicting
roles. Conﬂicting tasks must be performed by conﬂict-
ing roles. Recall that the ‘Stock Controller’ role and
the ‘Stores Manager’ role were identiﬁed as conﬂicting
with the ‘Manager’ role. Figure 5 depicts the ‘Man-
ager’ role as being assigned to the ‘Approve Order’
task. Figure 5 shows, furthermore, that subsequently
only the two roles conﬂicting with the ‘Manager’ role,
namely the ‘Stock Controller’ and ‘Stores Manager’
roles, may be assigned to the ‘issue stock’ task. If two
tasks are initially not indicated to be conﬂicting, but
they are assigned to conﬂicting roles, the tasks are
made conﬂicting tasks.
5.2 Conﬂicting Permissions
Now consider (SoD2) – The ‘Issue Stock’ permission
and the ‘Approve Order’ permission may not be as-
signed to the same user.
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Conﬂict Static Dynamic
Conﬂicting
Roles
May not have the same user
(or conﬂicting users) as mem-
bers
May not be assumed by
the same user (or conﬂicting
users) in one process instance
Conﬂicting
Permissions
Must be assigned to conﬂict-
ing roles
May not be exercised by
the same user (or conﬂicting
users) for a speciﬁc process
instance
Conﬂicting
Users
May not belong to the same
role or conﬂicting roles
May not perform conﬂicting
tasks in the same process in-
stance
Conﬂicting
Tasks
Must be assigned to conﬂict-
ing roles
May not be executed by
the same user (or conﬂicting
users) in the same process in-
stance
Table 1: Interpretation of conﬂicts according to the “conﬂicting entities” paradigm
May be associated Roles
with Conﬂicting Non-conﬂicting
Conﬂicting N YUsers
Non-conﬂicting Y Y
Conﬂicting Y NPermissions
Non-conﬂicting Y Y
Conﬂicting Y NTasks
Non-conﬂicting Y Y
Table 2: Static SoD – Allowable associations
  
Figure 5: Conﬂicting tasks must be assigned to conﬂicting roles
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Figure 4: Conﬂicting roles
The permissions involved are editing the ‘Ap-
proval’ and ‘IssueRec’ ﬁeld groups on the ‘Internal
Order Form’ object. Conﬂicting permissions may only
be assigned to conﬂicting roles. If this is not enforced,
conﬂicting permissions could be assigned to conﬂict-
ing users. These conﬂicting users belong to non-
conﬂicting roles, which have conﬂicting permissions
that were incorrectly assigned to the non-conﬂicting
roles. This clearly opens the door for a conspiracy.
The SoDA prototype, therefore, only allows conﬂict-
ing roles to receive conﬂicting permissions.
If the roles are not conﬂicting, they are made con-
ﬂicting, subject to additional integrity checking. Roles
cannot be made conﬂicting if conﬂicting users are as-
signed to the said roles. It can, therefore, be seen that
even if the ‘Manager’ and ‘Stock Controller’ roles were
not initially identiﬁed to be conﬂicting, they will be
made conﬂicting when the two conﬂicting permissions
are assigned to these two roles. Similar to section 4,
the tasks assigned to these two roles will also be made
conﬂicting.
5.3 Conﬂicting Tasks
Consider (SoD2c) – The ‘Issue stock’ task may not be
performed by someone who may perform the ‘Approve
order’ task. In section 5.1, it was shown how conﬂict-
ing roles could only be assigned to conﬂicting tasks.
If conﬂicting roles were assigned to tasks, these tasks
were automatically made conﬂicting. This approach
can be considered to be the reverse of that. Two tasks
are deﬁned to be conﬂicting. Subsequently, the roles
that must be assigned to the user must be conﬂict-
ing. If two non-conﬂicting roles are assigned, the roles
are made conﬂicting, subject to a series of integrity
checks being performed. It is evident that the same
result is achieved, irrespective of the approach used,
since automatic maintenance of conﬂict relationships
is performed.
The results of the conﬂicting role and conﬂict-
ing task approaches are thus identical. The conﬂict-
ing permission approach can, however, be considered
stricter. Conﬂicting permissions must be performed
by conﬂicting roles. However, conﬂicting roles do not
only have conﬂicting permissions. For example, the
‘Manager’ and ‘Stock Controller’ roles are conﬂicting,
but both should still be allowed the ‘view purchase
order’ permission. The conﬂicting permissions ‘Edit
Approval’ and ‘Edit Issuerec’ may, however, also be
assigned to the ‘Manager’ and ‘Stock Controller’ roles
respectively.
6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrated the “conﬂicting entities”
paradigm as a way of specifying SoD requirements.
This paradigm uses the task abstraction to intuitively
deﬁne separation of duty requirements that involve se-
quence of operations. It was shown that both Static
and Dynamic SoD requirements can be formulated ac-
cording to the “conﬂicting entities” paradigm in the
SoDA prototype.
It was, furthermore, shown that the SoDA proto-
type enforces Static SoD requirements. By specifying
one SoD requirement in three diﬀerent ways, it was
explained that equivalent results can be achieved.
It should be noted that Static SoD requirements
are extremely restrictive on the organizations func-
tioning. Consider, for example (SoD1). To assume
that a managers and a stock controller could never do
the same job could be, especially for a small company,
very restrictive. Dynamic SoD requirements addresses
this issue by imposing the restrictions per process in-
stance.
Other issues that could be of concern are the po-
tential of a lock-out situation. A situation could arise
that, for example no roles are available to assign to
a task. This would immediately be noticable to the
system administrator and he/she will have to rectify
the situation manually. However, due the extremely
strict restrictions imposed by static separation of duty,
it is likely to be used sparingly. This makes the like-
lihood of a lock-out occurring extremely small and
thus feasible for the adminstrator to manually cor-
rect. The issue of lock-out occuring due to dynamic
SoD requirements are much more complex and state-
of-the-art work regrading that may be found in [2].
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Appendix C. SoDA Prototype Scripts 
These scripts create the second prototype described in chapter 8.  This 
prototype demonstrates the feasibility of the SoDA model.   
The scripts in these listings are used to create the database tables and to 
create the triggers for the Oracle DBMS as described in chapter 8.  The 
trigger creation script begins on page 123 while the table creation script 
begins on page 136.   
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- SoDA integrity constraint rules 
-- For Oracle DBMS 
-- By Stephen Perelson 
-- Copyright © 2001, Stephen Perelson and the Secure Workflow Research Group 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
-- When inserting 
--   *associations into the ua, pa and ta tables 
--   *conflicts into the cr, cu, cp, and ct tables 
--   *roles into a role network (rh table) 
-- and when deleting 
--   *role conflicts from the cr table 
--   *role associations from the rh table 
-- it becomes necessary to restrict them from occurring based upon 
-- the SoDA integrity constraints. 
-- The logic that is followed within these triggers can be found in 
-- chapter 7. 
 
-- First create the package with the variables for the triggers. This 
-- is to prevent mutating table errors. This package contains all the 
-- variables for every SoDA trigger. 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE PACKAGE wf_mutvars_pkg 
IS 
   -- variables for the ua table (user to role association) 
   TYPE arrua IS TABLE OF ua%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
   uavalues       arrua; 
   uaempty        arrua; 
 
   -- variables for the pa table (permission to role association) 
   TYPE arrpa IS TABLE OF pa%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
   pavalues       arrpa; 
   paempty        arrpa; 
 
   -- variables for the ta table (task to role association) 
   TYPE arrta IS TABLE OF ta%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
   tavalues       arrta; 
   taempty        arrta; 
 
   -- variables for the cr table (role conflict) 
   TYPE arrcr IS TABLE OF cr%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
   crvalues       arrcr; 
   crempty        arrcr; 
 
   -- variables for the cu table (user conflict) 
   TYPE arrcu IS TABLE OF cu%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
   cuvalues       arrcu; 
   cuempty        arrcu; 
 
   -- variables for the cp table (permission conflict) 
   TYPE arrcp IS TABLE OF cp%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
   cpvalues       arrcp; 
   cpempty        arrcp; 
 
   -- variables for the ct table (task conflict) 
   TYPE arrct IS TABLE OF ct%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
   ctvalues       arrct; 
   ctempty        arrct; 
 
   -- variables for the cr table (delete role conflict) 
   TYPE arrdcr IS TABLE OF cr%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
   dcrvalues       arrdcr; 
   dcrempty        arrdcr; 
 
   -- variables for the rh table (role network) 
   TYPE arrrh IS TABLE OF rh%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
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   rhvalues       arrrh; 
   rhempty        arrrh; 
 
   -- variables for the rh table (delete role network) 
   TYPE arrdrh IS TABLE OF rh%ROWTYPE 
      INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
   drhvalues       arrdrh; 
   drhempty        arrdrh; 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for the constraint of the user to role associations. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER uastatbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON ua 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.uavalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.uaempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER uarowbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON ua 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.uavalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.uavalues (i).roleid := :new.roleid; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.uavalues (i).userid := :new.userid; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER uastatafter_trig 
AFTER INSERT ON ua  
DECLARE 
  -- Cursor to select all conflicting users for a particular user. 
  CURSOR conusercur (v_userid NUMBER) IS 
    SELECT userid FROM users 
    WHERE userid IN  
        (SELECT userid2 FROM cu WHERE userid1 = v_userid 
         UNION  
         SELECT userid1 FROM cu WHERE userid2 = v_userid); 
  -- Get the conflicting roles for the roles associated with the 
  -- conflicting users. 
  CURSOR assrolecur (v_userid NUMBER, v_roleid NUMBER) IS 
    SELECT roleid FROM ua, cr WHERE ua.userid = v_userid 
    AND ((roleid = cr.roleid1) OR (roleid = cr.roleid2)) 
    AND ((cr.roleid1 = v_roleid) OR (cr.roleid2 = v_roleid)); 
  TYPE arrcu IS TABLE OF users.userid%TYPE 
    INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
  conuser arrcu; 
  TYPE arrassroles IS TABLE OF ua.roleid%TYPE 
    INDEX BY BINARY_INTEGER; 
  assroles arrassroles; 
  vuserid ua.userid%TYPE; 
  vroleid ua.roleid%TYPE; 
  v_count NUMBER(38); 
  v_stop BOOLEAN := false; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.uavalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    -- Do the checks required here for each record inserted. 
    vuserid := wf_mutvars_pkg.uavalues(i).userid; 
    vroleid := wf_mutvars_pkg.uavalues(i).roleid; 
    FOR conuserrec IN conusercur(vuserid) LOOP             
      v_count := conuser.COUNT + 1; 
      conuser (v_count) := conuserrec.userid; 
    END LOOP; 
    -- Move to the next step: check for conflicting roles. 
    IF conuser.COUNT > 0 then 
      FOR j IN 1..conuser.COUNT LOOP 
        FOR assrolerec IN assrolecur(conuser(j), vroleid) LOOP 
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          -- This could have been done with a simple SELECT (count 1) 
          -- SQL statement with an IF statement to check it, but this works. 
          v_stop := true; 
        END LOOP; 
      END LOOP; 
      -- Move to the next step. 
      if v_stop = true then -- assroles.COUNT > 0 then 
        -- There are conflicting roles already assigned to conflicting users. 
        -- Therefore raise an error. 
        raise_application_error(-20201,'Cannot insert user to role ' || 
                                       'association - a conflicting user ' || 
                                       'is already associated to a ' || 
                                       'conflicting role.'); 
      END IF; 
    END IF; 
    -- Insert the record (or in this case don't do anything because it is 
    -- already inserted). 
  END LOOP; 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for the constraint of the permission to role associations. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER pastatbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON pa 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.pavalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.paempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER parowbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON pa 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.pavalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.pavalues (i).roleid := :new.roleid; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.pavalues (i).permid := :new.permid; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER pastatafter_trig 
AFTER INSERT ON pa 
DECLARE 
  vpermid pa.permid%TYPE; 
  vroleid pa.roleid%TYPE; 
  v_cannot NUMBER(1) := 0; 
  v_can NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_none NUMBER(1) := 0; 
  v_tally NUMBER(38) := 0; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.pavalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    -- Do the checks required here for each record inserted. 
    v_tally := wf_mutvars_pkg.pavalues.COUNT; 
    SELECT count(*) - v_tally INTO v_none FROM pa; 
    IF (v_none <> 0) THEN 
      vpermid := wf_mutvars_pkg.pavalues(i).permid; 
      vroleid := wf_mutvars_pkg.pavalues(i).roleid; 
      -- Count the conflicting permissions. 
      SELECT count(*) INTO v_can 
      FROM perms 
      WHERE permid IN (SELECT permid2 FROM cp WHERE permid1 = vpermid 
                       UNION 
                       SELECT permid1 FROM cp WHERE permid2 = vpermid); 
      IF (v_can <> 0) THEN 
        -- Select all the roles associated to the conflicting permissions. 
        -- If they are not all conflicting with the inserted role then it 
        -- should raise an error. 
        SELECT count(1) INTO v_cannot 
        FROM DUAL 
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        WHERE NOT EXISTS 
          (SELECT distinct(roleid) FROM roles 
           WHERE roleid in 
             (SELECT distinct(roleid) FROM pa 
              WHERE permid in (SELECT permid2 FROM cp WHERE permid1 = vpermid 
                               UNION 
                               SELECT permid1 FROM cp WHERE permid2 = vpermid)) 
              MINUS 
              (SELECT roleid2 FROM cr WHERE roleid1 = vroleid 
               UNION 
               SELECT roleid1 FROM cr WHERE roleid2 = vroleid)) 
        AND EXISTS 
          (SELECT distinct(roleid) FROM pa 
           WHERE permid in (SELECT permid2 FROM cp WHERE permid1 = vpermid 
                            UNION 
                            SELECT permid1 FROM cp WHERE permid2 = vpermid)); 
        IF v_cannot = 0 then 
          -- There are conflicting roles already assigned to conflicting 
          -- permissions. Therefore raise an error. 
          raise_application_error(-20202, 'Cannot insert permission to ' || 
                                          'role association - a conflicting ' || 
                                          'permission must be assigned to a ' || 
                                          'conflicting role.'); 
        END IF; 
      END IF; 
    END IF; 
    -- Insert the record (or in this case don't do anything because it is 
    -- already inserted). 
  END LOOP; 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for the constraint of the task to role associations. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER tastatbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON ta 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.tavalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.taempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER tarowbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON ta 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.tavalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.tavalues (i).roleid := :new.roleid; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.tavalues (i).taskid := :new.taskid; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER tastatafter_trig 
AFTER INSERT ON ta 
DECLARE 
  vtaskid ta.taskid%TYPE; 
  vroleid ta.roleid%TYPE; 
  v_cannot NUMBER(1) := 0; 
  v_can NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_none NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_tally NUMBER(38) := 0; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.tavalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    -- Do the checks required here for each record inserted. 
    v_tally := wf_mutvars_pkg.tavalues.COUNT; 
    SELECT count(*) - v_tally INTO v_none FROM ta; 
    IF (v_none <> 0) THEN 
    BEGIN 
      vtaskid := wf_mutvars_pkg.tavalues(i).taskid; 
      vroleid := wf_mutvars_pkg.tavalues(i).roleid; 
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      -- Count the conflicting tasks. 
      SELECT count(*) INTO v_can 
      FROM tasks 
      WHERE taskid IN (SELECT taskid2 FROM ct WHERE taskid1 = vtaskid 
                       UNION 
                       SELECT taskid1 FROM ct WHERE taskid2 = vtaskid); 
      IF (v_can <> 0) THEN 
        -- Select all the roles associated to the conflicting tasks. If 
        -- they are not all conflicting with the inserted role then it 
        -- should raise an error. 
        SELECT count(1) INTO v_cannot 
        FROM DUAL 
        WHERE NOT EXISTS 
          (SELECT distinct(roleid) FROM roles 
           WHERE roleid in 
             (SELECT distinct(roleid) FROM ta 
              WHERE taskid in (SELECT taskid2 FROM ct WHERE taskid1 = vtaskid 
                               UNION 
                               SELECT taskid1 FROM ct WHERE taskid2 = vtaskid)) 
              MINUS 
              (SELECT roleid2 FROM cr WHERE roleid1 = vroleid 
               UNION 
               SELECT roleid1 FROM cr WHERE roleid2 = vroleid)) 
        AND EXISTS 
          (SELECT distinct(roleid) FROM ta 
           WHERE taskid in (SELECT taskid2 FROM ct WHERE taskid1 = vtaskid 
                            UNION 
                            SELECT taskid1 FROM ct WHERE taskid2 = vtaskid)); 
        IF v_cannot = 0 then -- assroles.COUNT > 0 then 
          -- There are conflicting roles already assigned to conflicting users. 
          -- Therefore raise an error. 
          raise_application_error(-20203, 'Cannot insert task to role ' || 
                                          'association - a conflicting ' || 
                                          'task must be assigned to a ' || 
                                          'conflicting role.'); 
        END IF; 
      END IF; 
    END; 
    END IF; 
    -- Insert the record (or in this case don't do anything because it is 
    -- already inserted). 
  END LOOP; 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for the constraint of the role conflict assignment. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER crstatbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON cr 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.crvalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.crempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER crrowbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON cr 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.crvalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.crvalues (i).roleid1 := :new.roleid1; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.crvalues (i).roleid2 := :new.roleid2; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER crstatafter_trig 
AFTER INSERT ON cr 
DECLARE 
  vroleid1 cr.roleid1%TYPE; 
  vroleid2 cr.roleid2%TYPE; 
  v_exists NUMBER(38) := 0; 
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  v_asso NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_conf NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_rolenet NUMBER(38) := 0; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.crvalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    vroleid1 := wf_mutvars_pkg.crvalues (i).roleid1; 
    vroleid2 := wf_mutvars_pkg.crvalues (i).roleid2; 
    -- Check whether the roles are the same. 
    IF vroleid1 = vroleid2 THEN 
      raise_application_error(-20218,'Cannot insert role conflict - ' || 
                                     'both roles are identical.'); 
    END IF; 
    -- Do they form part of a role network? 
    SELECT COUNT(1) INTO v_rolenet FROM DUAL 
    WHERE 2 <= ANY (SELECT COUNT(1) FROM rh 
                    WHERE childid = vroleid1 OR childid = vroleid2 
                    GROUP BY rolenetid); 
 
    IF v_rolenet > 0 THEN -- Yes they do so raise an error 
      raise_application_error(-20223,'Cannot insert role conflict - ' || 
                                     'both roles are already part of a ' || 
                                     'role network.'); 
    END IF; 
    -- Are they already conflicting? We don't worry about checking whether 
    -- id1 and id2 are in their respective places as the primary key 
    -- constraints will prevent that from occuring. 
    -- This also prevents the same role from conflicting with itself. 
    SELECT count(1) INTO v_exists FROM cr 
    WHERE roleid1 = vroleid2 AND roleid2 = vroleid1; 
    IF (v_exists = 0) THEN 
      -- Doesn't exist yet so we can continue checking. 
      -- Check for user-role associations. 
      SELECT count(1) INTO v_asso FROM ua 
      WHERE roleid = vroleid1 OR roleid = vroleid2; 
      IF (v_asso <> 0) THEN 
        -- Found some associations so go to step 3. 
        SELECT count(1) INTO v_conf FROM DUAL 
        WHERE EXISTS ((SELECT userid FROM users 
                       WHERE userid IN (SELECT userid2 FROM cu 
                                       WHERE userid1 IN (SELECT userid FROM ua 
                                                        WHERE roleid=vroleid1) 
                                       UNION 
                                       SELECT userid1 FROM cu 
                                       WHERE userid2 IN (SELECT userid FROM ua 
                                                        WHERE roleid=vroleid1))) 
                       INTERSECT 
                      (SELECT userid FROM ua 
                       WHERE roleid = vroleid2)); 
        IF (v_conf <> 0) THEN 
          raise_application_error(-20205,'Cannot insert role conflict - ' || 
                                         'both roles are already associated ' || 
                                         'to conflicting users.'); 
        END IF; 
      END IF; 
    ELSE 
      raise_application_error(-20204,'Cannot insert role conflict - ' || 
                                     'the role conflict already exists.'); 
    END IF; 
  END LOOP; 
END; 
/ 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for the constraint of the user conflict assignment. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER custatbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON cu 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.cuvalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.cuempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER curowbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON cu 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.cuvalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.cuvalues (i).userid1 := :new.userid1; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.cuvalues (i).userid2 := :new.userid2; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER custatafter_trig 
AFTER INSERT ON cu 
DECLARE 
  vuserid1 cu.userid1%TYPE; 
  vuserid2 cu.userid2%TYPE; 
  v_exists NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_asso NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_conf NUMBER(38) := 0; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.cuvalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    vuserid1 := wf_mutvars_pkg.cuvalues (i).userid1; 
    vuserid2 := wf_mutvars_pkg.cuvalues (i).userid2; 
    -- Check whether the users are the same. 
    IF vuserid1 = vuserid2 THEN 
      raise_application_error(-20219,'Cannot insert user conflict - ' || 
                                     'both users are identical.'); 
    END IF; 
    -- Are they already conflicting? We don't worry about checking whether 
    -- id1 and id2 are in their respective places as the primary key 
    -- constraints will prevent that from occuring. 
    -- This also prevents the same user from conflicting with itself. 
    SELECT count(1) INTO v_exists FROM cu 
    WHERE userid1 = vuserid2 AND userid2 = vuserid1; 
    IF (v_exists = 0) THEN 
      -- Doesn't exist yet so we can continue checking. 
      -- Check for user-role associations. 
      SELECT count(1) INTO v_asso FROM ua 
      WHERE userid = vuserid1 OR userid = vuserid2; 
      IF (v_asso <> 0) THEN 
        -- Found some associations so go to step 3. 
        SELECT count(1) INTO v_conf FROM DUAL 
        WHERE EXISTS ((SELECT roleid FROM roles 
                       WHERE roleid IN (SELECT roleid2 FROM cr 
                                       WHERE roleid1 IN (SELECT roleid FROM ua 
                                                        WHERE userid=vuserid1) 
                                       UNION 
                                       SELECT roleid1 FROM cr 
                                       WHERE roleid2 IN (SELECT roleid FROM ua 
                                                        WHERE userid=vuserid1))) 
                       INTERSECT 
                      (SELECT roleid FROM ua 
                       WHERE userid = vuserid2)); 
        IF (v_conf <> 0) THEN 
          raise_application_error(-20207,'Cannot insert user conflict - ' || 
                                         'both users are already associated ' || 
                                         'to conflicting roles.'); 
        END IF; 
      END IF; 
    ELSE 
      raise_application_error(-20206,'Cannot insert user conflict - ' || 
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                                     'the user conflict already exists.'); 
    END IF; 
  END LOOP; 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for the constraint of the permission conflict assignment. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER cpstatbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON cp 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.cpvalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.cpempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER cprowbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON cp 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.cpvalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.cpvalues (i).permid1 := :new.permid1; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.cpvalues (i).permid2 := :new.permid2; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER cpstatafter_trig 
AFTER INSERT ON cp 
DECLARE 
  vpermid1 cp.permid1%TYPE; 
  vpermid2 cp.permid2%TYPE; 
  v_exists NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_asso NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_conf NUMBER(38) := 0; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.cpvalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    -- We need to check for an empty table? 
    vpermid1 := wf_mutvars_pkg.cpvalues (i).permid1; 
    vpermid2 := wf_mutvars_pkg.cpvalues (i).permid2; 
    -- Check whether the permissions are the same. 
    IF vpermid1 = vpermid2 THEN 
      raise_application_error(-20220,'Cannot insert permission conflict - ' || 
                                     'both permissions are identical.'); 
    END IF; 
    -- Are they already conflicting? We don't worry about checking whether 
    -- id1 and id2 are in their respective places as the primary key 
    -- constraints will prevent that from occuring. 
    -- This also prevents the same permission from conflicting with itself. 
    SELECT count(1) INTO v_exists FROM cp 
    WHERE permid1 = vpermid2 AND permid2 = vpermid1; 
    IF (v_exists = 0) THEN 
      -- Doesn't exist yet so we can continue checking. 
      -- Check for permission-role associations for both permissions only. 
      -- If one of the permissions has no association yet then allow add. 
      SELECT COUNT(1) INTO v_asso FROM pa p1, pa p2 
      WHERE p1.permid = vpermid1 AND p2.permid = vpermid2; 
      IF (v_asso <> 0) THEN 
        -- Found some associations so go to step 3. 
        SELECT count(1) INTO v_conf FROM DUAL 
        WHERE EXISTS ((SELECT roleid FROM pa 
                           WHERE permid = vpermid2) 
                           MINUS 
                           (SELECT roleid FROM roles 
                            WHERE roleid IN (SELECT roleid2 FROM cr 
                                             WHERE roleid1 IN 
                                             (SELECT roleid FROM pa 
                                              WHERE permid=vpermid1) 
                                             UNION 
                                             SELECT roleid1 FROM cr 
                                             WHERE roleid2 IN 
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                                             (SELECT roleid FROM pa 
                                              WHERE permid=vpermid1)))); 
        IF (v_conf <> 0) THEN 
          raise_application_error(-20209,'Cannot insert permission ' || 
                                         'conflict - one or more of the ' || 
                                         'associated roles of the two ' || 
                                         'permissions are not conflicting.'); 
        END IF; 
      END IF; 
    ELSE 
      raise_application_error(-20208,'Cannot insert permission conflict ' || 
                                     '- permission conflict already exists.'); 
    END IF; 
  END LOOP; 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for the constraint of the task conflict assignment. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ctstatbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON ct 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.ctvalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.ctempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ctrowbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON ct 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.ctvalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.ctvalues (i).taskid1 := :new.taskid1; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.ctvalues (i).taskid2 := :new.taskid2; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ctstatafter_trig 
AFTER INSERT ON ct 
DECLARE 
  vtaskid1 ct.taskid1%TYPE; 
  vtaskid2 ct.taskid2%TYPE; 
  v_exists NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_asso NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_conf NUMBER(38) := 0; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.ctvalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    -- We need to check for an empty table? 
    vtaskid1 := wf_mutvars_pkg.ctvalues (i).taskid1; 
    vtaskid2 := wf_mutvars_pkg.ctvalues (i).taskid2; 
    -- Check whether the tasks are the same. 
    IF vtaskid1 = vtaskid2 THEN 
      raise_application_error(-20221,'Cannot insert task conflict - ' || 
                                     'both tasks are identical.'); 
    END IF; 
    -- Are they already conflicting? We don't worry about checking whether 
    -- id1 and id2 are in their respective places as the primary key 
    -- constraints will prevent that from occuring. 
    -- This also prevents the same task from conflicting with itself. 
    SELECT count(1) INTO v_exists FROM ct 
    WHERE taskid1 = vtaskid2 AND taskid2 = vtaskid1; 
    IF (v_exists = 0) THEN 
      -- Doesn't exist yet so we can continue checking. 
      -- Check for permission-role associations for both tasks only. 
      -- If one of the tasks has no association yet then allow add. 
      SELECT COUNT(1) INTO v_asso FROM ta t1, ta t2 
      WHERE t1.taskid = vtaskid1 AND t2.taskid = vtaskid2; 
      IF (v_asso <> 0) THEN 
        -- Found some associations so go to step 3. 
        SELECT count(1) INTO v_conf FROM DUAL 
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        WHERE EXISTS ((SELECT roleid FROM ta 
                           WHERE taskid = vtaskid2) 
                           MINUS 
                           (SELECT roleid FROM roles 
                            WHERE roleid IN (SELECT roleid2 FROM cr 
                                             WHERE roleid1 IN 
                                             (SELECT roleid FROM ta 
                                              WHERE taskid=vtaskid1) 
                                             UNION 
                                             SELECT roleid1 FROM cr 
                                             WHERE roleid2 IN 
                                             (SELECT roleid FROM ta 
                                              WHERE taskid=vtaskid1)))); 
        IF (v_conf <> 0) THEN 
          raise_application_error(-20211,'Cannot insert task conflict - ' || 
                                         'one or more of the associated ' || 
                                         'roles of the two tasks are not ' || 
                                         'conflicting.'); 
        END IF; 
      END IF; 
    ELSE 
      raise_application_error(-20210,'Cannot insert task conflict - ' || 
                                     'task conflict already exists.'); 
    END IF; 
  END LOOP; 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for ensuring integrity when deleting role conflict assignments. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER dcrstatbef_trig 
BEFORE DELETE ON cr 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.dcrvalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.dcrempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER dcrrowbef_trig 
BEFORE DELETE ON cr 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.dcrvalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.dcrvalues (i).roleid1 := :old.roleid1; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.dcrvalues (i).roleid2 := :old.roleid2; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER dcrstatafter_trig 
AFTER DELETE ON cr 
DECLARE 
  vroleid1 cr.roleid1%TYPE; 
  vroleid2 cr.roleid2%TYPE; 
  v_stop BOOLEAN := false; 
  v_exists NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_passo1 NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_passo2 NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_tasso1 NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_tasso2 NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_conf NUMBER(38) := 0; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.dcrvalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    vroleid1 := wf_mutvars_pkg.dcrvalues (i).roleid1; 
    vroleid2 := wf_mutvars_pkg.dcrvalues (i).roleid2; 
    -- Doesn't exist yet so we can continue checking. 
    -- Check for user-role associations. 
    SELECT count(1) INTO v_passo1 FROM pa 
    WHERE roleid = vroleid1; 
    SELECT count(1) INTO v_passo2 FROM pa 
    WHERE roleid = vroleid2; 
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    SELECT count(1) INTO v_tasso1 FROM ta 
    WHERE roleid = vroleid1; 
    SELECT count(1) INTO v_tasso2 FROM ta 
    WHERE roleid = vroleid2; 
    IF ((v_passo1 <> 0) AND (v_passo2 <> 0)) 
       OR ((v_tasso1 <> 0) AND (v_tasso2 <> 0)) THEN 
      -- Found some associations so go to step 3. 
      IF ((v_passo1 <> 0) AND (v_passo2 <> 0)) THEN 
      -- Check the permissions first. 
        SELECT count(1) INTO v_conf FROM DUAL 
        WHERE EXISTS ((SELECT permid FROM perms 
                       WHERE permid IN (SELECT permid2 FROM cp 
                                       WHERE permid1 IN (SELECT permid FROM pa 
                                                        WHERE roleid=vroleid1) 
                                       UNION 
                                       SELECT permid1 FROM cp 
                                       WHERE permid2 IN (SELECT permid FROM pa 
                                                        WHERE roleid=vroleid1))) 
                       INTERSECT 
                       (SELECT permid FROM pa 
                        WHERE roleid = vroleid2)); 
        IF (v_conf <> 0) THEN 
          v_stop := true; 
        END IF; 
      END IF; 
      v_conf := 0; 
      IF ((v_tasso1 <> 0) AND (v_tasso2 <> 0)) THEN -- check the tasks next. 
        SELECT count(1) INTO v_conf FROM DUAL 
        WHERE EXISTS ((SELECT taskid FROM tasks 
                       WHERE taskid IN (SELECT taskid2 FROM ct 
                                       WHERE taskid1 IN (SELECT taskid FROM ta 
                                                        WHERE roleid=vroleid1) 
                                       UNION 
                                       SELECT taskid1 FROM ct 
                                       WHERE taskid2 IN (SELECT taskid FROM ta 
                                                        WHERE roleid=vroleid1))) 
                       INTERSECT 
                       (SELECT taskid FROM ta 
                        WHERE roleid = vroleid2)); 
        IF (v_conf <> 0) THEN 
          v_stop := true; 
        END IF; 
      END IF; 
      IF (v_stop = true) THEN 
        raise_application_error(-20212,'Cannot delete role conflict - ' || 
                                       'the roles form part of associations ' || 
                                       'to tasks or permissions that will ' || 
                                       'become invalid if the role conflict ' || 
                                       'is deleted.'); 
      END IF; 
    END IF; 
  END LOOP; 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for the constraint of the role network association. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER rhstatbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON rh 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.rhempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER rhrowbef_trig 
BEFORE INSERT ON rh 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues (i).rolenetid := :new.rolenetid; 
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  wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues (i).parentid := :new.parentid; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues (i).childid := :new.childid; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER rhstatafter_trig 
AFTER INSERT ON rh 
DECLARE 
  e_rolenet_loop EXCEPTION; 
  PRAGMA EXCEPTION_INIT ( 
    e_rolenet_loop, -1436); 
  vrolenetid rh.rolenetid%TYPE; 
  vparentid rh.parentid%TYPE; 
  vchildid rh.childid%TYPE; 
  v_root1 NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_root2 NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_exists NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_circ NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_conf NUMBER(38) := 0; 
  v_count NUMBER(38) := wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues.COUNT; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    vrolenetid := wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues (i).rolenetid; 
    vparentid := wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues (i).parentid; 
    vchildid := wf_mutvars_pkg.rhvalues (i).childid; 
    -- If there is no root record for the current rolenet 
    -- (count - current records) then we cannot add the record 
    -- if the parentid is not null. 
    IF (vparentid IS NOT NULL) THEN 
      SELECT count(1) INTO v_root1 FROM rh 
      WHERE rolenetid = vrolenetid AND parentid IS NULL; 
      IF (v_root1 = 0) THEN 
        raise_application_error(-20216,'Cannot insert role into role ' || 
                                       'network - root role is missing ' || 
                                       'for the particular role network'); 
      END IF; 
    END IF; 
    -- Check for an existing root role. If one is found for the particular 
    -- role network then raise an error. 
    IF (vparentid IS NULL) THEN 
      -- Must subtract the count because the record is already in the table. 
      -- This of course assumes that there will only ever be one record 
      -- inserted at a time. Disable all triggers and constraints when doing 
      -- batch transfers. 
      SELECT count(1) - v_count INTO v_root2 FROM rh 
      WHERE rolenetid = vrolenetid AND parentid IS NULL; 
      IF (v_root2 > 0) THEN 
        raise_application_error(-20217,'Cannot insert role into role ' || 
                                       'network - root role already ' || 
                                       'exists for the particular role network.'); 
      END IF; 
    END IF; 
    -- Is parent role in the role network as a child? 
    -- If not then raise an error. 
    SELECT count(1) INTO v_exists FROM rh 
    WHERE rolenetid = rolenetid AND childid = vparentid; 
    -- Added extra checks to make the error message that 
    -- occurs better because the record is already in the 
    -- table. This screws up this check in cases when the 
    -- parentid = childid. Also check if it is root level. 
    IF ((v_exists <> 0) AND (vparentid <> vchildid)) OR (vparentid IS NULL) THEN 
      -- Will it cause a circular reference? Rely on an 
      -- exception to be raised when the sql statement 
      -- fails. If it doesn't fail then it will work just 
      -- fine. This works because the record is already in 
      -- the table when this trigger fires. 
      SELECT count(childid) INTO v_circ 
      FROM rh 
      WHERE childid <> vparentid 
      START WITH childid = vparentid AND rolenetid = vrolenetid 
      CONNECT BY PRIOR parentid = childid AND rolenetid = vrolenetid; 
      -- Don't worry about checking the result of the previous 
      -- SQL statement as it will not get to the next statement 
      -- if it failed. 
      -- Check whether any of the records in the role network 
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      -- are conflicting with the child we wish to add. We only 
      -- need to check the children in the role network. 
      SELECT count(1) INTO v_conf FROM DUAL 
      WHERE vchildid IN 
      (SELECT roleid FROM roles WHERE roleid IN 
        (SELECT roleid2 FROM cr WHERE roleid1 IN 
          (SELECT childid FROM rh WHERE rolenetid = vrolenetid) 
         UNION 
         SELECT roleid1 FROM cr WHERE roleid2 IN 
           (SELECT childid FROM rh WHERE rolenetid = vrolenetid))); 
      IF (v_conf > 0) THEN 
        raise_application_error(-20215,'Cannot insert role into role ' || 
                                       'network - conflicting role(s) ' || 
                                       'are already present in the role ' || 
                                       'network.'); 
      END IF; 
    ELSE 
      raise_application_error(-20213,'Cannot insert role into role ' || 
                                     'network - the parent role is not an ' || 
                                     'existing child role.'); 
    END IF; 
  END LOOP; 
EXCEPTION 
  WHEN e_rolenet_loop THEN 
    raise_application_error(-20214,'Cannot insert role into role ' || 
                                   'network - it will cause a circular ' || 
                                   'reference to occur.'); 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Triggers for ensuring the integrity when deleting role network associations. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER drhstatbef_trig 
BEFORE DELETE ON rh 
BEGIN 
  -- Empty the main PL/SQL table buffer. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.drhvalues := wf_mutvars_pkg.drhempty; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER drhrowbef_trig 
BEFORE DELETE ON rh 
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE 
  i NUMBER := wf_mutvars_pkg.drhvalues.COUNT + 1; 
BEGIN 
  -- Copy the row's values across to the PL/SQL table. 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.drhvalues (i).rolenetid := :old.rolenetid; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.drhvalues (i).parentid := :old.parentid; 
  wf_mutvars_pkg.drhvalues (i).childid := :old.childid; 
END; 
/ 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER drhstatafter_trig 
AFTER DELETE ON rh 
DECLARE 
  vrolenetid rh.rolenetid%TYPE; 
  vparentid rh.parentid%TYPE; 
  vchildid rh.childid%TYPE; 
  v_child NUMBER(38) := 0; 
BEGIN 
  FOR i IN 1..wf_mutvars_pkg.drhvalues.COUNT 
  LOOP 
    vrolenetid := wf_mutvars_pkg.drhvalues (i).rolenetid; 
    vparentid := wf_mutvars_pkg.drhvalues (i).parentid; 
    vchildid := wf_mutvars_pkg.drhvalues (i).childid; 
    -- Does it have children? 
    SELECT COUNT(parentid) INTO v_child 
    FROM rh 
    WHERE parentid = vchildid AND rolenetid = vrolenetid; 
    IF (v_child > 0) THEN --It has children so prevent it from been deleted. 
      raise_application_error(-20222,'Cannot delete role association - ' || 
                                     'children associations already ' || 
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                                     'exist for the role been deleted.'); 
    END IF; 
  END LOOP; 
END; 
/ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- End of SoDA integrity constraint rules. 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- SoDA Prototype Database Tables 
-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--Drop all constraints 
 
-- FK's for ua 
ALTER TABLE ua 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_userroleid; 
 
ALTER TABLE ua 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_useruserid; 
 
-- FK's for pa 
ALTER TABLE pa 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_permroleid; 
 
ALTER TABLE pa 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_permpermid; 
 
-- FK's for ta 
ALTER TABLE ta 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_taskroleid; 
 
ALTER TABLE ta 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_tasktaskid; 
 
-- FK's for cu 
ALTER TABLE cu 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_user1userid; 
 
ALTER TABLE cu 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_user2userid; 
 
-- FK's for cr 
ALTER TABLE cr 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_role1roleid; 
 
ALTER TABLE cr 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_role2roleid; 
 
-- FK's for cp 
ALTER TABLE cp 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_perm1permid; 
 
ALTER TABLE cp 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_perm2permid; 
 
-- FK's for ct 
ALTER TABLE ct 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_task1taskid; 
 
ALTER TABLE ct 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_task2taskid; 
 
-- FK's for rh 
ALTER TABLE rh 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_rolenetrolenetid; 
 
ALTER TABLE rh 
      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_parentroleid; 
 
ALTER TABLE rh 
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      DROP CONSTRAINT fk_childroleid; 
 
 
Drop Table tasks; 
Drop Table roles; 
Drop Table users; 
Drop Table perms; 
Drop Table rolenet; 
Drop Table rh; 
Drop Table cu; 
Drop Table cr; 
Drop Table cp; 
Drop Table ct; 
Drop Table ua; 
Drop Table pa; 
Drop Table ta; 
--End of Dropping SoDATables 
 
CREATE TABLE ta 
(      roleid       Number(38), 
       taskid       Number(38), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_ta PRIMARY KEY (roleid, taskid) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE pa 
(      roleid       Number(38), 
       permid       Number(38), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_pa PRIMARY KEY (roleid, permid) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE ua 
(      roleid       Number(38), 
       userid       Number(38), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_ua PRIMARY KEY (roleid, userid) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE ct 
(      taskid1      Number(38), 
       taskid2      Number(38), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_ct PRIMARY KEY (taskid1, taskid2) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE cp 
(      permid1      Number(38), 
       permid2      Number(38), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_cp PRIMARY KEY (permid1, permid2) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE cu 
(      userid1      Number(38), 
       userid2      Number(38), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_cu PRIMARY KEY (userid1, userid2) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE cr 
(      roleid1      Number(38), 
       roleid2      Number(38), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_cr PRIMARY KEY (roleid1, roleid2) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE rh 
(      rolenetid    Number(38) NOT NULL, 
       parentid     Number(38), 
       childid      Number(38) NOT NULL, 
       CONSTRAINT pk_rh UNIQUE (rolenetid, parentid, childid) 
-- Caused bad things: 
-- CONSTRAINT pk_rh PRIMARY KEY (rolenetid, parentid, childid) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE rolenet 
(      rolenetid    Number(38), 
       description  Varchar2(128), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_rolenet PRIMARY KEY (rolenetid) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE perms 
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(      permid       Number(38), 
       description  Varchar2(128), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_perms PRIMARY KEY (permid) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE users 
(      userid       Number(38), 
       description  Varchar2(128), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_users PRIMARY KEY (userid) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE roles 
(      roleid       Number(38), 
       description  Varchar2(128), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_roles PRIMARY KEY (roleid) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE tasks 
(      taskid       Number(38), 
       description  Varchar2(128), 
       CONSTRAINT pk_tasks PRIMARY KEY (taskid) 
); 
 
-- End of create tables 
 
--Beginning of Foreign Key constraints 
 
-- FK's for ua 
ALTER TABLE ua 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_userroleid FOREIGN KEY (roleid) 
          REFERENCES roles(roleid); 
 
ALTER TABLE ua 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_useruserid FOREIGN KEY (userid) 
          REFERENCES users(userid); 
 
-- FK's for pa 
ALTER TABLE pa 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_permroleid FOREIGN KEY (roleid) 
          REFERENCES roles(roleid); 
 
ALTER TABLE pa 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_permpermid FOREIGN KEY (permid) 
          REFERENCES perms(permid); 
 
-- FK's for ta 
ALTER TABLE ta 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_taskroleid FOREIGN KEY (roleid) 
          REFERENCES roles(roleid); 
 
ALTER TABLE ta 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_tasktaskid FOREIGN KEY (taskid) 
          REFERENCES tasks(taskid); 
 
-- FK's for cu 
ALTER TABLE cu 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_user1userid FOREIGN KEY (userid1) 
          REFERENCES users(userid) 
          ON DELETE CASCADE; 
 
ALTER TABLE cu 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_user2userid FOREIGN KEY (userid2) 
          REFERENCES users(userid) 
          ON DELETE CASCADE; 
 
-- FK's for cr 
ALTER TABLE cr 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_role1roleid FOREIGN KEY (roleid1) 
          REFERENCES roles(roleid) 
          ON DELETE CASCADE; 
 
ALTER TABLE cr 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_role2roleid FOREIGN KEY (roleid2) 
          REFERENCES roles(roleid) 
          ON DELETE CASCADE; 
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-- FK's for cp 
ALTER TABLE cp 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_perm1permid FOREIGN KEY (permid1) 
          REFERENCES perms(permid) 
          ON DELETE CASCADE; 
 
ALTER TABLE cp 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_perm2permid FOREIGN KEY (permid2) 
          REFERENCES perms(permid) 
          ON DELETE CASCADE; 
 
-- FK's for ct 
ALTER TABLE ct 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_task1taskid FOREIGN KEY (taskid1) 
          REFERENCES tasks(taskid) 
          ON DELETE CASCADE; 
 
ALTER TABLE ct 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_task2taskid FOREIGN KEY (taskid2) 
          REFERENCES tasks(taskid) 
          ON DELETE CASCADE; 
 
-- FK's for rh 
ALTER TABLE rh 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_rolenetrolenetid FOREIGN KEY (rolenetid) 
          REFERENCES rolenet(rolenetid); 
 
ALTER TABLE rh 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_parentroleid FOREIGN KEY (parentid) 
          REFERENCES roles(roleid); 
 
ALTER TABLE rh 
      ADD CONSTRAINT fk_childroleid FOREIGN KEY (childid) 
          REFERENCES roles(roleid); 
 
-- End of Foreign Key constraints 
 
-- Beginning of Sequence drop and create 
 
Drop Sequence seq_rolenet; 
Drop Sequence seq_perms; 
Drop Sequence seq_users; 
Drop Sequence seq_roles; 
Drop Sequence seq_tasks; 
 
CREATE SEQUENCE seq_rolenet; 
CREATE SEQUENCE seq_perms; 
CREATE SEQUENCE seq_users; 
CREATE SEQUENCE seq_roles; 
CREATE SEQUENCE seq_tasks; 
 
commit -- End of Create Sequences 
/ 
 
 
 
